CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

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Modern western European practices of racialized discrimination developed in the late medieval and early modern periods, but the concept of “race” has a much longer history in the West. This history, while unique to Europe and its territories, is important to consider even as we attempt to pay new attention to other geographical notions of difference between peoples, if only because the West has been the self-appointed culture of “modernity.” The idea of the Black Legend as a specific name for Spain’s colonial brutality in the Americas during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries dates from the early twentieth century. A Spanish journalist, Julián Juderías, coined the phrase “Black Legend” in 1912, protesting the characterization of Spain by other Europeans as a backward country of ignorance, superstition, and religious fanaticism that was unable to become a modern nation. Juderías rightly points to envious sixteenth-century Protestant hostility within Europe as the primary origin of such anti-Spanish sentiment, and it is the long-lasting legend of Spain’s unique brutality in the conquest of the New World that we seek to reconceptualize. Spain was not the only European power to carve an empire out of the New World; it was merely the first. A comparative study of the Dutch and Portuguese engagements in India as well as English projects in America allows us to put Spain’s actions into a new context. To add to that context the wider consideration of Chinese, Mughal, and Ottoman imperial arrangements before and during the western European expansions of the sixteenth century makes possible a global rereading of the very different racism of western European Renaissance empires. It was a racism that was subtended by religious differences and that not only helped to structure the imperial programs of sixteenth-century western European societies but also continued to structure western Europe’s thinking into the time of Emmanuel Kant, whose rehearsal of some of Las Casas’s sixteenth-century prescriptions about barbarians reveals how reverberant the concepts have been.
The Black Legend owes its own genesis to the course of three simultaneous events: the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from the Iberian Peninsula; the so-called discovery of America and the domination and exploitation of Indians and African slaves; and the privileged position in which Christianity found itself to create a classification in which Christians were one of the groups classified and, simultaneously, possessors of the privileged discourse that created the classification. Christianity’s originally nonexclusionary evangelism could be used to pointed imperial effect, as, for example, at the moment when the Inca Atahulapha threw down a religious book a Spanish priest had handed to him; because of his apparent rejection of the Christian God, the Spanish felt free to attack, firing into a crowd of unarmed people, ultimately overtaking the empire and enslaving the population. Ganzalo Lamana in chapter 7 chronicles the remarkable import of the varying redactions of this iconic moment in Spanish aggression against Peru. In contrast, as Leslie Peirce reveals in chapter 2, Ottoman rulers were required by Islamic law to protect the religious freedom of foreigners within their realms. While Ottoman emperors did force some conquered Christians to convert and also enslaved them, they drew Janissaries—their highest imperial administrators and their royal consorts—from this group. Both the Ottomans and the Chinese used castration to render conquered men useful for their imperial administrative purposes; in mid-fifteenth-century China, Muslim eunuchs rose to great power, but the famous maritime commander Zheng He, for example, a eunuch serving Emperor Zhu Di, was never required to relinquish his Islamic faith. Eastern empires were not without their repressive brutalities; they simply operated on very different axes from the Western empires.2

The links between religiously coded racism and color-coded racism were the consequences of early modern European imperial expansion in Africa, the subjugation of the indigenous populations of America, and the evolution of the ancient practice of slavery practiced by virtually all ancient peoples into the hugely profitable transatlantic slave trade, later monopolized throughout the eighteenth century by the British. Slavery had existed from time immemorial but had not been associated with color or had ever generated so much capital. The discourses of religious and racial difference in the European Renaissance became naturalized in the subsequent centuries and established the epistemic foundation of modern colonial racism. Although antecedents of the concept of race may be found in the remote history of humankind, the drastic qualitative conceptual shift in the sixteenth century (which in the eighteenth century was universalized as race and racism) is unprecedented. The history of racism as we know it today began to be articulated right then, in the sixteenth century, and there, in the Atlantic world.

Chapter One

By seeking to revisit the processes of global colonial domination in the context of the European debate about Spain’s New World empire, we hope to locate a historical intersection for the creation of stereotypes, classifications, or what Foucault called “dividing practices”—practices of enormous ideological and practical consequence in forging, justifying, and maintaining early modern regimes of domination and exploitation, whose shifting combinations continue to shape how we think and act in the world we inhabit today. We approach this intersection via a rereading of the Black Legend about the Spanish conquest of the Americas, itself a manifestation of imperial conflicts within Christian Europe. Placed in the wider context of a global system of imperial expansion that included Turkey, China, India, and Russia, we are in a better position to see how the distinct form of western European imperialism is marked by capitalist effects not much in evidence elsewhere: where the Chinese chose to extract tribute from newly contacted countries and showered the ambassadors with gifts often of greater value than the tribute, the massive appropriation of land on new continents by the Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, and finally the English, along with the massive exploitation of the labor of indigenous and imported nonindigenous peoples, created the conditions of a proper capitalist global market in newly valuable commodities (not merely the gold and silver found in the Americas but also the labor of extracting them itself). When seen in this global context capitalism clearly is not, properly, the creation of the industrial revolution but rather of the commodification of labor attendant upon western European colonial expansion into the Americas.

We do not in any way seek to downplay the devastating consequences for native populations in the Americas of European invasions of their lands, but we do seek to explore from a variety of perspectives how the concept of race as we understand it today began to emerge in the discourses of colonial otherness fostered by the global contest for empire. By juxtaposing the ways in which non-European sixteenth-century empires of the east—Chinese, Mughal, and Ottoman—constructed hierarchical differences within their own newly conquered or reorganized territories to those of the Western regimes, we hope better to understand the differential structures of empire and therefore also its distinctive means for compelling complicity in conquered populations. While Mughal and Ottoman emperors enslaved religious and ethnic others, and also transported and exploited the labor of specific ethnic populations, they did so to build their own dynastic power, not in the service of a widely dispersed search after monetary profit, open to any freelance adventuring individual as was the case with many of the Spanish conquistadors and, later, northern European colonists. The Ottomans de-
cided not to invest in New World exploration, and in the fifteenth century, the Chinese, while more capable than any empire of global conquest by their sheer maritime and technological superiority, chose not to extend their trade network and, indeed, elected to shut down the massive fleet of treasure ships they had built and to focus inward on internal developments. While freelance Chinese traders sailed the Indian Ocean both before and after the massively government-financed voyages of the early fifteenth century, commanded by the famous Muslim navigator Cheng He, their activities were mostly illicit and of little lasting consequence. The Eastern empires, in short, were not individualistically entrepreneurial and capitalistic, while the Western empires can be seen, in contrast, to be clearly so. In Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*, for example, a clownish character comments that when Londoners would not “give a doit to relieve a lame beggar they will lay out ten to see a dead Indian. Any strange beast” in England “makes a man.” In direct opposition to the cast of mind Trinculo reveals when he speculates on the money he could earn by making a profitable spectacle of the New World creature Caliban, the Chinese invited ambassadors from Africa to bring tribute directly to the emperor, including exotic animals such as giraffes. These ambassadors were lavishly entertained on luxurious ships the size of which would have allowed all three of Columbus’s galleons to be easily stored on deck (fig. 1.1). The ambassadors would have been received with great and elaborate ceremonies, allowed to trade with the populace, and received gifts in return from the emperor. In celebration of the success of the imperial treasure fleets under Zheng He, Emperor Zhu Di had a 240-foot-high porcelain pagoda built, costing 2.5 million ounces of silver. “Each story was fashioned with exactly the same number of tiles and the tiles became smaller as the graceful structure narrowed to a point. The base of the gilt finial at the top was twelve feet in diameter and was decorated with 152 porcelain bells that chimed in the wind. The finial itself, covered in gold leaf, shone brilliantly in the sun. Around the temple were beautiful gardens and exotic trees that Zheng He had brought back from his voyages.”

And, of course, like the Ottomans, the Ming emperors finally decided they had little interest in trade with territories so far removed from what they considered to be the center of the universe. The discourses constructed to deal with the differences Europeans perceived in the New World profoundly affected the way western Europe, at least, looked back at other Old World regimes and formed the basis for many orientalizing ideologies, completely misrecognizing the histories of their different imperial structures. By going back to the sixteenth-century site of the instantiation of so many imperial projects, we hope to be in a better position to critique the ideological after-
effects of their shared history, specifically the very different racist discourses constructed by the processes of empire in different places, to unravel their blindness to each others’ histories.

LAS CASAS

It is one of the first ironies of this history that the condemnations of the barbarity of Spain’s conquest were based from the mid-sixteenth century forward on its own questioning of the legitimacy of its imperial enterprise in America. The first important critiques of the conquest for its injustice and brutality to indigenous populations in the western hemisphere were actually voiced by Spanish missionaries in the New World. The most famous of them was the Dominican priest and bishop of Chiapas, Bartolomé de las Casas, who, after the failure of his legal arguments against the *encomienda* system of slave labor for the conquered indigenous peoples, published in Seville in 1552 the *Brevisima relación de la destrucción de las Indias* (A very short account of the destruction of the Indies). This volume would quickly become a cornerstone of the Black Legend, to be translated and republished over the centuries with each new conflict involving Spain and its European rivals or American colonies. The first translation, into French, as *Tyrannies et cruautez des Espagnols, perpetrees ès Indes Occidentales* by the Fleming Jacques de Miggrode,
appeared in Antwerp in 1578 with a notice that it was “To serve as example and warning to the seventeen provinces of the Low Countries,” where Philip II’s governors, particularly the Duke of Alba, had been dealing out harsh punishments for religious dissent and separatist rebellion against Spanish rule. Anti-Catholic and protonationalist sentiments fed the growth of the Black Legend in England. The repetition of the Black Legend would serve the interests of the rival Dutch and English empires belatedly contesting Spanish imperial dominance in the Americas. It was, as Fernández Retamar (1989, 63) points out, a weapon in an interimperial struggle. The Black Legend would have another revival in the early nineteenth century, inspired by the wars of independence against Spain by the Latin American colonies, and yet again in 1898, now centering in the United States and connected to the so-called Spanish-American War.

Translated into English as The Spanish Colonie in 1583, Las Casas’s own Spanish and Catholic identity was ignored so that the tract formed the basis of a wholesale denunciation of the Spanish imperial project. A century later, when at the treaty of Utrecht in 1714 England gained the Asiento and took over the monopoly of the African slave trade, Spain still carried on its shoulders the imprint of the cruelty so famously denounced by Las Casas. It was African ex-slaves who testified to the fact that northern European colonists were just as vicious as their Iberian counterparts. Published in 1787, Quobna Ottobah Cugoano’s Thoughts and Sentiments on the Evil of Slavery made clear that from the point of view of the colonial subject there was no difference between Spanish and British domination. He observed, “The French and English, and some other nations in Europe, as they founded settlements and colonies in the West Indies or in America, went on in the same manner, and joined hand in hand with the Portuguese and Spaniards, to rob and pillage Africa, as well as to waste and desolate the inhabitants of the western continent” (1787, 73).

If we can say that Las Casas’s tract formed the basis of an anti-Spanish tradition among other European powers—which resistances like Cugoano’s did little to change—we can also trace a second important strand of European discourse about racial difference to Las Casas as well. This second text by Las Casas provides the context for understanding what we normally think of as racial difference in the Renaissance empires. In his epilogue to the Apologética Historia Sumaria (1552), Las Casas defines four types of “barbarians.” Briefly, the first and third types of barbarians are very similar. The first places greatest emphasis on ferocious individuals, while the third underlines communities living close to a state of nature, a point similar to the bases on which Hobbes and Locke will build their political theories—but that could
also be found in Aristotle’s *Politics*. The second and fourth types of barbarians clearly establish the foundation of modern/colonial and Western racism. They are defined by one main criterion and described as *barbarie negativa* (negative barbarism): all those who “lack” some key civilizing element—or sometimes have it in excess—are barbarous. All non-Latin empires, as well as the Inca and Aztec empires, may have been in Las Casas’s mind when defining this second type, for such barbarians are characterized by the lack of “literal locution,” by which Las Casas means a lack of “Latinity.” Deploying the full force of the humanist Renaissance recovery of Roman imperial power, Las Casas here instantiates a key point in Renaissance consolidation of European superiority by means of alphabetic writing and of Latin as the language closest to God. The conjunction of both ruled out Turkic, Arabic, Hebrew, and Russian and because, although they may all be alphabetic languages, none of them derive directly from Latin (English may pose a special case, being of Germanic base but having been conquered by French, a Latin tongue). The consequences of this move by Las Casas were profound: in casting aside ancient languages such as Arabic, Turkic, Hebrew, and Chinese, as well as non-Christian and noncapitalist empires, it cast aside the Islamic and the Ottoman empires. He may not have realized that he was also casting aside the emerging Russian empire, at that moment consolidating itself with Ivan the Terrible’s rise to power—curiously enough, during the very same years that Elizabeth I and Philip II took over Spain and England. More to the point, neither the Aztecs nor the Incas had literal locution, and so in this respect, both could be classified/categorized as the second type of barbarians.

Although Las Casas is not clear about it, none of the four types of barbarians seem to be found in western Christendom, which was quickly being transformed into Europe. In this respect, Las Casas’s barbarians in the age of Christian imperialism became one template for Immanuel Kant’s racial classification of the ethnocontinental tetragon, this time based essentially on skin color: yellow Asia, black Africa, red America, and white Europe. For Kant as for Las Casas, none of the people inhabiting the globe outside of Europe—beyond Germany, France, and England—were apt to understand a central literary tradition, which for Kant was understood to be the beautiful and the sublime; the level of all non-Europeans’ rationality thus becomes questionable. Such is the Kantian version of Las Casas’s second type of barbarians—those lacking literal locution. In the later half of the eighteenth century Kant said, following Hume, “Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even been set free, still not a single
one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any
other praise-worthy quality, even though among the whites some continually
rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn respect in
the world” (1991, 111).

Las Casas’s fourth type of barbarian—comprising all those who did not
have the right religion (such as the Moors, the Chinese, and all those living
in South Asia)—was equally central for the Renaissance invention of colo-
nial difference. They could not have religion because their infidel souls had
been taken and dominated by the devil, the prime example of which were the
Indians of the New World. That is why conversion was the necessary impe-
rial “civilizing” mission. The four types of barbarian “comprende todos aque-
llos que carecen de verdadera religion y fe cristiana, conviene a saber, todos
los infieles, por muy sabios y prudentes filósofos y políticos que sean. La
razón es porque no hay alguna nación (sacando las de los cristianos) que no
tenga y padezca muchos y muy grandes defectos, y barbaricen en sus leyes,
costumbres, vivienda y policías [. . . ]” (1967, 2:645). [include all those who
lack true religion and Christian faith; in other words, all infidels, however
wise and prudent philosophers or politicians they might be. The reason is
that there is no nation (apart from Christian ones) that does not have and
suffer many great defects and barbarities in its laws, customs, housing and
policies.] There is thus a double implication of the racial underpinnings of
the Black Legend. One is the superiority of European culture to the rest of
the world, and the other is the construction of an imperial difference, inter-
nal to Europe, that Immanuel Kant also articulates when he argues how civ-
ilized the British are and how absurd and leaning toward the uncivilized the
Spanish are. Kant argues, for example, in his papers On the Beautiful and the
Sublime and in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, that the Spanish
possess a second-class European national character only slightly better than
the Orientals: “The Spaniard, who evolved from the mixture of European
blood with Arabian (Moorish) blood, displays in his public and private be-
havior a certain solemnity; and even the peasant expresses a consciousness
of his own dignity toward his master, to whom he is lawfully obedient” (1978,
231). That is for Kant the “good” side of the Spaniards. As for the bad side,
“The Spaniard’s bad side is that he does not learn from foreigners; that he
does not travel in order to get acquainted with other nations; that he is cen-
turies behind in sciences. He resists any reform; he is proud of not having to
work” (1978, 231). Sentiment against Spaniards for being “tainted” by
Moorish and Semitic blood predated the Renaissance conquests and also
the completion of Spain’s reconquest, so Kant’s assumption of the Spanish
mixed-blood origins is of longer duration than the Renaissance prejudice.
Spain had long served as Europe’s racialized internal other. For example, Geoffrey of Monmouth’s twelfth-century formulation of the legend of King Arthur in the *Historia Regum Britanniae* works to distance a painful episode in Christian history, the desperate degradation of the Christian forces’ practice of cannibalism in Syria during the first Crusade. He transforms the crusaders’ cannibalism into a battle Arthur wages with two anthropophagous giants who invade Europe, one of whom is of Spanish origin. According to Geraldine Heng (2003, 5), this constituted a double writing to indict Islam, relating Muslim Spain with Syria to distance the memory of cannibalism from England and from Christians. Fernández Retamar (1989) notices the persistence of the racial othering of Spain and its extension to Latin America when he cites Alexandre Dumas’s classic formulation of the cliché, “Africa begins at the Pyrenees.” Retamar points out the persistence of this form of the Black Legend itself as a form of racism, evident in the common use in the United States of the words “Hispanic” and “Latino” as classified with other “people of color.”

A vivid illustration of the “denigration” of the Spanish can be seen in Theodor de Bry’s engraving for the frontispiece of Part V of *America* (fig. 1.2). Printed in 1595, the volume published John Benzoni’s narration of Spaniards’ cruelty to the Indians and their use of slaves imported from Africa. As Patricia Gravatt carefully argues in chapter 12 of this volume, de Bry actually had a more nuanced view of the Spanish than the engraving itself reveals. But the engraving does make clear the way in which the Spanish soldiers are seen to become indistinguishable from their Negro slaves as they all toil, with bulging buttocks, up the left side of the engraving. Perhaps even more pertinently than the shared toil, the Africanized features, including the flattened nose of one of the Spanish conquistadors scrambling down the right side of the mountain, differs markedly from the Spanish noblemen at the base of the engraving, where the pope divides up the New World between Portugal and Spain. So too, the cross being planted on top of the mountain, seen slanted backward as if in perspective, radically distorts the Christian symbolism of the Catholic civilizing process as seen by the hostile Protestant eye.

### RACE AND RELIGION IN SPAIN BEFORE AND AFTER THE RECONQUEST

Spain is indeed a crucial site in the history of the concept of race and the practice of racial discrimination, from the late medieval period on through its empire building and colonization. Race in medieval Spain was not color coded, however, but was defined as a descent group or lineage, or as a given
1.2 Theodore de Bry, frontispiece to Volume V of America (Frankfurt, 1595). Yale Collection of Western Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library.
religious identity. The religiously based definition assumed an increasingly racialized character by the late Middle Ages, and a categorization by class or estate would be added to definitions of race by the late seventeenth century.

Whether or not the *convivencia* (literally, “living together”) of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in medieval Spain constituted a culture of tolerance or cohabitation of convenience or one of necessity remains a matter of dispute. María Rosa Menocal (2002) paints southern Spain under the Islamic Umayyad dynasty as a “first-rate place” of tolerance, in which Islamic respect for dhimmi (people of the Book) fostered beneficent interfaith relations that were acknowledged and to an extent perpetuated by Christian kings from Alfonso VI to Alfonso X even as the Christian reconquest advanced. David Nirenberg (1996) and Joseph Pérez (2000), however, discount the existence of real tolerance between the three religious communities, each of which believed itself the possessor of the one true faith, which it was obliged to defend. Religious affiliation in medieval Europe meant membership in the community into which one was born, as a Muslim, Jew, or Christian, and ethnic and religious strife were generally inseparable. Nevertheless, intermarriages did occur, and Nirenberg (1996) maintains that at least in the Crown of Aragon, prior to the 1391 wave of anti-Semitic violence, there is little evidence of anxiety about the conservation of racial purity. According to Christian doctrine, all human beings were children of Adam and Eve, and the objective was their conversion.

Just what caused the breakdown of this at least relative tolerance? Menocal’s (2002) narrative implies that a key factor was the successive invasion of two fanatic groups of North African Berbers into southern Spain after the breakup of the Umayyad caliphate when the domains of the taifa (party) kings were shrinking before the Christian advance. Under the repressive Berber regimes, not only mozárabes (Christians living in Arab realms) but also Jews migrated north into the Christian realms. Jews—at their maximum point comprising close to 5 percent of the population of Iberia, the largest contingent of Jews in medieval Europe—were welcomed and valued for their learning, for their language skills, and as a financial and administrative resource for the royalty. Jews lived under the direct jurisdiction of Christian royalty and were dependent on their protection. In the fourteenth century, a series of bad harvests, the Black Death that ravaged all Europe, and political turmoil set the scene for a devastating wave of anti-Semitic violence in 1391. Economic resentment and something like class warfare played a part in the scapegoating of Jews for their role as lenders to Christians; they were accused of causing the plague by poisoning wells, of alliance with the devil, of ritual killing of Christian children, and similar atrocities. As
large-scale conversions of terrified Jews followed, the same suspicions and resentments would eventually be turned against _conversos_ (converted Jews). The infamous statutes of _limpieza_ (purity of blood) that denied public and church offices to those of Jewish and Muslim ancestry were also rooted as much in class interests as in religious concerns, as the aristocracy sought to limit competition for the positions it had traditionally dominated and as commoners who had risen by dint of talent and education retaliated by requiring proof of blood purity of an aristocracy that had intermarried with wealthy _converso_ families.\(^{13}\) The “Catholic kings” had continued to protect Jews and rely on Jewish financiers, who bankrolled the last stages of the reconquest. Yet, a mere two months after the capitulation of Granada in 1492, on the grounds that their continuing presence encouraged secretive practice of Judaism on the part of the _conversos_, Isabela decreed the expulsion of all Jews in Spain who did not convert.

A similar process of a shifting balance of power and the difficulty of integrating a large Muslim population under Christian authority led to the revocation of protection for newly conquered Muslims, when it was only the owners of large landed estates in Aragon and Andalusia who depended on their labor. Forced conversion proved even less effective than it had in the case of the Jews, and the _moriscos_ (converted Muslims) rebelled at mounting pressure to abandon their language and culture as well as their religion. So too, large-scale resettlement of _moriscos_ among northern Christian populations also caused economic resentment. Fears that they were a fifth column within Spain who might call on assistance from North African Muslims and the Turks culminated in the 1609 expulsion of the _moriscos_, against the objection of numerous theologians and two popes, who argued that they were at least technically Christians and that they represented no real danger to Spain.

**DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS OF RACE**

The historical context of the publication of the first Spanish dictionary of Sebastian de Covarrubias Orozco in 1611 was therefore fraught with a profoundly negative attitude toward converted Jews and Muslims. In this dictionary we find _raza_ defined as, “La casta de caballos castizos, a los cuales señalan con hierro para que sean conocidos.... Raza, en los linajes se toma en mala parte, como tener alguna raza de moro o judío.” [The breed of thoroughbred horses, which are branded with an iron so that they can be known. ... Race in [human] lineages is understood pejoratively, as having some Moorish or Jewish race.] As this reference to the branding of thoroughbred horses implied, there was in fact no truly reliable way of distin-
guishing pure breeding that was visible to the naked eye, hence the need for making a visible mark by branding.\textsuperscript{14} Men are distinguished only by a “lineage” centered on religious “race,” where race is the inmixing of something other and equally invisible.

The expanded definition of \textit{raza} in Real Academia Española’s 1734 \textit{Diccionario de Autoridades} demonstrates the further development of the concept of a religioethnically based notion of race and reveals the same hardening of genealogical attitude as Kant’s. It repeats the definitions given by the early seventeenth-century dictionary but further emphasizes the threatened nature of “pure breeding”: “Casta o calidad del origin o linage. Hablando de los hombres, se toma mui regularmente en mala parte. Es del Latino \textit{Radix}. \textit{Latino Genus. Stirps. Etiam genus macula, vel ignominia.” [Breed or quality of origin or lineage. In speaking of men, it is regularly used pejoratively. From Latin \textit{Root. Genus. Stock. Even a stain on the breed, or ignominy.]} The examples that this early eighteenth-century dictionary provides are telling. The first is drawn from the statutes of the Order of Calatrava, one of the military-religious orders founded in the twelfth century to advance the Christian reconquest of Muslim lands in Spain: “Ordenamos y mandamos que ninguna persona, de qualquiera calidad y condición que fuere, sea recibida a la dicho Orden, ni se le dé el Hábito, sino fuere Hijodalgo, al fuero de España, de partes de padre y madre y de abuelos de entrambas partes, y de legítimo matrimonio nacido, y que no le toque \textit{raza} de Judío, Moro, Hereje, ni Villano.” [We order and decree that no person, of whatever quality or condition, be received in the said Order, nor be given its Habit, unless he be of noble descent, according to the law of Spain, on the part of father and mother and grandparents of both, and born of legitimate marriage, and not tainted by the \textit{race} of Jew, Moor, Heretic, or Lowborn.]

The second example is drawn from the 1600 \textit{History of Spain} of the Jesuit historian Juan de Mariana and makes equally clear the problem of intermixture and bastardization: “No de otra manera que los sembrados y animales, la \textit{raza} de los hombres, y casta, con la propiedad del Cielo y de la tierra, sobre todo con el tiempo se muda y se embastarda.” [Not differently from sown fields and animals, the \textit{race} and caste of men, with the influence of the heavens and the earth and above all over time, changes and is bastardized.] Such definitions, discounting the possibility of true religious conversion or full assimilation to the dominant culture, register a religioethnic racism, as Frederickson (2002) has defined it: “when differences that might otherwise be considered ethnocultural are regarded as innate, indelible, and unchangeable . . . a racist attitude or ideology can be said to exist.” Some scholars have attributed the anxiously inquisitorial society of early modern
Spain in the wake of the expulsion and/or forced conversion of Jews and Muslims to the deeply problematic invisibility of true faith. The Inquisition then becomes a futile attempt to read in the bodies of the converted any tell-tale sign of impurity, in body and blood as well as in religious practice. Black skin, despite the symbolic linkage of black with death and evil, carried few generalized negative connotations for a medieval Europe with little contact with blacks. As the representation of one of the Magi as black and the legend of Prester John demonstrate, blackness was exotic and could be coded positively. The very lack of visible signs that so troubled the Inquisition indeed shows the difference between this earlier instantiation of religiously raced difference and later versions of racism attendant upon the hugely profitable African slave trade.

SUMMARY

Although not named until the twentieth century, the Black Legend was created when Spain’s enemies took Spain’s own internal debates about its identity and “purity of blood” and the morality of its behavior in the New World and constructed an image of the Spanish as violent and close to barbarians. The image of the Spaniards that the Black Legend helped to create was similar to the first type of barbarian described by Las Casas. But of course, it was impossible for Las Casas to think that Christian Spaniards would belong to any category of barbarian, as he was operating on the premise of the superiority of Western Christians. For Las Casas, the problem the Spaniards had in the New World was an in-house problem that needed to be cleared up, but it could in no way confuse them with the “barbarians out there.” From the perspective of the northern Europeans, in contrast, the difference was more imperial than colonial (although the Dutch, colonized by Spain, had a different motive and used Spanish New World barbarity to legitimize their political rebellion). For England it was a difference among equals, even if those in the south were Catholic. There was, however, a fifth type of barbarian belonging to a category Las Casas termed the “barbarie contraria.” To the fifth type belong, states Las Casas, all those who hate Christianity and want to destroy it. Las Casas may well have included northern Christians, the Lutherans and Calvinists, in this category, along with the followers of Islam. Las Casas wrote the Apologética Historia Sumaria in defense of the Indians during the years of the Council of Trent, so that the Counter-Reformation moment is a clear context for his thinking about “differences” among barbarians around the globe.
Yet even a barbarian of the fifth sort, such as Suleyman the Magnificent, would not yet have been racially denigrated. There would have been no doubt in the minds of the Spaniards living in the first half of the sixteenth century that Suleyman the Magnificent had the same stature as Charles V. Both men came to prominence during the same years and established the imperial foundations of both the Ottoman and the Spanish empires. If we consider the history of their two empires after Suleyman and Charles V, we see the multiple uses of Las Casas’s rhetoric: in time, both the Ottoman and Spanish empires succumbed to the growing power of a capitalist Anglophone imperial project. Five centuries later, Spain elected to withdraw from the war against Islam being waged by Anglophone powers facing the menace of Islam in present-day Iraq. Which is the “barbarie contraria” of the twenty-first century?

The book begins with the section on empires in the East because the two empires in question offer a remarkably different perspective on imperial organization from that based on western New World conquests; thus they offer a usefully “estranging frame” for our rereading of the Black Legend. The two chapters in part I, titled “Two Empires of the East,” one on the Ottoman Empire and the other on the Mughal Empire, provide this useful frame—but it would be irresponsible not to offer some comment on the vast expansion China also undertook at this time and from which they inexplicably turned away. Under emperor Zhu Di in the first decades of the fifteenth century, seven expeditionary navies were sent out around the world, commanded by Zheng He, a Muslim eunuch captain loyal to the emperor, to set up an elaborate tribute system and to map all the oceans of the globe. The records for four of these expeditions reveal that the treasure ships reached Africa (Kenya and Somalia), India, Arabia, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea and carried ambassadors back and forth to China as part of a vast trading system. Apparently, the records from two of the last voyages were destroyed, according to Gavin Menzies (2002), because the Mandarins turned so violently against Zhu Di’s costly programs of internal and external expansions. He had moved the Chinese capital to Beijing and built the Forbidden City, had rebuilt and lengthened the Grand Canal between Beijing and Nanking, and had vastly enlarged the navy, including the construction of the treasure ships themselves. Built of teak and mahogany, the ships were huge, each requiring three hundred acres of forest to be felled. Zhu Di’s policies meant that...
China’s colony Vietnam was deforested, causing a major uprising and the loss of the colony. Carrying between five hundred and one thousand sailors, the expeditionary galleons stretched 400 feet in length and were 160 feet wide; they easily dwarfed Columbus’s ships (see fig. 1.1). Zhu Di commissioned more than two hundred fifty treasure ships, making the Chinese fleet by far the largest in the world.

Menzies (2002) argues that it was only Zhu Di’s fleet that had the capacity to map the entire world and to produce the maps that clearly predate Columbus’s voyages; he provocatively argues that on the two missing voyages, the Chinese did map all the ocean shores—as the emperor had commanded—and had reached the west coast of the Americas (from Oregon to Tierra de Fuego), rounded the Cape of Good Hope, sailed to western Africa, and built a navigational tower in Newport, Rhode Island. While such a hypothesis remains as yet unproven, there is some evidence to suggest that contact was made between South America and the Chinese before Columbus arrived. If it is ever proven to be so, Columbus’s lifelong insistence that he had discovered China will make a bit more sense. And even if the Chinese did not make contact with the Americas, it is certain that they had explored a major part of the world and that, like western Europe during the fourteenth century, they had experienced huge economic and social shifts that included outward reaching into an unknown world. With its government-planned expeditions, requiring vast outlays of men and resources, China finally decided that the effort to maintain trade with the underdeveloped (compared to China) world was not worth it, thus leaving the way clear for the tiny, ragged, individualistic, and entrepreneurial “conquests” of the western Europeans. As a Muslim, Zeng He was allowed to make one last voyage to Mecca in 1433 in deference to his naval achievements under the former emperor. But after that, the Chinese fleet faded into oblivion. We begin, then, with a section on empires in the East not only because their modern offspring today offer a powerful challenge to the hegemony of the west but also because their sixteenth-century imperial structures are so different from the organization of dominance based on western New World conquests and on the emergence of modern/colonial capitalism.

In chapter 2, titled “An Imperial Caste: Inverted Racialization in the Architecture of Ottoman Sovereignty,” Leslie Peirce argues that the Ottomans, far from abjecting subjugated colonial others, instead used enslaved, converted Christians from the borders of their empire to create an elite ruling caste with which the Ottomans continuously intermarried for six centuries of remarkably stable rule. The Ottoman rulers, however, never married out to other royal dynasties; this endogamous and self-perpetuating unit bu—
rehoursically controlled an expanding polyglot empire, which allowed the conquered kingdoms to retain their various cultural differences unconverted and so remained densely hybrid in nature. This super-elite “kul” class of enslaved Christians was forced to convert to Islam and then trained in the arts of Ottoman rule; such a process produced the pool from which all the administrative pashas, elite Janissary troops, and royal concubines were drawn. Peirce argues that by such a means, the Ottomans avoided the specter that in 1556 broke up, for example, the European Hapsburg Empire into its Austrian and Spanish halves. In forcing the conversion of Christian slaves, the Ottomans freely transgressed the Islamic law that required Muslim rulers to protect people of different faiths within their domains. This single instance of such illegality freed the Ottomans to obey the rule throughout the rest of the empire, where people of radically divergent devotional practices were protected and embraced. Peirce points out that, had the Ottomans extended their rule to the New World (which they specifically declined to do), they would have been required by their customary structures to allow, for example, Aztec and Inca rulers to reign as Ottoman magistrates. It would also have been illegal to convert indigenous peoples from their native religions. Self-conscious inheritors of the legacy of the Roman empire—so much so that they called their domains “Rumi”—the Ottomans ruled in a manner that projects, as Peirce puts it, an “inverted” mirror image of racial and religious hierarchy from the western Renaissance empires.

Addressing the similarly multicultural nature of the Mughal Empire in India during the sixteenth century, Ruby Lal argues in chapter 3 that the increasing invisibility—and number—of women in the imperial harem in Mughal India marked the changing claims by the sultan to a differentiating divinity. A hegemonic withdrawal symbolized by the architecture of the harem building itself, the secreting of the women (and the sultan’s power) allowed Hindu and Muslim ritual practices to coexist so that the two cultures could be connected, out of sight but joined within the most powerful center. This mixing of cultures, and the dominance of one over the other, took place behind the mystifying screens of the harem itself, as the hiddenness of gender became a suitable discourse for the occlusion of cultural conflict.

Part II, “Spain: Conquista and Reconquista,” concerns the Iberian Peninsula and its global reach to the New World, with the Spanish conquests of Mexico and Peru. Before beginning a discussion of those outward conquests, however, it is necessary to understand the medieval prehistory of the Iberian Renaissance empires, especially with respect to the question of racial difference. David Nirenberg thus opens part II with a discussion of the medieval problem of the Jews: were they, in fact, a separate race, or were they simply
a different religious ethnicity or caste? Deftly summarizing the modern question of race and racialization, Nirenberg works to conserve the term for use in the Middle Ages—however different its use might have been then—in order to understand the history of race and how, indeed, medieval people worked to “naturalize” their own histories of social conflict.

Further complicating the question of racial difference within the peninsula itself, in chapter 5, titled “The Spanish Race,” Barbara Fuchs argues for an enduring fascination with Moorish culture in the construction of Spanish identity itself. So persistent was “maurophilia”—even in the face of the violent expulsions of the reconquista—that a hidden “Orient within” continuously reveals itself in multiple identifications of Spanish with specifically Moorish dress and cultural fashions. “Turkish” or Islamic turbans, for example, as Fuchs points out, were worn as part of Spanish national costumes, and the endurance of many other Muslim cultural styles (of eating, of interior decoration, etc.) enabled an “orientalizing” of Spain. Other emerging European nations could use the cultural persistence of Muslim “blackness” within Spain to ward off its looming imperial and cultural threat. The Black Legend could be used in Fuchs’s careful formulation, then, “to stigmatize Spain, in Spain’s own terms, by reinscribing the presence of the Moors as a racial taint.” Northern Europe then was able, through time, to use the complicated persistence of Moorishness within Spanish self-identity to denigrate Spain as the black other of its northern European self.

Irene Silverblatt in chapter 6 demonstrates the power of racialized peninsular thinking as it was transformed by Spain’s colonial experiences in the New World. In 1639 in Lima, Peru, two different individuals were burned at the stake: a wealthy merchant and a female mulatta slave. Both were accused of “unholy” relations with the native Andeans. In the case of the wealthy merchant, Perez, suspicion fell on him because he was a “New Christian,” a Jewish convert. Silverblatt points out the typical paranoid blending of Judaic ritual and native practice in the inquisitorial mind when Perez was accused of engaging in Jewish rituals with tobacco and cola nuts. The case of the woman, burnt as a witch, pointed to fears among colonial administrators that women would “go native,” adopting Indian dress, manners, and, ultimately, worship of Incan deities. The etiology of fear and blame created by colonial administrators in Peru used a racialized vision to confuse the differences among caste categories, religious practices, and nationalist sentiments.

By revisiting the many different printed versions of Pizarro’s confrontation with the Inca emperor Atahualpa in the plaza of Cajamarca on November 16, 1532, Gonzalo Lamana in chapter 7 argues for the evolving—and contrasting—perspectives on the catastrophic moment from the point of
view of the Spanish conquistadors, of the Inca elite themselves, and of subsequent propagandistic deployments in the Anglophone world.

Taking as their focus the persistence of indigenous culture, particularly in Mayan and Mexican contexts, SilverMoon and Michael Ennis argue in chapter 8 that one assumption of the Black Legend—that the Spanish conquest utterly annihilated indigenous culture—is wrong and that the postconquest period can usefully be thought of as a moment when Mexican and Mayan elites actively collaborated in the creation of postconquest Indian cultures. Paying close attention to the process by which the famous Florentine Codex was created, SilverMoon and Ennis argue that its author relied on a Nahua elite—leaders, informants, interpreters, and scholars—who collectively managed to tell their side of the story. The story was slanted toward the interests of those who had been earlier conquered by the Aztecs and who were, therefore, critical of them. SilverMoon and Ennis name the individual men who were educated at the famous school in Mexico City, who commented from their own indigenous perspective and with cosmopolitan sophistication on many global matters, including England’s Protestant Reformation under Henry VIII. As SilverMoon and Ennis point out, “Nahua culture survived [during the Renaissance] in forms exceeding the stereotype of a provincial peasantry.”

Using Raymond Williams’ schematic formula for social change—of dominant, residual, and emergent cultural forms—Yolanda Fabiola Orquera argues in chapter 9 that it is possible to see three distinct periods of cultural development in Central and South America after the Spanish conquest. The first period is of imperial peninsular consolidation out of the initial conflicts articulated by the Sepulveda/Las Casas debates—Sepulveda’s humanist-based, protocapitalist, and modernizing understanding of the indigenous American populations as profit-based labor power versus Las Casas’s more medieval sense of the people as fellow humans, capable of conversion, with their own undeniable rights. After the ideology of domination was consolidated, a second phase occurred in which indigenous residual forms began to play a part. Orquera locates the residue in the distinctive manner by which indigenous peoples sought to interweave themselves into the fabric of the dominant Spanish ideology, much as they had earlier handled ethnic conflict and difference among themselves before the conquest. In this mode of appropriation, just as before the conquest when the victors in a war had “interwoven” the myths of the conquered into their own rituals, various indigenous writers created alphabetical texts that simultaneously deployed older pictorial techniques to imagine real agency for the impoverished Indian subject. The final period of “emergence” goes beyond our period of the Renais-
sance, but, Orquera argues, the emergent forms of colonial and postcolonial expression owe much to the earlier “residual” attempts of interweaving indigenous cultural practices.

Kathryn Burns, in chapter 10, titled “Unfixing Race,” examines the persistence of racism by focusing on the supposedly fixed categories of race as shifting markers whose evolution responds both to very local conditions and tensions and to far-flung imperial rivalries as well as to the drive to consolidate a Spanish absolutist state grounded on a militant and intolerant Christianity. Arriving in America fresh from the end of the reconquest of Granada, Columbus described the Indians by reference to Moors, and early modern Spanish dictionaries, as discussed above, defined “race” in terms of impurity of both breeding and religious faith. Yet the very terms shifted according to who used them and when and where they did so. Burns examines the use in colonial Peru of the words creole, mestizo, mulato, and puka kunka (red neck) from the perspective of the subjects wielding them rather than in relation to the human object whom they purportedly labeled.

To begin part III, “Dutch Designs,” Carmen Nocentelli turns her attention in chapter 11 to the Portuguese trading empire in India to describe a Portuguese version of the Black Legend there. The creation, at least at first, of a Dutch traveler, Jan Huygen van Linschoten, in his Itinerario (1596), the Portuguese Black Legend concerned the marked decline in the Portuguese maritime empire due to the tendency of the colonists to go native, pushed to the brink of moral bankruptcy by “Oriental” influences and especially by the allure of native women. At first the Portuguese Crown had encouraged interethnic unions as a means for creating stable colonial societies, but toward the end of the sixteenth century such practices had become suspect, leading to an effeminization and degeneration of the colonial population, causing even castigos, or creole, native-born European children, to acquire a different skin color. Nocentelli notes that as a Protestant Dutchman, Linschoten unsurprisingly insists upon the need of all Europeans, not merely the Portuguese, to remain constantly vigilant in disciplining the self against the dangers of foreign seduction, a program Nocentelli finds most compellingly offered in the foreign techniques of Indian sati and Chinese foot binding, each of which Linschoten praises and which represent, she argues, “training procedures that supercede mere repression.”

Patricia Gravatt in chapter 12 explores the work of another Dutchman, Theodore de Bry, whose majestic, multivolume folio printing of America became a major purveyor of images of the New World for Europeans. Published throughout the 1590s and into the first decade of the next century, de Bry’s book has been generally assumed to be a major source of the Black
Legend, offering visual proof that Spain had profoundly abrogated its human responsibilities in the conquest of the Americas. Gravatt takes exception to this assumption and shows that, in fact, some of de Bry’s pictorial representations owe their particular cruelty to exemplars drawn from the representations of civil conflict in France during the wars of religion. De Bry specifically cautions, “Let us not be too quick to condemn the Spaniards and let us first seriously examine ourselves, in order to see if we are truly better than they are.”

Save its troubled conquest of Ireland, in the sixteenth century England had no overseas empire. Such a situation does not mean that it was not engaged with the European project of nation and global empire building, or that its concerns were less racial. Part IV’s chapters devote themselves to the peculiarities of England’s idiosyncratically belated and imaginary sixteenth-century empire.

In chapter 13, titled “West of Eden: American Gold, Spanish Greed, and the Discourses of English Imperialism,” Edmund Campos argues for the complications inherent in England’s belatedness in New World conquest and most particularly its envy of Spanish gold. Beginning with a discussion of Richard Eden’s mid-sixteenth-century description of his alchemical creation of an island of silver, Campos traces England’s envious emulation of Spain, with its fabulous gold and silver mining wealth. The problem for England was, according to Campos, how to emulate Spain’s success without descending into the immorality of forced labor so infamously a part of the Black Legend. The most heinous cruelties were caused by Spain’s mining for New World gold and silver. Campos shows how the dramatist Lyly places the problem of gold-mining wealth back into classical times with the tale of Midas, who lusts after the island of Lesbos (a cover for England). So too, Campos shows how Edmund Spenser reveals to Guyon the fountain of all the world’s wealth by means of demonic mining activity. Spenser makes Guyon proof against the temptation, revealing the crucial English disdain for wealth gotten by forced labor. As Campos also points out, however, Guyon’s “freelance” heroism also legitimates the piracy on the open seas whereby men like Francis Drake were authorized to relieve the Spanish galleons of their gold without also incurring the guilt of the labor that produced it. In such a way, England used the Black Legend of Spanish enslavement of local populations to differentiate and authenticate its own piratical imperial policies.

Like Campos’s discussion of Eden’s alchemical experiment, Linda Bradley Salamon in chapter 14 traces how Roger Ascham’s completely imaginary construction of “The Turk” form his experiences at the Hapsburg court in Germany during a similar mid-sixteenth-century moment. Viewing the Ot-
tomans through the lens of the Hapsburg court makes Ascham’s sense of the Turk a completely imaginary encounter with a colonial other figured as an orientalized icon rather than an individual. While, as Salamon observes, all other contemporary rulers are specifically named, only Suleyman the Magnificent remains “The Turk.” Salamon argues that Ascham’s midcentury imaginings before any real contact between England and Istanbul anticipate the orientalizing figurations Edward Said analyzes in later colonial discourse. Salomon points out that the startling cruelty of anecdotes associated with feeding of human flesh to animals by the Turk retains a remarkable consistency that goes throughout the discourse of contact with America. Perhaps more surprisingly, “The Turk” is imagined to be a geopolitical other, not a religious other, perhaps (as Salamon suggests) because the more important religious differences for Ascham held between English Protestants and Hapsburg Spanish Catholics. Indeed, as she argues, the cruelty of the Turks is, in Ascham’s text, sutured to the cruelty of the Spaniards and becomes a hallmark of the English version of the Black Legend in service of the increasingly violent war with Spain, during which Elizabeth made a temporary peace with the Ottoman empire.

In chapter 15, titled “Nations into Persons,” Jeffrey Knapp explores the means by which Elizabethan writers characterized English national identity as “motley,” that is, as a mixture of many other cultures, languages, and peoples. Rather than reaching out to imagine the conquest of other realms, Knapp argues that Lyly, Shakespeare, and Spenser reach back into history to remember when England was itself a conquered territory, first by Rome, then by the Danes, and of course by the Normans. So often tracing England’s mythological origin from Troy, Elizabethan writers turn England into the quintessentially vanquished civilization. Insisting that such a tradition of loss allows for a powerful disintegration and intermixing, Knapp argues that Spenser in particular claims that no European nation is of pure blood. Shakespeare’s Hal exemplifies such a personal character, which is, as he declares himself, to be “of all humors.” The intermixed nation, then, is not figured as a multicultural social unit, but as a single person who embodies in himself or herself the complexity of the social formation. Hal as future monarch is a case in point: the complicatingly intermixed nature of a realm is not merely identified with the person of the monarch but is continually figured in Elizabethan literature by persons. Such persons (Britomart, Lyly’s heroines, Richard II), by means of their often erotic self-alienation, can act as able carriers of the possibility of imperial inclusion. In such a way, Spenser can base his sense of England’s imperial destiny in A View of the Present State of Ireland on the very
inclusiveness of the flexibility of English personhood to which different nations, gathered into a peaceful empire, may aspire.

Everywhere in this history of racial difference, violent domination, and barbaric cruelty we see interstices of desire for peace and tolerance. Before we can ever get to a new world order that allows such a thing, we must understand the inordinate pressures that history places upon us. The Black Legend emerged as part of the racial organization of the world and contributed to founding the racial imperial difference within and outside Europe itself. Racism, we should remember, is not a question of skin color, blood proportions, or the shape of one’s nose. Racism is a discursive classification of the chain of human beings, their distance from the ideal model.

In assembling the chapters in this book, we have by design used the term “Renaissance” rather than “early modern” to locate our study in time for two reasons. First, a number of the empires touched on in the following chapters—Aztec, Inca, Maya—did not survive as politically organized structures into the era that calls itself modern, although the lure of the mythical Aztec homeland, Aztlan, the emergence of Mayan organizations in Guatemala, and the present growth of indigenous political forces in the Andean region demonstrate their continuing power. Second, the notion of modernity itself imposes a teleological narrative that privileges the narrative about western European dominance. If we name the period with the word that calls up comparison with the classical past—Greek and Roman empires—we do not thereby banish Eurocentrism, but we are at least in a better position to see the construct of empire as a conceptually different form of social organization, specific to a local site and history and not in the service of current (postmodern) Anglophone world dominance and global capitalism. By using a term that privileges the past as a past, which understands its crucial informing pressure on the present, we have tried to resist (however successfully) the way modernity itself colonizes previous human experience, turning it into a primitive version of the present.

*Imperum*, which originally meant sovereignty, was the word used to name the Roman social organization. In other similar social organizations, the word referred to the head of the organization. Therefore, a better name for what is called the Inca empire would be “Incanate,” as Inca was the name of the ruler; similarly, we should use “Sultanate” instead of Ottoman Empire and “Tzarate” instead of Russian Empire. We should recognize, nevertheless, that *imperum* became the name imposed by the affirmation and expansion of western European capitalist and Christian empires (primarily Spanish and English).
The Renaissance imposed a racial classification in which, as Las Casas stated, Christians served as the model and point of reference, and western Christianity (on its way to becoming Europe) as the self-legitimated locus of enunciation. There is no doubt that race and racism are social constructions. But the questions are, who constructed them, when, for whom, and why? We hope to have answered some of these questions in this introduction and in the chapters that follow. If we are to understand the possibilities for our global future, we need to apprehend the varieties of historical experience, each with their own very different pressures on myriad locales. China, Muslim and non-Muslim South Asia, Turkey, North and South America, England, and Europe are all in play at this new millennial moment. By looking back half a millennium, we may be better able to deal with where we are today.