INTERNATIONALIZATION:
RHETORIC OR REALITY?

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Sheila Biddle was a program officer in the Ford Foundation’s Education and Culture Program from 1982–1996, working in the field of higher education. She was responsible for the Foundation’s programs in international studies, including the less commonly taught foreign languages, and teaching and scholarship in the social sciences at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. She has served as a consultant on internationalization for a number of universities and organizations and recently was a member of the Intellectual Review team for the Abe Fellowship Program, a review commissioned by the Social Science Research Council on behalf of the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, the program’s funder. Dr. Biddle received her doctorate in history from Columbia University and taught in Columbia’s history department for 13 years. She was a senior research scholar at Columbia from 1996–2002 while she was completing the research and writing of this project.
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Sheila Biddle’s study is about the craft of university navigation. Most reviews of fields of scholarship turn towards either the stars of intellectual history or the basic design of institutional vessels. Here, we are simply trying to find ways forward, mainly by trimming old sails and tinkering with existing techniques. The post-1989 conviction—reinforced in new ways post 9/11—that the rest of the world does matter fundamentally to American economy and society turns out to generate treacherous intellectual cross-currents rather than any simple guiding orientations for university policy about education and research for a globalizing future. Internationalization is constantly in danger of running aground on one or another implication of America’s mutating sense of its own uniqueness in the world.

It is to Sheila Biddle’s enormous credit that she focuses on this level: the complex, labor-intensive struggle to keep the rest of the world on the horizon and in the discussion as contexts shift. Her sense of the work of programmatic change in the university comes from her long and successful experience as a Ford Foundation program officer. In this she was both ambitious and modest: ambitious that backing particular ideas and individuals could leaven entire new fields, from African-American studies to agrarian studies; and modest that firmly established outcomes would require something beyond both individuals and funds, namely institutional commitment. Most of us who have worked in these galleys will recognize the concerns, the costs and the sense of movement and achievement that Biddle describes, even if our own programs do not figure explicitly. It is this tangible, experiential sense of various processes (in the plural) of internationalization that makes this report so valuable.

It was in the context of the area studies revival of the mid-1990s that I came to appreciate the accumulated wisdom that is realized in this study. In it, as in her programmatic work, Biddle exposes the particular permutations and combinations of individuals, funds and institutional commitment that have kept internationaliza-
tion on university radar screens. Some findings are chastening, such as the relative lack of attention to the undergraduate curriculum, more or less across the board. Others are enlightening, such as the particularity of solutions to their own milieux. Others are encouraging, such as the emergence of a younger generation of scholars who cross disciplinary and regional boundaries with more alacrity than was characteristic in the recent past. Yet others are simply noteworthy, such as the vast amount of time and energy that has been spent on the problem. But the real strength of the study lies in the clarity with which Biddle sees all these permutations and the bluntness with which she expresses the nature of the challenges. In every section, there are examples of how challenges have been addressed by others and therefore how one’s own horizons of imagination and warning could be opened up.

There is a particular importance to a study of how things actually work. Many of those—from center heads to deans—who are called on to head up new programs are quite inexperienced on this whole range of issues. As leadership becomes even more of a revolving door than in the past, new incumbents can have no idea of the possibilities and difficulties ahead. Those who master the techniques of interdisciplinary faculty appointments may be in the dark about the theoretical currents that one or another appointment would join. And vice versa. Knowing a field is a necessary but not a sufficient preparation for making a center function. For all of us then, this report on the pragmatics of internationalization is a goldmine of information and insight, gleaned not only from the study itself but from a career of attempting to make innovative programs work.

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For more than half a century, The Ford Foundation has funded curricular efforts to help American university students know and understand key parts of the developing world. From the early 1950s through the end of the 1990s, Ford played a critical role in the development of a field which has been called “area or international studies.” This phrase gained legitimacy especially during the Cold War period, since it was used as a shorthand for university-based programs that examined the culture, economics, and social and political landscapes of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, including East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Thus, long before the relatively recent call to “internationalize” the teaching and research agendas of American colleges and universities, the Foundation was deeply engaged in supporting area or international studies projects.

Examining the presence, quality, and impact of area and international studies efforts at five distinguished American universities in the 1990s is the focus of my former colleague, Sheila Biddle’s, stimulating and thoughtful report. Biddle, a historian by training, was, for more than 15 years, responsible for Ford’s grantmaking in area and international studies. This responsibility enabled her to acquire a breadth of knowledge and experience about this interdisciplinary field that could not be gained by working on any single campus. Her report is full of useful and often surprising observations, and, happily, it reads more like an essay for a monthly magazine than a dry foundation-commissioned study. It should find a wide audience among teachers, scholars, students, and administrators.

The timing for this publication could not be more propitious. It comes at a moment when the need for a deeper and more nuanced understanding of the world outside the United States could not be greater. It is also a time of shrinking budgets for most universities, and hard choices must be made. Biddle eschews simple solutions. When some among us think that more funding for area studies will automatically solve the problems of U.S. parochialism, Biddle knows better. Her view is that a bland “internationalist” approach at the
university level is not likely to result in a more educated citizenry unless it is backed up by rigorous research and a certain humility about one's own biases. We all do well to remember that.
I have incurred obligations to a great many people in the course of completing this project. I am indebted, first and last, to the administrators, faculty, and staff of the five universities in the study—without their cooperation, there would have been no project. I am especially grateful to the individuals on each campus who set up the site visits, put together the appointment schedules, and made the arrangements for my stay. I found out just how frustrating and time-consuming this could be when I had to do it myself. The faculty and administrators I interviewed were unfailingly generous with their ideas and their time, the second a scarce commodity during the academic term; I talked to many of them more than once, and I thank them for their good will in welcoming me back each and every time. I have not listed them individually for fear of leaving out names that should be included, and also because I’m not sure that all of the people I talked to would want to be implicated in what I have written. But I do thank them, one and all.

The individuals who offered advice and commented on sections of the text are too numerous to mention by name, but I am grateful to all of them. I am particularly indebted to Lisa Anderson, Jane Guyer, Charles Keyes, and Jim Scott, who watched over the project, and read substantially all of the manuscript along the way. Their substantive comments and suggestions were enormously helpful to me in thinking through the issues I was writing about, and while many of their contributions are reflected in the text, it goes without saying that responsibility for the final product rests entirely with me. Thanks are due also, in chronological order, to Lailee Moghtader, my research assistant for 18 months when the project was based at Columbia University, and Sue Laizik, who put the manuscript into its final form. I thank them for their labors, and also for their good cheer and encouragement when my spirits were flagging.

Finally, I owe thanks to several institutions: to the Ford Foundation, which provided funding for the project; the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, where the project was housed for the first several years; and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS), the project’s home during the final phase. Special thanks are due to Steve Wheatley of ACLS, who orchestrated the transition.
I. Introduction

The idea for this project took shape in the mid-1990s, when I was at the Ford Foundation, working in the higher education division of what was then the Education and Culture Program, and responsible for programming in international studies. A steady stream of presidents, provosts, and deans came through my office every week, and from them I gained a sense of the changing educational landscape—though I found that visiting campuses and talking to faculty and administrators, unchaperoned by their development officers, was essential to discovering what was really going on. At some point in the early 1990s, I began to hear increasingly about the need to “internationalize” the curriculum or, alternatively, the college or university itself. The idea was not new, the frequency of its mention was. As the months went by, I heard numerous iterations of “internationalization,” but in practical terms, it was often difficult to pin down what the word meant, and my visitors did not always provide much enlightenment.

At about the same time, I started to hear from college and university faculty around the country, saying they had been asked to serve on committees or task forces or working groups to draft plans for “internationalizing” their institutions. The mandate had come from the president or chancellor, but without further direction; they weren’t sure what they were being asked to do, or how best to proceed—could I help? I could not, I was as puzzled as they were. Eventually, these committees did produce reports and strategic plans, many of which called for restructuring the university’s international programs; these were subsequently implemented to a greater or lesser extent, and with varying degrees of success.

“Internationalization” became a buzzword in academic circles, the rhetoric surrounding it ubiquitous. Given the significant amount of time and money invested in efforts to realize the goal, it seemed to me worth trying to understand what that goal was: what faculty and administrators meant by the term, what the principal issues were, and how the process of “internationalizing the university” worked on the ground. Moreover, I hoped that an account of the experiences of a subset of institutions—what worked and what didn’t work in a given set of circumstances, whether there were demonstrably better or worse
ways to resolve a given set of problems—might prove useful to other institutions embarked on the same enterprise. Thus the present project. I chose to focus on five research universities that had recently restructured their international programs or were in the process of reviewing them as part of the internationalization effort. The five were Columbia University, Duke University, the University of Iowa, the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, and the University of Washington. Though the group was geographically diverse and reflected a balance between public and private institutions, it was, obviously, not a scientific sample, nor was it intended to be. As of the mid-1990s, Duke, the University of Iowa (UI), and the University of Michigan (UM) had plans for internationalization in place, and at the University of Washington (UW), a task force on international education had recently submitted its report to the president. Columbia’s administration had decided against drafting a comprehensive plan, choosing rather to proceed on a project-by-project basis. Columbia is nonetheless part of the study because it seemed important to include an East Coast institution that could profit from its location, within easy reach of the nation’s political and financial capitals, to strengthen its international profile.

In carrying out the project, I visited each campus two or three times, occasionally more, for two or three days each visit. I interviewed university administrators, directors of area and other international programs, faculty with international interests, chairs of disciplinary departments, administrators and faculty of schools of international affairs and, to the extent possible, other professional schools. I did not always find all the people I wanted to see, but in cases where I missed key individuals, more often than not I was able to interview them by telephone at a later date. In preparation for the site visits, I read whatever background materials were available, including annual reports, committee reports and strategic plans for internationalizing the university, and along the way collected program descriptions, course listings, and assorted brochures, catalogues, and bulletins. All these were important in providing the university context; the reports and strategic plans in particular were essential in setting out the rationale for the initiative and what it was intended to accomplish. For the most part, the site visits were conducted from 1997 to 1999, though in some cases they were supplemented by follow-up interviews both on site and by telephone. Because the study has taken far longer than I anticipated, and on every campus much has happened
since, throughout the text I have given dates for site visits and specific interviews I refer to.

The length of time it has taken to complete the study has had at least one positive advantage: it has allowed me to gain some perspective on the decade of the 1990s. In retrospect, it is apparent that a number of developments converged in those years to make the period a difficult one for international studies. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War brought shifts in political alignments around the world that required a reexamination of existing paradigms of international studies. These events had an immediate and far-reaching impact on area studies, on Russian studies in particular, where the end of the Soviet system signaled the instant obsolescence of Sovietology and of the scholars who worked in that field. For area studies more broadly, the end of “the communist menace” raised fears of severe reductions, or even termination, of federal funding, since government support for regional programs was largely tied to the needs of national security. At roughly the same time, the early 1990s, the long-running debate between area studies and the social sciences erupted in a series of overheated exchanges that unduly polarized the issues and produced a significant amount of ill will before passions and rhetoric cooled. But the flare-up exacerbated existing tensions and drew attention to the problems area programs faced on a practical level, particularly in making appointments in regional fields. For all these reasons, the 1990s were an unsettling and challenging time for area and international studies.

The new century brought further challenges, though they are not dealt with here. I have made no attempt to revise the text to take into account the events of September 11, 2001, and their implications for international studies. At that time, I had not finished writing, but the interviews were completed earlier, and since they form the basis of the study, it did not seem feasible, or desirable, to try to update my conclusions. Several other options and omissions deserve some elaboration. This is a study of internationalization in research universities. I chose to focus on a subset of these institutions because they set the pace in American higher education, they have the broadest array of international programs, and they are responsible for graduate and professional training. The results would almost certainly have been different had I looked at liberal arts colleges, whose relatively small size and greater cohesiveness make it easier for them to make an institu-
tional commitment, whether to internationalization or some other purpose. Moreover, since liberal arts colleges are concerned with undergraduate education, their chances of success in developing curriculum that will produce students aware of, and sensitive to, other cultures and societies are far greater than those of research universities. Finally, except in specific contexts, I have not dealt with the impact of technology, and especially of the Internet, in the internationalization project. The issue here would not be the extraordinary benefits to research and teaching of new modes of communication and access to resources around the world, but whether, over time, the Internet will ultimately “internationalize” students by putting them in touch with individuals and events in other parts of the world. Because the point came up only once in the course of the interviews I did for the project, and in the context of another question—“Is internationalization happening anyway?”—I have not attempted to take the discussion further.

Though I have not addressed the challenges of the new century and what they may mean for universities and for international studies, debate on these questions has already begun. The position paper drafted for a seminar convened in the summer of 2000 by the University of Michigan’s International Institute, on the impact of the events of September 11 on “the internationalizing project of the North American university,” proposes that “the decade-long internationalization of American higher education toward recognition of global interests and universal values seems now to have been a passing moment,” threatened by renewed focus on national interest.1 This may turn out to be so. But institutions change slowly, none more slowly than universities; administrative structures and practices do not change with the calendar, new initiatives must build on those already in place. Whatever new demands the twenty-first century places on research universities, they will necessarily respond, at least initially, with the institutional resources developed in the last decades of the twentieth; however the international studies community regroups and reinvents itself to deal with new global realities, it will start from the point it had reached at the close of the 1990s. In focusing on the decade of the 1990s, the study provides a baseline for whatever changes follow.

II. Why Internationalize?

Over the last 15 years, large numbers of university faculty and administrators have spent a great many hours on task forces, working groups, and committees charged with devising plans to “internationalize” or “globalize” their institutions. Typically, these committees were convened at the behest of the president, the chancellor, or the provost, and more often than not their work resulted in a report and a set of recommendations. The reports shared the common fate of the genre: in some cases, the recommendations were implemented to one degree or another; in others, the plan was put on hold for future consideration, with “future” unspecified; or, in the worst case scenario, report and recommendations simply disappeared from view. (In the circumstances, it is not surprising that at many institutions a series of reports addressing the same set of issues stretches back over 20 to 25 years.) But irrespective of the ultimate fate of these documents, they provide some answers to the question “why internationalize,” or at least why leading academic administrators believe internationalization is important. They provide fewer answers to the prior question: in the university setting, what does “internationalization” mean?

The rationale for internationalization laid out in these reports followed a common pattern and employed a common rhetoric—the introductory sections were more or less interchangeable. In the context of an increasingly interdependent world characterized by the emergence of a global economy, the rapid development of global communications and technology, and the shifting political alignments of states and the regions and ethnic groups formerly within their borders, universities have both an obligation and an opportunity to play a significant role. To begin with, they must educate their students to be “globally literate citizens” prepared to live and work in the new international world. “Globally literate” was defined as having a global consciousness and a critical understanding of how national and international issues intersect. Alternatively, the goal was to promote in students an awareness of their role in an interdependent world and how “as citizens and professionals” they could contribute to and shape it. The university’s further responsibility was to provide them with the knowledge and skills to do this, in part by ensuring that
they had a wide range of opportunities for learning about the world outside the United States. One administrator put it well when he said that knowledge of and interaction with different peoples and cultures were critical "to [students'] development as human beings, to their professional lives, and to their capacity to fulfill their responsibilities not just as citizens of countries where they happen to be born, but as citizens of an increasingly global society." From a practical point of view, familiarity with other peoples and cultures was necessary since graduates were likely to spend increasing amounts of time abroad as part of their working lives.2

A second point was the need for universities to keep pace with local and national economic developments in order to better serve the larger community and be positioned to take advantage of the opportunities these developments presented. A University of Washington report cited the university's location at the edge of the Pacific Rim in a region whose economy is heavily dependent on international trade (a separate appendix was devoted to the state's trade figures).3 The university must internationalize in order to be a better resource for the region and the nation. (Implicit here was the hope that the state legislature, notoriously tightfisted with respect to university funding, might come to regard UW as deserving more support. This point would hold true for virtually all state universities.) Duke's report talked about Duke's role in the Research Triangle area, an increasingly international center for industrial and technological development, and North Carolina's growing participation in international markets. Here again, the language spoke to the reality of economic internationalization, the university's need to contribute more to the international scene, and the opportunities that would be lost if it failed to internationalize in timely fashion. The same message came through at the University of Iowa, less in its restructuring plan, which was largely concerned with administrative reorganization, but in conversations with university administrators.4 The president's speeches


emphasized the global economy and the need for students to develop a global perspective; and both she and other administrators alluded to the state's increasingly international economic base. In spring 1998, an associate provost reported that even though the Board of Regents had mandated level, and possibly decreased, funding for the next five years, additional targeted funds might be forthcoming if the university attended more to the needs of the state and its diversifying economy. He hoped that the medical sciences, engineering, and business might be able to contribute on this front.

Reputation, both national and international, was a third element of the rationale. At home, the university must keep pace with its peers, many of whom had already put in place new international programs and institutional structures. There was an ever-present fear of falling behind. If the university was to remain a great university in the twenty-first century, it must move to meet the challenge of internationalization. In so doing, it would enhance its visibility and stature internationally, and this in turn would put it in a stronger position to recruit international students and faculty, and develop collaborative partnerships with overseas universities. The university, then, must strengthen its international profile at home and establish or enhance its presence internationally. The two efforts were interdependent: without them, opportunities would be lost, not least funding opportunities for programs and research but also for making a significant contribution to policy. An aspect of the search for greater visibility was the hope that the university would become a player in the policy arena.

In summary, universities must internationalize in order to educate their students for global citizenship, to keep pace with their peers, to better serve the national and international community, and to remain great universities. Moreover, beneath the rhetoric, the subtext was clear: universities must internationalize in order to raise money. The thread ran throughout the rationale, in the repeated references to opportunities that might otherwise be lost; the concern with maintaining a competitive edge to attract more students at home and increase recruitment abroad; and in the mention of establishing connections with international alumni, which translated into broadening the base of alumni donors. Irrespective of other considerations, the financial imperative was reason enough for administrators to push for internationalization. The subtext revealed as well that a second
reading of “reputation” was to be where the action was nationally, to keep up with the “buzz” on the university circuit, and without any question the buzz in the last 15 years has been internationalization and globalization for the new millennium.

Two further points are worth noting. The obligation to educate students to live and work in the new international world assumed pride of place in the rationale for internationalization, but it was by no means clear how, exactly, students would be transformed into “global citizens” or what skills were required to enable them to move easily across cultures in their personal and professional lives. To say that students must have some knowledge of the world beyond U.S. borders, including familiarity with another culture, was easy enough; to make the leap to “global consciousness” was more problematic. What, one might ask, was meant by “global consciousness,” and how was it created or taught? A second question relates to student demand for a more international education, which did not receive much space in the rationale. Unquestionably, student demand varies from campus to campus and among different groups of students; but given the difficult challenge of producing global citizens and the fact that students have the most direct stake in learning to compete in a newly internationalized world, one would have expected the student constituency to receive more attention.

What, then, does internationalization mean? By and large, the reports were not much concerned with definition, and this may have been partly because the presidents and chancellors who commissioned them were not always clear what they meant—the commitment was rhetorical rather than substantive. A few reports did attempt to articulate the goal. The University of Michigan’s report took a pragmatic approach, defining internationalization as expanding the international dimension of both curriculum and research throughout the university, with “international” meaning matters and concerns that reach beyond the borders of the United States.5 This meant enhancing programs that were already international and building an international perspective into courses and research agendas where it did not currently exist. Duke’s report followed a more visionary course. Internationalization meant “ensuring that knowledge of the

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cultures, arts, histories, and contemporary affairs of peoples and nations throughout the world” was “central to the experience of membership in the Duke University community.” Further, it meant individual and institutional participation in academic, professional, and cultural experiences across national boundaries; and familiarity with the best scholarship, learning, and professional activities irrespective of national boundaries or cultural differences. Acknowledging that this was “a vision for internationalization,” the report proposed a set of more specific goals, including the provision of strong international library collections and foreign language training. (Lest it be thought that vision and goals were entirely, or largely, rhetorical, it should be noted that Duke reinstituted a foreign language requirement as part of a major curriculum revision in January 1999.)

Absent an attempt to define the end in view, the rationale laid out in the reports became the definition. What does internationalization mean? It means producing global citizens, remaining competitive with other U.S. universities, and achieving a stronger presence internationally. In any case, the attempt to define the “vision” for internationalization was probably more important than the result: it required task forces and committees to think about what internationalization meant for their campuses and what, specifically, they hoped to accomplish.

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III. The University Context

Translating the rhetoric of internationalization into reality is a complex enterprise, and it can be an expensive one. Recommendations for new structures and programs are a beginning; implementing them entails negotiation, persuasion, and compromise. Ultimately, the plan put in place must reflect the university’s particular history and culture; failure to respect the institutional context puts the initiative at risk. A number of factors may influence, even dictate, the form the effort takes. The most obvious of these include size; resources, both financial and human; whether the institution is public or private; and if it is public, how tightly the state controls its day-to-day operations. The structure of the administration is key, particularly the division of power and responsibility between the office of the provost and the college or faculty of arts and sciences. The principal questions here concern resources and appointments, and whether there is a history of tension between the two administrative centers. Tensions can arise from the nature of the structure and the competing needs of the units, from a poor relationship between the provost and the dean, from lack of communication, or from a combination of all of these. In any case, the relationship between the two units is a major consideration in locating the initiative within the university.

The administrative context includes as well anomalous units within the university, and there is usually at least one of these. The Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, for example, is a department within the College of Arts and Sciences, despite its designation as a school; it houses 13 degree programs and 6 federally-funded National Resource Centers (NRCs), and has over 100 faculty members teaching in its programs, in addition to its own faculty of 30–35, many of whom hold joint appointments with other departments. The head of this large and complex unit, which is a principal locus of international programs and research in the university, holds the title of “director,” though he is de facto a department chair who reports to the Divisional Dean for the Social Sciences in the College of Arts and Sciences. Columbia

7 The number of NRCs increased to seven in the 2003–06 funding cycle.
University's School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) is only somewhat less anomalous. A professional school that awards MAs in both international affairs and public affairs, SIPA is one of four separate schools in the division of Arts and Sciences. But it is also a department of Arts and Sciences (DIPA), since only departments can make appointments, and SIPA now has a faculty of some 35 full-time positions and 70 adjuncts. Moreover, it houses a large number of centers and institutes, including five NRCs. By its very nature, it is a focus of international activity and its relationships to other departments and schools within the university are many and varied.

The peculiar structures of the Jackson School and SIPA are accidents of history, and they draw attention to two other key aspects of institutional context: the history of international programs at the university and, more specifically, the particular history of area programs and their present place in the spectrum of international activities. Of the universities included in this study, at Columbia, the University of Michigan, and UW international studies, broadly defined, has a long history, dating back at least to the beginning of the twentieth century. At those universities, the first area centers were established in the 1940s, following the end of World War II, and at all three they remain a significant presence. International programs have developed much more recently at Duke, which only assumed its present institutional identity in 1924. Duke's first vice provost for international studies was appointed in the mid-1960s, signaling an effort to expand the university's international dimension, but most, though not all, of Duke's area programs have been established since 1980. At the University of Iowa, most international programs date from the 1970s. There is not a strong tradition of area studies, but over the last 30 years efforts to expand international activities and to give the university a stronger international presence have resulted in the creation of a number of interdisciplinary programs, including several with a regional focus. In terms of internationalization, the historical context is essential to understanding the nature of present and past international strengths, what there is to build on, what skeletons lie buried. Related and equally important, the historical context sheds light on the needs and demands of established units and how these can be met within a workable new structure or new initiative. The second point has particular relevance to area centers.
These elements of the university context contribute to defining its institutional culture. The ethos of the university, its affect, is more elusive and more difficult to characterize. It subsumes history, tradition and custom, and the institution's sense of its own identity. Duke is conscious of its youth and the need to catch up with its peers, Michigan of its long tradition as a world-class university in the middle of the country, with some slight ambivalence about its distance from the coastal centers of power. UW looks west from its perch on the Pacific Rim, speaks with pride of its “Asia tilt” and the excellence of a faculty it does not deserve, given the level of its salaries; Iowa presents itself as a “modest” place despite its many excellences and a talented faculty that believes the university should push harder to extend its reach. Columbia is urban, fragmented, an agglomeration of schools and colleges each with its own identity, and thinks of itself as already an international university. The precise nature of these characterizations is less important than that they be taken into account. No two universities are alike. The scheme that works for one will not necessarily work for the other, even though they resemble one another generically and in some details. Recognition of the particular culture of the institution is essential to the success of the internationalization initiative.
IV. Routes to Internationalization

Most universities pursue a variety of routes to internationalization, depending on what the initiative is designed to accomplish. Several of these are discussed below, with two notable exceptions: study abroad programs and foreign exchanges. Study abroad is not included for a number of reasons. First, there is already an extensive literature dealing with the subject, and it seemed unlikely that a discussion of programs in the five universities under consideration here would add to it significantly; second, methods of collecting and interpreting the data on student participation differ, and it would have been difficult to extract comparable figures across campuses from the materials provided by study abroad offices; third, and most important for the purposes of this study, in the course of interviewing faculty and administrators, I did not hear much about study abroad, except from those administrators—and there were several—who believed that increasing the number of students going abroad was the surest, sometimes the only, route to internationalization. In conversations with faculty, overseas study was mentioned largely in the context of specific international programs. In the case of student and faculty exchanges, again the difficulty of discovering what the numbers meant and of finding figures that were comparable across campuses were the major obstacles. In some instances, the data consisted of a list of international institutions with which the university had exchange agreements, a beginning perhaps, but ultimately not very helpful in trying to assess the extent and impact of de facto exchanges. Here too, I heard about formal exchange programs and informally arranged exchanges largely in the context of specific initiatives.

In considering approaches to internationalization, two general observations are in order. First, the matter of purpose is crucial, and it subsumes a number of subsidiary questions. Is the effort intended primarily to reorganize existing programs and bring them into a more effective relationship with one another or to spread an international focus across the university, or both? Does the effort deal explicitly with curriculum, including language? Is there reasonable consensus on the definition of internationalization? Presumably questions of definition and purpose have been dealt with in reports and recommendations, but there is often a disconnect between prose and practice. Second,
failure to confront these issues at the outset can lead to a further, potentially disastrous, disconnect between the educational and intellectual objectives of the initiative and its organizational dimensions. Substance and structure are not separable: how the practical problems are solved, how the university organizes its international programs, both reflects and shapes the intellectual agenda and in consequence the allocation of resources. These aspects of the enterprise are interconnected.

**Administrative Reorganization**

Administrative reorganization can be minimal or far-reaching, again depending on why it was undertaken. The decision to restructure often follows from the perception that while a university’s international resources are considerable, they are widely dispersed across schools and colleges so that “the whole is less than the sum of its parts.” Absent a unifying structure, the presence of first-rate faculty and programs has failed to give the university the international reputation it deserves. Reorganizing these programs under a single umbrella will strengthen international activities across the board and at the same time give the institution a stronger international profile. A second, related reason for restructuring is the desire to bring a diverse group of quasi-independent centers and programs into a more rational administrative structure. However the rationale may be framed, this usually represents an attempt to exercise greater control over these units and, in the process, save money by eliminating overlapping functions and administrative costs. Such efforts tend to target area centers and small international programs, and inevitably they raise contentious political issues. Irrespective of motivation, the structure most often chosen consists of a central administrative office headed by an associate provost or dean, sometimes a director. This individual may be primarily a facilitator, with responsibility for coordinating the international initiative, and ideally with some money to spend; or she may preside over a new or revitalized structure—an institute or center—intended to house international programs. Designing such a scheme is relatively easy; putting it in place on the ground is not.

Restructuring encounters a number of obstacles, and it raises a number of questions. A first question relates to the mandate of the new administrative office, and its reach. Who and what will be brought
under the umbrella? And to what extent is the initiative designed to spread an international focus across the university, or as one report put it, “to integrate an international perspective into the fabric of the university as a whole”? If the emphasis is on internationalizing the university, it becomes necessary to consider how best to build relationships between arts and sciences divisions and professional schools; and within the arts and sciences, how to bring the physical and natural sciences into the enterprise. A further challenge is to identify faculty with international interests who have no connection with, indeed are unaware of the existence of colleagues working in related fields, and do not define themselves as part of the international community. Reports often call for an inventory of faculty that will enable the institution to gain a clearer sense of its international resources and at the same time facilitate contact between individual researchers. The results of these efforts appear to be mixed: the census tends to be imperfect and, even if a list of scholars and their research areas is compiled, it does not necessarily follow that other faculty will use it to identify and seek out new colleagues. As one veteran administrator pointed out, there is no natural reason why people working in diverse international fields need or want to collaborate. The vertical organization of universities by schools, colleges, and departments, which bear primary responsibility for appointments and promotions, teaching and research, works against the horizontal coordination and collaboration called for by efforts to internationalize the university.8 This is one obstacle in the path to reorganization, one that a central administrative office is intended to remedy.

The typical administrative organization of universities is one obstacle in the path to restructuring. The innate conservatism of academic culture is another. University communities tend to regard with suspicion new structures and programs, because they threaten existing entitlements and traditional lines of authority. The Michigan report, for example, made clear that any proposal to further internationalization must respect the university’s tradition of decentralization. A detailed plan for change was rejected in favor of an evolutionary process that would allow the university to move ahead without threatening already excellent programs. The report did recommend

a new structure as a vehicle for change, and intentionally or not, this was the Trojan horse in the scheme. Duke was equally wary of an overly centralized, highly structured plan; its report spoke of internationalization as a diffuse, incremental process. Incremental turned up frequently in reports and recommendations: it was the term of choice to describe acceptable change.

The creation of a central administrative office is manifestly not the silver bullet that will internationalize the university. But if the decision is to go forward, three issues are critical to the initiative's success: its location, the title of the administrator, and if there is a new structure, what it should look like. In terms of location, the question is whether the initiative should be placed in the office of the provost or in the division of arts and sciences. In general, linkages between schools and across units of the university fall under the jurisdiction of the provost, or at least fit more comfortably there; but the appointments, and the allegiance, of large numbers of faculty teaching in international programs are in the arts and sciences. The issues are where faculty will teach, what they will teach, and who will pay. Difficulties can arise, for example, when a faculty member appointed to an arts and sciences department wants to teach in an interdisciplinary center or program that does not "count" in departmental terms and that may require dropping a departmental course. If the dean of arts and sciences has to find a replacement, who will pay? (Here, it should be noted that the pressures are quite different for a dean responsible for ensuring adequate course offerings for 20,000 undergraduates and one who tends to the needs of perhaps 5,000.) This is a budgetary issue, but it is also a matter of turf. It can be resolved more or less easily if there is a good working relationship between dean and provost and if some general agreement on cost-sharing has already been worked out. But it is worth pointing out that ownership of the initiative counts for something and can be the key to unlocking resources. More generally, it cannot be stated too often that the strong support of the administration, either through the provost or the dean of arts and sciences, is essential to the initiative’s success.

Two further points. Wherever the initiative is located, it is a mistake to bypass already existing centers of international activity in the effort to create something new or to diffuse international interests more widely across the university. These centers and the programs they house are effectively in place, and ultimately they will have to be
incorporated into the new scheme; including them to begin with will avoid resentments and recriminations that could undermine the enterprise. Moreover, any new structure will have a better chance of success if it bears a generic resemblance to other units currently existing in the university or that have existed in the past. Ideally, it should fit into a recognized niche. But to create something entirely new that is perceived as alien and an anomaly in the system courts rejection: faculty will be wary, and they are likely to stay away. A second consideration is the title of the administrative officer who will preside over the new initiative. It is generally argued that the new appointment should be at the level of vice provost or dean to guarantee access to the top circles of university administration. Having “a seat at the table” is essential to being an effective advocate for international programs and the resources to support them. “Director” is a more ambiguous title: it carries no guarantees of access to power and resources, and can represent an effort to limit the scope of the position. The title of the position also bears on the kind of person who will fill it. The job description most often calls for a tenured scholar who can command the respect of the faculty: the search for such an individual is likely to be easier for a relatively high-level appointment. Examples of three differing approaches to restructuring follow.

**Duke University**

Administrative reorganization was one component of Duke’s plan for internationalization and though an essential one, it could best be described as minimal. Following the recommendation of Duke’s report, the Office of the Vice Provost for Academic and International Affairs was created, with responsibility for coordinating the international initiative across the university. The new vice provost was charged with serving as a leader and advocate for international studies and with developing new sources of funding for international programs and projects. The report specified that he must do this within the university’s existing decentralized administrative structure, and further that he must have sufficient resources to promote international initiatives. Moreover, it made clear that his success, indeed the success of the entire initiative, was dependent on the support of the president and the provost.

The new office was set up and the vice provost appointed in 1994. When I visited the campus in 1998, the office was well established,
though both the vice provost and other members of the administration agreed that the shape of the new structure was still evolving. The vice provost described his role as that of a facilitator; he said the key issue he faced was how to work within the existing decentralized structure. He presided over a substantial budget, which he used both to initiate projects and to respond to requests, a combination of top-down/bottom-up support. He provided small amounts of money, with the expectation that the recipients would raise additional funds on their own. Beyond these functions, he dealt with international issues and concerns across the university and served as liaison with the deans of the professional schools.

In general, response to the new office seemed positive. Not surprisingly, faculty liked the fact that the vice provost had money to spend, and further, that he had influence with the provost in seeking additional funds for international programs. They appreciated his role as an advocate and supporter and as someone who could make things happen. Several faculty members were particularly pleased by the appointment of a new staff member in the development office whose primary responsibilities included international affairs and credited the vice provost with lobbying successfully for the position. Predictably, the naysayers tended to be people who had lost out in the competition for funds and regarded the decision-making process as inherently unfair.

It is worth pointing out that the creation of the Office of Academic and International Affairs followed from the decision to make internationalization a university-wide initiative. This in turn meant not locating the new office in Duke’s Center for International Studies (CIS); it also meant not designating a building to house international programs on the grounds that this would isolate people doing international work from the rest of the university. (I was told that the building issue had come up at intervals over the years.) CIS had long been an undergraduate NRC, and a focus of international activity; but by the late 1980s its broader mission had become unclear, and efforts to redefine its role ended in political disaster. The new administrative structure bypassed CIS, its status was downgraded, and in 1997 it lost its federal support. But in 2000, with the support of the vice provost, who assumed the title of director, CIS successfully reapedplied for federal funding, this time as a comprehensive NRC. In fall 2000 it moved into a new building where it shared space with the recently
established John Hope Franklin Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies—it appeared that the building issue was not entirely laid to rest. Several area and international programs relocated with it, and others have followed. CIS now resembled its former self, but with at least two significant differences. First, it was a center of international activity, but not the center; second, since its director was the vice provost, CIS was set firmly in the broader internationalization initiative. All this was consistent with Duke’s restructuring plan.

When I last visited Duke in 1999, the new administrative structure was functioning effectively and seemed generally accepted across the university. What accounted for its success? To begin with, the location of the international initiative was not an issue. The office of the vice provost was an expanded and newly defined version of a position within the provost’s office, and it slid into that niche. Beyond that, tension between the office of the provost and the college of arts and sciences seemed largely absent, perhaps in part because at Duke there was no dean of arts and sciences but rather a dean of the faculty with responsibility for the arts and sciences. Titles do make a difference. It was also true that though the new office added an extra layer of bureaucracy, it was a thin layer, and it functioned in largely positive ways, providing moral and financial support for international projects. Resources are, of course, key. The fact that the vice provost had funds to disburse and was an effective lobbyist for additional funding both inside and outside the university was alone sufficient to gain faculty approval.

University of Iowa

In contrast to Duke, administrative reorganization was the core of UI’s international initiative. A series of reports dating back to the early 1980s had repeatedly recommended the creation of a centralized administrative structure to coordinate the university’s growing number of international activities, but no action had been taken until 1997, when the “Strategic Plan for International Programs” was implemented. Drawn up in 1995, the plan was designed to strengthen and extend international programs at UI, to increase their visibility, and to “infuse international activities into all aspects of the teaching, research and service missions” of the university. It was approved by Iowa’s Board of Regents in July 1997, and put into effect shortly thereafter. The plan called for abolishing the two largest international
programming units, the Center for International and Comparative Studies (CICS), which housed a large number of international programs, and the Office of International Education and Services (OIES), the umbrella for the offices of study abroad and international students and scholars; the core support services of the two units were merged. The offices and programs formerly within these two units now reported to a new administrative hierarchy consisting of an associate provost and dean for international programs, an associate dean for international programs, and an assistant dean for international programs, the last two taking over the responsibilities of the former directors of CICS and OIES. This, in its essentials, was the new structure. Its goal was to promote cooperation and collaboration among international programs, departments, and colleges on campus—in the view of several administrators, to break out of existing programs and units, which tended to isolate “the international”—and spread an international perspective across the university. By eliminating overlap and duplication in support services, it was also an attempt to save money. And intentionally or not, it had intellectual as well as administrative and financial consequences.

Response to the new structure must be viewed in the context of international activities at UI, and here perhaps two points are key. First, there was not much international activity at Iowa until the 1970s, when several programs were established and, at the same time, a group of three or four faculty members began to push for space and money for international programs and research. Their efforts resulted in a building that ultimately became home to the CICS, the umbrella for most international centers and programs and a federally funded NRC in its own right. CICS was, in effect, the nursery of international studies at UI. Second, even though the number of international programs had grown in the decades since, the international faculty remained relatively small, and they felt they had been waging an uphill struggle to gain the attention and support of the administration. One faculty member spoke of the “guerilla operation” carried on by himself and his colleagues to build and maintain international programs. The international faculty agreed to the restructuring plan because it seemed like a reasonable idea and because they thought it would translate into additional resources for program purposes. They also thought there would be new money.
When I first visited the Iowa campus in spring 1998, the new structure had been in place since the previous fall. As is often the case with administrative reorganizations, there was a good deal of confusion about redefined responsibilities and lines of reporting—it was not always clear who was in charge of what. The grand design was in place, said one administrator, but the details had not been worked out. Proponents of the new scheme were optimistic that the kinks would be worked out. The associate provost and dean, who had held an earlier version of the position on an interim basis since 1993, believed that by removing an extra layer of bureaucracy—the directors of CICS and OIES—the new structure benefited the heads of individual programs, who now reported directly to him. He also thought that consolidating support services would make them more effective. And though CICS had feared the loss of “an international place,” this had not happened. In general, those who supported the reorganization believed it gave greater visibility to international programs; moreover, the associate provost’s position gave international initiatives a “seat at the table” in the central administration.

But a number of faculty and staff members were unhappy with the new scheme. Their concerns centered on four sets of issues. First, faculty complained that the dissolution of CICS had resulted in a loss of collegiality and intellectual vitality. The center’s former space, renamed the International Center, was now a building that housed a support staff rather than a programmatic unit that had been a forum for intellectual exchange. Program faculty did feel they had lost “an international place.” Second, both faculty and staff found the new administrative system cumbersome and difficult to navigate: a relatively simple organizational structure had been replaced with a top-heavy, unwieldy bureaucracy. Third, communication was inadequate at all levels, but especially between the associate provost’s office and the centers and programs. Finally, there was a sense that resources were fewer as a consequence of the reorganization, and this raised a host of financial and budgetary questions.

The core international faculty represented their dissatisfactions to the associate provost at the end of the academic year, but when I next visited UI in December 1998, their concerns had not abated. Not surprisingly, budgetary and financial issues had come to the fore. The faculty had agreed to the breakup of CICS in part because they had been told the center’s resources would go back to international
programs—in any case, this is what they understood. But in fact, there seemed to be less money than before, and the anticipated new funds had not been seen. Program heads spoke of a lack of financial transparency: it was unclear how much money was available, where it was going, and how the decisions were being made. They knew that some of the money CICS had used for a university-wide grants competition had been reallocated to matches for outside grants (a new NRC, for example) and to support the new administrative unit. But since there was no new money, it was a zero-sum game. The associate provost had urged program heads to seek external funding, which many of them were already doing; but they thought there should be internal funds for essential program activities—conferences, speakers, and films. Ultimately, the expectations created by the restructuring plan had not been met, there was resentment of the cost of the new administrative apparatus, and the reallocation of existing funds left everyone feeling poorer.

The associate provost acknowledged that he had used funds from the CICS competition as matches for outside grants, though the competition was still going on. This seemed to him reasonable, particularly since the competition created winners and losers, and the losers had always been unhappy. And he had allocated some funds to the new administrative office, which he said had a “modest” budget. He thought that once the budgets of CICS and OIES were effectively combined, it would be possible to reallocate resources on a more rational basis and at the same time request additional funds from the central administration. He agreed that there was not enough money—the current budget was inadequate. In the past there had been a recurring allocation from state funds for programs and another for staff, but these allocations were now smaller and the demands on them greater. He recognized that restructuring had raised expectations for increased funding and commented, as had many others, that the president’s speeches urging the university to become more international had further heightened anticipation. But he and his staff believed the financial issues could be satisfactorily addressed and that over time the new system would settle into place.

In fact, the restructuring effort, at least in this first phase, did not end well. Faced with a stalemate, the senior international faculty took their case to the provost; the associate provost resigned to go back to teaching and research. At the end of December 1999 a new associate
provost and dean for international programs was appointed and given
a free hand to revise the administrative structure. What went wrong
with the initiative in the first two years? Some speculations follow.
Though personalities are not germane to the purpose of this study, it
would be foolish to suggest they did not play a significant role in the
debacle—they did. But a number of other factors worked against the
success of the restructuring plan. To begin with, the dissolution of
CICS in particular appears to have created more problems than it
solved. Diffusing an international perspective across the university
was certainly not the only or even the primary reason to reorganize the
center out of existence. One account held that the principal motive for
restructuring was to save money, another that CICS was growing
stronger and more influential, and was ripe for an administrative take-
over. It is likely that all these elements entered into the decision, that
the issues at stake were financial and bureaucratic rather than
intellectual. But whatever the course of the deliberations, not enough
weight was given to the fact that the center worked. It may have had
problems, but it was nonetheless a focal point for intellectual
exchange, a space where faculty could discuss research agendas and
program issues: it was “an international place.” The faculty agreed to
the dissolution of CICS, but once it was gone, they wanted to recreate
the old center’s spirit in the new one, even though it had been
redefined as a “physical plant” rather than an intellectual space. The
larger point is that CICS had a history; it had evolved over two decades
and could not be rebuilt in a day.

The nature of the new administrative structure was another factor
working against the reorganization. It was top-heavy, and its troika of
deans, together with their support staff, appeared to be expensive
irrespective of how much it really cost. It asked to be resented. Failure
to develop effective lines of communication between international
program faculty and staff and the new set of administrators com-
pounded an already difficult situation. So did the fact that newly
established bureaucratic procedures were by all accounts slow and
inefficient. But in the end, money issues were decisive. A long-time
UI administrator commented that “so much depends on budgets, not
just the amount but how it’s allocated,” and this is a crucial point. All
sides agreed the current budget was inadequate; they differed on how
it should be spent. Whatever the reality in terms of total budget, most
program heads believed there was less money for programs than under
the old structure, and calculated in terms of prior allocations, they
were probably right. From the associate provost’s point of view, the reallocation of existing budgets had been a principal purpose of restructuring and the necessary basis for asking for more money. But he did not move fast enough to allay the fears of the faculty.

Looking back over these events, one must ask whether the dispute came down to a confrontation between a small group of faculty jealously guarding their prerogatives and privileges and an administrative reorganization designed to serve a broader constituency. Given the circumstances, this would, I think, be a mistaken reading of the record, and for two reasons in particular. First, the faculty were the de facto custodians of UI’s international enterprise, and they were understandably afraid of losing what they had built over several decades. Second, there was no indication of support from the central administration, other than rhetorical, and thus no guarantee that more resources would be forthcoming. The further point here is that no high-level administrator “owned” the initiative and was committed to lobbying for it. Ultimately, it was the associate provost’s plan, and he was not in a position to unlock new resources. At the end of the day, it was clear that a seat at the table in the central administration was in itself not enough to secure additional resources for UI’s growing international programs. It was equally clear that without the financial support of the president and provost, the initiative had little chance of success.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ANN ARBOR

The International Institute (II) at the University of Michigan originated with President Jim Duderstadt’s “State of the University” address in October 1988, which set forth as one of the three principal goals of his presidency “internationalizing” the university to keep pace with the internationalization of American life. President Duderstadt subsequently commissioned John H. Jackson, professor of law and associate vice president for international affairs, to prepare a report on how best to accomplish this goal. The report, which was issued the following year, reviewed the history of international studies at UM, identified the problems that needed to be addressed, and recommended that a major new unit, an institute for international studies, be established.9 It found that overall, though there were many

excellent international programs at UM, there was little connection or crossover between them: the whole was less than the sum of its parts. The university’s international strengths lacked visibility both locally and nationally, in part because there was no institutional structure to provide leadership and advocacy for international studies. Furthermore, much of UM’s international activity had been centered in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LS&A), but there was now a need to extend the role of international studies and link them to the interests of other colleges and schools. The creation of an international institute would be a significant first step toward solving these problems. The institute would be charged with assisting all units on campus in enhancing their international activities and with sheltering and supervising certain existing international units and programs, notably the area centers. It would be an intellectual center with a role in developing programs and curriculum, though it would not be an instructional unit, and it would undertake a major effort to seek external funding. It would be headed by a dean, who would report to the provost, and would also be a university officer with a rank at least equal to associate vice provost for academic affairs or vice provost, to signal her university-wide role in facilitating, encouraging, and coordinating international studies across all units on campus. The institute would be provided with the financial resources necessary to carry out its task. These would consist of funds currently allocated to international studies and, initially at least, additional new funds from internally generated sources. Finally, in recommending that an institute be established, the report observed that “it will likely be a decade after it is created before we feel comfortable with its achievement.”

The immediate origin of the II was the Jackson report, but its provenance can be traced through a series of earlier reports dating back to the 1970s, which proposed that some kind of umbrella structure be created to bring together and build on the university’s resources in international and area studies. The “problem” of the area centers runs through all these documents. This was compounded of long-running hostilities within and between the half dozen or so centers (a former administrator commented that the area centers “rarely spoke to each other except in anger”); inefficiency in their administrative operations; and inadequate leadership—since directors served limited

10 Jackson, 67.
terms and traditionally were tenured associate professors or higher, the pool of candidates was necessarily small. These persistent difficulties were a strong motivation for establishing an administrative unit that would assume responsibility for the centers.

No action was taken on the Jackson report until the early 1990s, when a group of high-level administrators proposed the plan that resulted in the International Institute. The II, which was established by Michigan’s Board of Regents in September 1993, was a compromise among differing views of what the new unit should look like, and its structure departed in significant ways from the recommendations of the Jackson report. The institute was located within LS&A and was charged with serving the entire university, with the “sheltering” of most but not all area centers and programs, and with administering both existing and new resources in a single governance structure. It was headed by a director, and operated under the oversight of a university-wide governing board and a smaller executive committee with representation from LS&A and the professional schools. Just as the governing board, and more particularly the executive committee, were intended to link the II to units across the university, the director had reporting responsibilities to the provost, who represented the university-wide constituency.

As established, the II had four principal roles. It housed pre-existing centers and programs previously located within LS&A. Program and center directors were appointed by the director of the institute, who was expected to provide oversight and support for program activities; but these units retained their distinctive identities and agendas and for the most part managed their own governance, including the disposition of specific resources, such as grants, gifts, and endowments. However, all centers and programs were now asked to extend their reach beyond LS&A to serve the entire university. The institute also operated as a small foundation making grants, generally up to $30,000, in support of international activities anywhere within the university. Funds for these grants were provided largely by the dean of LS&A and the provost, but they might also come from special grants and endowments. In a third role, the II was responsible for some 42 faculty lines. These included 27 so-called FASAC positions located within LS&A and designed to secure research and teaching expertise in area studies, with each position linked to an academic
department and a center within or affiliated to the II. Another 15 positions were made available for joint appointments between a professional school and an academic department within LS&A. The institute’s executive committee was responsible for recommending how these positions would be used; vacant positions returned to the II for reallocation. Finally, the institute was assigned responsibility for providing coordination and leadership for the university’s internationalization effort.

When I visited UM in October 1997 and again in February 1998, the II was gearing up for an internal and external review by LS&A and the provost. The institute was in its fifth year of operation, and the dean of LS&A, the provost, and the director of the II agreed that this was an appropriate time to take stock of its progress and consider its future. The review was routine in that all units within LS&A were reviewed periodically, but in this instance there was more at stake, both because the institute had not been reviewed before and because opinions about its accomplishments varied widely. Those who were most negative, and most hostile, had opposed the institute from the beginning and questioned its long-term viability; but virtually everyone I talked to, including the director, thought some changes were necessary to enable it to function effectively. The criticisms touched every aspect of the II, from the way it was created to its structure to how it was funded and how the money was spent. There was, to begin with, resentment of the fact that the institute was a top-down creation, set up by a small group of administrators and imposed on the faculty. According to this view, its structure put the II’s director in a position to set the intellectual agenda, which properly should come from the faculty. A related complaint focused on the extra layer of bureaucracy the II brought with it. A number of faculty members in language and culture departments and attached to area centers regarded the institute as an alien body, an intrusion on a system that had worked well enough without it. Whereas formerly the school of graduate studies, the provost’s office, and LS&A had been separate sources of funding, now all funds were funneled through the II. A department chair conceded that departments and centers had

11 The FASAC positions were designated in the early 1980s as a means of protecting the university’s traditional strength in area studies. The acronym comes from Foreign Area Studies Advisory Committee, the body that recommended their creation.
not lost because of this, but in his view they had not gained either: the II had added a cumbersome administrative structure, but it had not made any positive difference. Area centers and language and culture departments had other concerns as well. Centers were understandably wary, since the II’s director now appointed center directors and was charged with their oversight. Departmental faculty worried about the disposition of the FASAC positions, now controlled by the II, and feared their priorities would not be respected. Many felt that the funds committed to joint appointments should have gone directly to departments, where the need was greatest; more generally, they resented the investment of substantial funds in a new international institute when their units were already international. One chair said he felt his department had been marginalized, as had the humanities in general, by the new administrative scheme.

This last point illustrates the extent to which divisions between the humanities and social sciences were reflected in attitudes to the II. Though humanities faculty could feel marginalized and on occasion complained that internationalization seemed to be regarded as a social science enterprise, many in the social sciences, particularly those working in more theoretical fields, believed the institute had a humanities tilt that made it impossible for them to feel comfortable there. A comparable division characterized the relationship between LS&A and the professional schools, which resented the fact that the II was located in LS&A. In their view, LS&A’s predominant role undermined the institute’s university-wide focus and made them wary of cooperative ventures. A faculty member in a social science discipline, who was also a center director, commented that the II’s location was “a big problem—professional schools won’t play.”

The II’s location was one of the compromises negotiated when the new unit was established, and it embodied a degree of contradiction. The institute was located in LS&A, but it was to serve the whole university; the director had reporting responsibilities to the provost as well as to the dean of LS&A. The Jackson report had recommended that the head of the institute should report to the provost, and this was the structure many would have preferred, particularly given the institute’s mandate to coordinate and facilitate international activities across the university. A number of different reasons were offered for the dual reporting structure. According to the dean of LS&A, the II was placed under LS&A and the provost principally because of the
large amount of money put into it, though she acknowledged that LS&A was criticized for “getting too much of the pie.” It was also true that the faculty members involved in the institute were largely from LS&A, and from this point of view the arrangement made sense. Some critics said the dean insisted that the II be housed in LS&A for budgetary reasons and to ensure that the faculty and programs attached to the institute remain within the college—in other words, to guard her turf. Others claimed that LS&A administrators had supported the creation of the II primarily as a mechanism for solving the problem of the area centers: they were unwilling to deal with the separate centers any longer. However much weight one assigns to these justifications and speculations, it was clear that the II’s structure was a source of major problems.

Two other points were frequently raised by both critics and supporters of the institute. First, it was said that the II had been charged with responsibilities it could not possibly fulfill: it was unrealistic to suppose that the institute, or for that matter any other single unit, could coordinate and lead the internationalization effort across the university. Second, the title and status of the director were questioned. The Jackson report had recommended that the international institute should be headed by a dean who would also hold an appointment as a university officer; this would make clear the importance attached to the international initiative and ensure that its leader had access to the top levels of university administration. But the head of the II was given the title of director, his position was not full time, and he sat on no policymaking bodies within LS&A or the university other than those of the II. Defined in these terms, the director’s position was severely circumscribed and, as one administrator observed, there was no one speaking for the international agenda at the center.

On the positive side, several administrators credited the II with “making a space” for people with international interests who were not necessarily area specialists and with bringing them together, at least to some extent. It had been successful in raising funds for new programs, Korean studies for example; in leveraging money elsewhere in the university; and increasing the funds available for graduate student support and for faculty doing international work. The II’s mandate had been to transform the area centers, and the director felt that this was happening: most centers were reshaping their activities

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to reach more broadly across the university. By fall 1997, every center
director had been replaced; the new people were younger, and two
were from professional schools. In part because of the turnover, the
intra and inter-center wars had quieted, and some faculty who had
initially opposed the II now thought it had turned out to be “a good
thing.” Perhaps most significantly, there was general agreement that
some good appointments had been made, both at the departmental
level and to fill the joint positions authorized when the II was
established. Several administrators thought channeling appoint-
ments through the institute had reduced feuding within the centers,
and at least one center director said it had been helpful to go through
the II in filling new positions.

As of spring 1998, 14 joint appointments had been authorized
and 10 had been filled, most of them between a department of LS&A
and a professional school but several within LS&A. Among others,
appointments had been made with the School of Natural Resources
and Environment and both biology and anthropology; the School of
Public Policy and sociology and history; the School of Social Work and
anthropology; the School of Public Health and biology; the School of
Music and Asian Languages and Cultures; and within LS&A, with
Asian Languages and Cultures and film and video. Others with law
and business were pending. In general, these appointments were
proposed to the II by an LS&A department or a professional school
and the II then proposed them to LS&A. LS&A administrators agreed
it was preferable to hire tenured scholars for these positions—to avoid
the difficulties inherent in gaining tenure in two departments—but
in fact most were junior. On the other hand, those who applied were
self-selected, and as the II director pointed out, “if you take this kind
of a position, it’s necessary to take risks.”

Though some appointments were described as “very good” or even
“brilliant,” they were not without their critics, and interestingly
enough, these spanned the humanities and social sciences as well as
the professional schools. Several faculty members in social science
departments objected to joint appointments because they were “too
hard to fill,” even when potential positions had been agreed upon; the
“humanist orientation” of the II was mentioned here. Humanities
faculty felt the positions diverted funds from more pressing depart-
mental needs and at the same time, they resented the fact that, at least
initially, more appointments had been made with social science than
humanities departments. On this point, both the dean of LS&A and
the II’s director said they had tried hard to suggest possible proposals
for humanities departments, since not many had come from the
departments themselves. The schools of architecture, art, and music
were the most natural partners for the humanities, but for a variety of
reasons, including the cultural studies tilt of a number of humanities
departments, making the connection was difficult. Professional school
faculty and administrators tended to think that the II’s suggestions for
positions were not what they wanted—the II’s humanist orientation
was cited by way of explanation—and shared the view that the
positions were too hard to fill. They were unhappy with LS&A’s role
in the process, though LS&A’s dean pointed out that those schools
where appointments had been made took a more positive view. It
appeared that the obstacles to joint appointments were greatest in the
law and business schools, presumably because those schools were
focused on their own needs and had the resources to hire accordingly.
As a law school administrator put it, the school “didn’t need the
money and wasn’t waiting for the II” to make international hires. But
at least one faculty member in the law school felt that his colleagues
should be less rigid in setting the criteria for joint appointments, and
presumably he was not alone. The point was phrased more generally
by a university administrator who said that on the matter of joint
appointments, people were not willing to try as hard as they might.

Sorting through the questions raised by the II’s critics and by the
institute itself as it prepared for the five-year review, two problems
stood out. One was the complex of issues arising from the II’s location
within LS&A and the dual reporting structure. The second related to
the II’s mission, which seemed to have been unclear from the start.
Was it intended to be primarily an administrative umbrella for a
group of international centers and programs? Alternatively, if it was
indeed expected to coordinate and lead the university-wide interna-
tionalization effort, how was it to do this, given its structure and the
resources available to it? And however broad its reach, should it play
more of an intellectual role in shaping the international agenda? The
provost thought the question really was what the II was supposed to do;
in her view, it could not carry out its charge to oversee the area
programs and also serve as a clearinghouse for international projects
across the university. There was too much international activity
university-wide, internationalization was too broad a concept to fit
within a single institute.
The internal and external reviews of the II were completed in the summer of 1998. In the fall, the provost appointed a committee whose members were drawn from schools and colleges across the university to look more broadly at UM's international programs, including the II. The plan that emerged from these several reviews called for the creation of a vice provost for international affairs and director of the II, a new full-time position, and the appointment of a part-time associate director. One of the positions would be filled by a faculty member from LS&A, the other by one from a professional school. The dual reporting structure was continued, but according to the provost, the new vice provost would be "firmly" in the provost's office. Moreover, development would be shifted from LS&A to the office of the provost, signaling a greater commitment from the provost. The joint appointments would remain under the jurisdiction of the vice provost, but they would no longer have to be joint with LS&A.

When I visited UM again in March 1999, the new administrative structure had been announced, though the details had not been filled in. Two significant changes in personnel were pending as well: the dean of LS&A had resigned the previous year and a search for her replacement was nearing completion; and since the director of the II, by prior agreement, was returning to teaching, the search for the new position of vice provost and director was just beginning. Response to the new plan was generally positive. The director was particularly pleased that the leadership of the institute had been upgraded to the level of vice provost, moving the II up in the university's organizational chart and increasing its visibility. Moreover, he welcomed the move to the office of the provost, which brought with it the possibility of additional funding. But no new resources were forthcoming, other than for the two new administrative positions, and faculty and administrators were concerned that the II's current budget would not be adequate to sustain its commitments, including several new units created in recent years. The other major concern related to the continuation of the dual reporting structure. The provost thought there would be no difficulty, both because the new vice provost would be in the provost's office and because she anticipated a good relationship with the incoming dean of LS&A. On this last point, there was general agreement that the joint reporting system worked as long as there was a good relationship between the provost and the dean, but when that partnership broke down, usually because new people came...
in, so did the system. This had happened in the early years of the institute, leaving the director in an all but impossible situation. It was hoped that the shift in primary responsibility to the provost’s office would prevent it from happening again.

It remained to be seen how successful the new vice provost and director would be in bringing disaffected social science faculty back into the II’s orbit, in establishing stronger ties with professional schools, and in creating relationships between these constituencies and the area centers. Whether the II’s mission was any clearer remained an open question, though in the provost’s view, the institute would no longer be “the international center for everything but will be a center of gravity.” But a good faith effort had been made to address the institute’s problems and to shore up its leadership, and this was the principal point. The II survived its first trial. In this, the support of the provost was key; so was the university’s commitment to sustaining the international initiative. For the present, it seemed that the last word belonged with the Jackson report: it would likely be a decade after the institute was created before the university felt comfortable with its achievement.

CURRICULUM, FACULTY INCENTIVES, FACULTY RESEARCH

The rhetoric of reports and strategic plans generally cited educating “global citizens” as a primary goal of internationalizing the university. Whatever else that term may mean, it implies that students must acquire some knowledge of regions and cultures other than their own, as well as the ability to negotiate diverse social and cultural settings. Curriculum, including language, is the principal vehicle for acquiring such knowledge; study or internship experience outside the United States is another; contact with international students and faculty members a third. In this context, one must approach curriculum at two levels, and with two sets of questions in mind. If the goal is indeed to turn students, all students, into global citizens, the questions relate to general education and distribution requirements, and how these should be revised or reconfigured to ensure that all undergraduates take courses with significant international content. At this level, the issues are both intellectual and financial, since curriculum revision carries with it an implicit commitment of resources. If, as is more often the case, the goal is to strengthen and expand international offerings to provide students, graduate and undergraduate, with more oppor-
tunities to pursue international interests, the question is how to do this with the resources available. The present study is not concerned with the broad set of issues relating to undergraduate curriculum—what constitutes an international course, for example, whether students should be required to take a certain number of such courses, and to what extent course work does in fact make students more aware of and sensitive to societies and cultures other than their own. But on every campus I visited, I asked about the international dimension of the undergraduate curriculum, and, except in cases where a curricular debate was currently in progress, the answers suggested it did not rank high on the international agenda. The rhetoric of reports and strategic plans went largely unheeded.

There were, of course, exceptions. Columbia College, the principal undergraduate unit within Columbia University, had for a decade included a Major Cultures component in its core curriculum that required all students to take two courses on the civilizations and cultures of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. At Duke, a curriculum review was underway when I visited the campus early in 1998. The committee’s recommendations, passed the following year, revised the university’s general education curriculum to include, among other things, reinstitution of a foreign language requirement and two courses in “cross-cultural inquiry,” which might or might not have an international dimension. The addition of an explicitly international course had been on the table but did not reach the recommendation stage. But curriculum revision is never easy, and the foreign language requirement, together with the courses in cross-cultural inquiry, constituted a significant step toward educating global citizens. The dean of the faculty, who commissioned the review, commented that the proposals created “a viable framework for students to be exposed to the kinds of courses and learning that will be effective in the next century in a global economy and environment.” 12 It should be noted that before the proposals were formally adopted, Duke’s administration agreed to provide the resources necessary to launch the new curriculum, including funds for course development and hiring additional faculty.

This last point suggests one reason why international curriculum is not a priority at most research universities: curriculum is expensive, and its costs are calculated in terms of instructional personnel—full-time equivalents or “FTEs.” New curricular initiatives require faculty to develop courses and to teach them, and by and large university administrations are not willing to commit the resources required. Particularly at universities with large undergraduate populations, instructional budgets in the arts and sciences tend to be earmarked for basic curriculum, including the spread of courses needed to meet general education and distribution requirements. Administrators are understandably reluctant to divert scarce funds to new offerings. A dean of arts and sciences commented that the question was how many new programs the university could support: “If you put in something new, what do you lose?” She had to worry about departments and core curricular needs, the international programs “were icing on the cake.”

There are other reasons why introducing international curriculum can be difficult. In general, faculty, even those with international interests, are not prepared to devote time to curricular projects without some form of compensation, either a stipend or released time; others are not interested at all. The availability of resources, time pressures, and competing research interests are the issues here. At the institutional level, departments resist reallocation of instructional FTEs as a threat to their status and turf; deans of arts and sciences tend to be wary of new curriculum that draws on their faculty but may not be under their control, or that could siphon off departmental enrollments. Again, this is a turf issue, and also a financial one, since at most institutions instructional budgets are allocated at least in part on the basis of enrollments. Moreover, for individual faculty members, the intellectual and political obstacles to undertaking international work can be formidable. These questions are discussed below.\(^\text{13}\)

The point to make here is that given the impediments, the availability of external funding has been the single most important factor in establishing and maintaining international programs, including curriculum.

The importance of outside funding was reflected in reports and strategic plans, virtually all of which called for more active development efforts on behalf of international activities; in interviews with

\(^{13}\text{See sections V and VI.}\)
faculty and administrators; and in the prominent and frequent mention of grants received for international programs. During the period I was making the site visits for this project, for example, the Ford Foundation was engaged in a major area studies initiative.\textsuperscript{14} Several of the universities included in the study had received awards, and though the curricular emphasis in their projects differed, all of them promised some curricular pay-off. On the campuses with Ford grants, the Ford project was repeatedly cited as an example of innovative international work and an indication of the institution’s commitment to developing international curriculum. In every case, the project had indeed created opportunities for faculty members and students, but it was often the most significant, if not the only, example of international curriculum development; and while the university had made some contribution, the program was dependent on outside money. There were other federal and foundation grants for international purposes, some for research and teaching, others for research alone, but the pattern was the same. The prevailing institutional view appeared to be that curriculum was too expensive to spend money on: available funds were designated for research, curriculum would have to wait.

In some circumstances, research universities did spend money on curriculum. To begin with, administrators could not afford to ignore student demand for international courses—in Latin American politics, for example, or the economies and societies of modern China or Japan—or for instruction in Korean, Hindi, or Vietnamese, called for by the increasingly large enrollments of “heritage” students whose ethnic roots were in regions where those languages were spoken. University administrations found ways to offer both kinds of courses, most often through hiring junior or adjunct faculty—in the case of language, adjuncts who were native speakers. Second, university funding, irrespective of its scale, played an important part in promoting international curriculum because it represented an institutional commitment. In practice, internal and external funding usually worked in combination, with institutional funding either seeding a project that would later secure outside money or, alternatively, providing supplementary support for a venture started with outside funds.\textsuperscript{15} But some international curriculum was funded primarily by


\textsuperscript{15}See below, section VI, \textit{passim}.
the university, most often with resources specifically designated for innovative research and curricular initiatives.

When I visited UI in December 1998, the associate provost for international programs had recently launched a pilot project designed to increase the international content of courses across the campus, a first move toward the larger goal of globalizing the curriculum. The project targeted 10 high-enrollment core courses in the colleges of business administration, education, engineering, liberal arts, and nursing. In the College of Business Administration, for example, the instructor of Introduction to Marketing, a course enrolling some 350 students, had introduced international case studies of Iowa firms that do business in Asia. The College of Engineering was planning to increase the international content of the introductory engineering course the following year and, at the senior level, to expand a program of “virtual international design teams,” in which UI engineering students joined with engineering students from other countries to come up with a common design for a particular project. The College of Nursing hoped to add international content throughout its undergraduate curriculum, and the sociology department in the College of Liberal Arts planned to offer a revised Introduction to Sociology that would deal with issues of international concern and look at them in a comparative international context.16 The project, which was funded through the office of the provost, was designed to reach a relatively large number of students, and to give them some sense of the international dimensions of their fields of study.

By contrast, the Sichuan project at UW proposed to give a small number of students an intensive international experience, and to do it in a way that would bridge the divide between research and undergraduate education. Through a four-year program offered jointly by UW and Sichuan University in Chengdu, China, 25 UW students would work with a comparable number of Chinese students, and with faculty at UW and at Sichuan University, on environmental challenges in Sichuan province and Washington state, regions that face many of the same environmental problems. The program combined research experience with courses in Chinese language and culture, a year spent in Chengdu structured around the students’

16 *International Highlights* (University of Iowa International Programs), October, 1998, 8–9.
research projects, and a fourth year back at UW in which students would complete a senior thesis/design project and other requirements for the degree. During the year the UW students were in Chengdu, their Chinese counterparts would be at UW, with significant overlap in both China and the United States to enable them to work together. Research groups would focus on topics in one of five areas—anthropology/archeology, biodiversity, eco-materials, forest ecology, and water. The program was expected to attract students contemplating majors in the physical and biological sciences, anthropology, engineering, forestry, urban planning, and environmental studies.

The Sichuan project was launched in fall 2000 with a three-year grant of $750,000 from the university’s Tools for Transformation program, a fund administered through the provost’s office and targeted to innovative ventures. The project director subsequently raised another $1.4 million in federal funds through grants from the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education and the National Science Foundation. The program attracted students with a particular set of interests, and in this sense it was limited, inevitably so, given its design. The more serious limitation followed from its cost per student. The pilot project would offer some 100 UW students an extraordinary intellectual and cultural experience, but it came at a high price, especially given UW’s perennially tight budgets and an undergraduate population in excess of 30,000 students. The cost of the project, whether it would continue beyond the pilot phase, and more significantly, whether the design could be transferred to other venues, were issues from the beginning. As of academic year 2001–02, two groups of UW and Sichuan students had started the program, and the first exchanges were scheduled to begin in summer and fall 2002. The project directors were encouraged by the program’s progress to date, particularly by its recent adoption as a track in the international studies major at UW’s Jackson School, a move that would attract a broader student constituency. But the project’s future remained uncertain, especially in light of impending state budget cuts. No further funding was anticipated from UW’s central administration, which meant that core support would have to come largely from external sources. A faculty member at UW believed there was general agreement that, despite the exceptional opportunities the Sichuan project provided, it was too expensive to replicate.
The Sichuan project was designed to integrate research and education through embedding undergraduate curriculum in existing international research collaborations. With faculty research interests as a starting point, it provided a strong incentive for faculty members to participate in the venture. This raises the broader question of the extent to which incentives were needed to engage greater numbers of faculty in international research and teaching. On the campuses I visited, faculty and administrators generally agreed that incentives were necessary and further, that providing financial incentives for faculty to extend their research to international issues was the most direct route to a more international curriculum. This was the view of faculty members with international interests and those without. A department chair at UM, whose own work was not international, made precisely this point when he said that the way to internationalize the curriculum was to make it possible for the faculty to internationalize their research, and the way to do this was to persuade, and to provide incentives. The commitment of deans and chairs to the internationalization effort was essential: resources were important but they were not the issue, the issue was the strategy used to dispense them. He added that his own involvement with international projects had come about with small amounts of funding from internal sources.

The resources available for international research and course development varied from one institution to another, but in general funds for incentives came from a combination of internal and external sources, often in the form of released time and summer salaries. But irrespective of the magnitude or source of funding, the link between research and curriculum was a constant theme in projects and proposals. A social scientist at UW hoped to establish an institute with sufficient resources to provide incentives for faculty research: the research would be translated back into teaching and curriculum. He recognized that funding—for released time and summer salaries—would probably have to come from outside sources. At Duke, where significant resources were available for international activities, the administration approached curriculum on several levels. The new general education requirement, sponsored and funded by the administration, was one route to a more international curriculum. Making small grants to faculty, contingent on their raising additional funds on their own, was another. But there was no attempt to internationalize the curriculum across the board. The vice provost for interna-
tional affairs was pragmatic in his approach: those courses that could be internationalized should be, the others not. The decision was left in the hands of individual faculty members. The director of an externally funded project spoke for most of his peers when he said that the way to involve faculty was through their research interests, and providing funding opportunities.

The view that attracting more faculty to international research was the most effective way to develop international curriculum was known as the “trickle-down” theory of internationalizing the curriculum. It was, understandably, an approach that was common in research universities, where a research culture flourishes, and its results varied, depending on the extent to which faculty did, in fact, become engaged in international projects. At these institutions, international work was not an easy sell: faculty had obligations in teaching and service (departmental and university committees, for example), but careers were built on research. Younger faculty on the tenure ladder had to concentrate on the body of work required to be considered for tenure; tenured faculty were generally disinclined to spend time on curricular projects they perceived to be a diversion from their primary research interests. The director of a regional studies program observed that it was possible to appeal to the self-interest of individuals, to persuade them to participate in a project because there was something in it for them; but another director warned that recruiting faculty with financial incentives alone was a mistake—if the interest wasn’t there, when the money ran out, so did they. In the circumstances, the burden of international programming, including curriculum, fell on the relatively small number of scholars already committed to area and international fields. From one point of view, this was as it should be; these were the people whose interests were directly involved and who, in the past, willingly took on the work, often without additional compensation and at some cost to their own research. But in the context of an initiative whose explicit goal was to internationalize the university, including the curriculum, it would seem that some further institutional commitment was in order, in terms of resources for existing faculty or additional personnel, or both. Without such a commitment, the development of a more international curriculum was left to the initiative of individual faculty members and to the availability of external support, which is to say the system remained
unchanged. Two conclusions follow: first, to the extent that an institution acknowledged that international programs were largely dependent on outside money, in effect it admitted that however desirable international curriculum might be, it remained peripheral; second, the goal of educating students to live and work in a global environment turned out to be largely rhetoric.

**FOREIGN LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION: SOME IMPRESSIONS**

Foreign language instruction is a complex and contested field. It subsumes a large number of professional interest groups and serves a variety of constituencies. The range of issues concerned with language pedagogy—the comparative advantages of various methods of instruction and testing, the training of teachers, for example—are part of an ongoing national debate within the profession and not within the purview of this inquiry. What languages should be taught, at what levels, and by whom, are questions specific to individual campuses; so is the relationship of foreign language departments to other academic units, in particular to the departments, centers, and schools that play a key role in the international enterprise. These relationships are alluded to throughout the present study, but a full and fair account of the place of language instruction and language and literature or culture departments in a given institutional setting would have required more time than the project allowed. The observations offered here are impressions and no more. They are, in effect, a summary of the principal points that emerged in conversations with administrators, foreign language faculty, and faculty from other departments and schools across the campuses I visited.

Any discussion of campus-based foreign language instruction must start with the precipitous decline in foreign language enrollments in U.S. colleges and universities over the last 40 years. According to the Modern Language Association, which has been collecting foreign language registration figures since 1958, undergraduate and graduate enrollments fell from a high of just over 16 percent of total enrollments in the mid-1960s to less than 8 percent in the mid-1970s, where they have remained more or less stable ever since. The most recent survey, in fall 1998, found that more than half of the students who were enrolled in language courses were taking Spanish, with
French a distant second, and German, Italian, and Japanese rounding out the top five.\textsuperscript{17} Using transcript data from 1986, Richard Lambert, who has written extensively on international studies and foreign language instruction, calculated that fewer than half of all undergraduates took any foreign language, that most of those who did took a year or less, usually at an introductory level, and more generally, that students in foreign language classes came predominantly from the humanities and, to a lesser extent, the social sciences.\textsuperscript{18} A recent report by the American Council on Education, using additional data sources, confirmed the pattern Lambert found but suggested that the total number of undergraduates taking a foreign language might be significantly lower than he thought.\textsuperscript{19}

That said, a few general points are in order. Foreign language departments have a number of constituencies with differing needs and expectations. On campuses where there is a foreign language requirement, generally for students in the arts and sciences but sometimes cast more widely, the needs of undergraduates must be met. Ordinarily, students can “test out” of the requirement if they demonstrate a specified level of proficiency; even so, the task of providing the requisite number of introductory and intermediate language classes can be daunting. Deans of arts and sciences spoke of the logistical problems, and the expense, of offering and staffing these courses. Since students could test out either upon entering or on completion of a semester or two of language study, it was difficult to anticipate the number and level of classes needed in a given semester. The level of instruction was perhaps the most troublesome issue. Demand was heaviest for introductory and intermediate language, with enrollments dropping off sharply at more advanced levels; but foreign language faculty preferred, indeed sometimes insisted, on teaching only literature courses and advanced language. The faculty point of

\textsuperscript{17}The exact figures are Spanish (55%), French (16.7%), German (7.5%), Italian (4.1%), Japanese (3.8%). Richard Brod and Elizabeth B. Welles, “Foreign Language Enrollments in United States Institutions of Higher Education, Fall 1998,” \textit{ADFL Bulletin} 31. 2 (Winter 2000): 22–29.


view was understandable enough. Scholars trained in French or Spanish or Russian language and literature were interested in the substance of their disciplines and in working with more advanced students; from their perspective, teaching introductory language to students interested only in meeting the requirement was a waste of their skills and talents. Given the mismatch between supply and demand, and depending on the flexibility of departments, the usual solution, albeit an expensive one, was to hire additional instructors—adjunct faculty and graduate teaching assistants (TAs)—to teach the introductory classes.

The administrators I interviewed, particularly at universities with large numbers of undergraduates, found this situation increasingly unsatisfactory. They tended to regard language faculty as difficult to deal with, conservative, and unwilling to respond to current realities, though at least one dean conceded that incentives were required for change. And they were looking for ways to reduce the need for introductory language instruction. On several campuses, people talked of increasing the language requirement for entering students, from two years to three or three to four, though for state universities this was problematic, since any change would have implications for state high school curriculum. Moreover, incoming students who had taken several years of language routinely failed the appropriate proficiency test and enrolled in an introductory course anyway. Administrators and faculty alike regarded this as remedial instruction and not, properly speaking, the university’s job. The dean of arts and sciences on one campus faulted the school system for failing to deal with the inadequacies of language instruction: she thought that high schools were “backing away from language more and more.” On another campus, the dean said there should be less introductory language, it was not a good allocation of resources. He didn’t believe in the language requirement, language should be optional. But there was general agreement that “less traditional” ways should be found to provide language instruction—distance learning and summer programs, for example, both for high-enrollment introductory classes and for those languages with chronically low enrollments.

Language and literature departments regarded their principal constituency as advanced students, particularly undergraduate majors and graduate degree students. Enrollments varied from department to department and across campuses, but with the exception of
Spanish, and perhaps French, they were rarely high. On one of the campuses I visited, the dean of arts and sciences commented that, apart from Spanish and to a lesser degree French, language enrollments were “in the cellar,” Russian was vanishing. She was trying to get the language people to do something to promote foreign language study with students; she had persuaded a number of faculty members to offer literature courses in English—this might interest students in studying language, and at least they would become familiar with the literature of another culture. On another campus, an undergraduate dean said that all departments were losing students but, in her experience, when a department broadened its reach to include contemporary literature and culture and film, enrollments increased. Students wanted more than texts and classical literature. A third dean reported that at her university enrollments were relatively high in East Asian languages and literature but low in Middle Eastern, 50 undergraduate majors as against 15. She thought language per se was the deciding factor: Arabic was difficult, so were the languages of East Asia, but there were considerable numbers of Chinese and Japanese native speakers in the student body for whom upgrading their reading and writing skills was relatively easy.

The Chinese and Japanese native speakers point to another growing language constituency, students who were first- or second-generation immigrants and spoke, but could not read or write, their native languages. These “heritage” students were increasingly pushing for instruction in Korean, Vietnamese, and Tagalog, Hindi and Tamil, fueling the demand for these and other “less commonly taught languages” (LCTLs) as well as for area or ethnic studies programs focusing on the regions where those languages were spoken. At UM, for example, Korean language instruction was first offered in the mid-1990s, and a course in Korean civilization followed shortly thereafter. And the director of the Southeast Asian studies program said that heritage students—and their parents—filled the program’s language classes. An administrator at Duke spoke of the push by South Asian students for instruction in the languages of the sub-continent, Sanskrit and Hindi in particular, and the director of the Southern Asia Institute at Columbia, where Tamil and Bengali were first offered in the late 1990s, remarked on the “huge enrollments” in Tamil: it hadn’t been taught before, and there was a huge second generation community.
In the context of internationalization, which is the focus of this study, in a general sense language was promoted as a means of exposing undergraduates to another culture, or as one administrator put it, as a way “to achieve cross-cultural competency.” This was the rationale for reinstituting the language requirement at Duke, though a faculty member in a language and literature department put the point more forcefully when she said that “to be serious about internationalization, you must start with language.” Across other campuses, many but not all agreed. A historian in the Middle East studies program at UW thought that study outside the United States should be counted in lieu of language: “The point of a language requirement for undergraduates is exposure to another culture, it’s not merely a question of taking a language.” One of his colleagues suggested that requiring each entering student to have a passport would be a sensible requirement in terms of internationalizing the university. In any case, if foreign language instruction was intended to provide students with a “window into another culture,” whether and to what extent language requirements and introductory language courses actually did this was a much debated issue.

More specifically, the language needs of students in international programs cut across and overlapped with those of the graduate and undergraduate language and literature constituency, particularly with regard to the more difficult or less commonly taught languages. Students in programs with an area or regional specialization were expected to acquire advanced proficiency in the languages spoken in those regions, a list that included Arabic, Korean, Turkish, Slavic languages other than Russian, the languages of Central Asia such as Uzbek and Kazakh, and the languages of sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast Asia, among others. Few universities had the resources to offer instruction in more than a small number of these languages, and it was expensive to maintain them on a regular basis, particularly beyond the introductory level. Enrollments were low, demand varied from year to year, and it was difficult to find instructors, especially those with some knowledge of language pedagogy. From the administration’s point of view, the question was

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20 “Less commonly taught” is a relative term. According to the 1998 MLA survey, Japanese and Chinese ranked fifth and sixth among the seven most commonly taught languages, but enrollments in both totaled only 6%, while Russian, with just over 2%, was in eighth place, down from sixth in 1990. But all three are regarded as “difficult.”

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which languages to offer, where to offer them, and how to do it in a
cost-effective way.

For languages that fell within the sphere of a language and
literature department, Asian or Middle Eastern or Slavic, the depart-
ment would seem the obvious place to locate a new offering. But
departments set their own priorities and allocated their resources
accordingly. A department was not likely to offer Serbian/Croatian or
Turkish or Thai without additional funding, particularly if the
language was not linked to a literature or culture program, or if the
principal demand came from area programs rather than its own
students. The central issue was money, but the question of language
for whom, and for what purpose, was often a source of tension between
departments and centers devoted to training regional specialists. For
students in an area studies program, the purpose of studying a
language was to become proficient in speaking it and in reading and
studying contemporary written and visual texts, including journals,
newspapers and film. The emphasis was on learning language to use
it in-country. For students in language and literature departments,
there was likely to be more emphasis on classical literature and the
close reading of texts, though some departments embraced contem-
porary culture to a greater or lesser extent. But depending on a
department’s orientation, its faculty might resist providing language
instruction for constituencies other than their own: they viewed it as
a service, like teaching elementary French and Spanish to entering
students, and demeaning because it relegated them to the status of a
service department. This is an old grievance, but a persistent one, and
it remains a divisive issue. At least one faculty member I spoke to, an
anthropologist who works on Southeast Asia, thought it would make
sense to detach basic language instruction from language and litera-
ture departments, at least in cases where there were tensions over
issues of purpose, and put it in the hands of instructors trained in
language pedagogy. But on his campus, the departments resisted such
a move: they needed the large enrollments provided by basic language
classes to justify their budgets to the administration.

For “orphan” languages, those for which there was no appropriate
department or which a department chose not to offer, there were other
venues—other language departments, linguistics departments, free-
standing language centers, and a variety of ad hoc arrangements
brokered through regional centers. At UI, African languages were
offered through the linguistics department; at Columbia, whose
catalog listed some 40 languages, Hungarian was taught in the Italian
department, and a number of LCTLs were offered through the
university’s newly established Language Resource Center. But worry-
ing about where to place a language meant that the resources to teach
it were already in place, and this raises the issue of funding the LCTLs.
In the university community, the groups that had a direct interest in
offering and maintaining these languages were language and literature
departments and area studies programs, for whom certain languages
were essential to the intellectual integrity and viability of their
programs; for different reasons, the growing numbers of heritage
students on campus; and occasionally, administrators, who made the
case that, at least in principle, a university that claimed to be
international should maintain its commitment to foreign language.
The extent of language offerings varied enormously across universities,
with the greatest breadth ordinarily found in institutions with a
longtime commitment to international studies, and a substantial
number of area centers. Thus Columbia, UM, and UW offered the
most LCTLs on campus; Duke and UI offered considerably fewer,
though Duke was able to list many more through consortial arrange-
ments with neighboring institutions.

Funding for the LCTLs, many of which typically enrolled no more
than half a dozen students, came from a combination of internal and
external sources. Departmental budgets supported core languages,
but there was a limit to the number of low-enrollment offerings they
could carry, particularly if budgets were tied to enrollments. The
principal source of external support was the federal government
through Title VI of the Higher Education Act, which provided funds
for area training centers and graduate fellowships for foreign language
study. Title VI grants could be used for a variety of purposes,
including language instruction, but they were often critical to
maintaining low-enrollment languages.21 As of spring 1999, Columbia
offered Hungarian, Uzbek, and Serbo-Croatian, among others, with
the help of Title VI funds. (Here, it is worth noting that when the
university withdrew its share of support for instruction in Serbo-
Croatian, the funds needed to continue offering the language were
raised from the local ethnic communities.) At UW, the chair of South
Asian studies said that Title VI was crucial to maintaining language

21 See below, section V, passim.
instruction; and the director of Southeast Asian studies at UM commented that while the heritage students in the center’s language classes were not part of the Title VI mandate, they were important in terms of outreach to the local community—the center now thinks about this population. Duke’s four area centers were all funded jointly with the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), and one, the North Carolina Center for South Asia Studies, was a four-way collaboration among Duke, UNC, North Carolina State University, and North Carolina Central State University. 22 Duke offered Hindi through its Department of Asian and African Languages and Literatures, but the consortium extended the list of languages to include Bengali, Persian, Sanskrit, and Tamil. In the same way, Duke’s Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East European Studies could offer a greatly expanded menu of languages through its partnership with UNC, and Title VI funding allowed the Duke-UNC Program in Latin American Studies to offer a Mayan summer language program that included a field trip to the Yucatan.

But Title VI funds could not underwrite all LCTLs, and all regional centers were not federally funded. Moreover, having a language on the books was not the same as teaching it on a regular basis. The director of an East Central European center complained that the Slavic department, where most of the center’s languages were taught, had to negotiate with the dean of arts and sciences every year about which languages would be taught and how. It could also happen that several years of minimal or no enrollment in a particular language would result in its disappearance from the curriculum. Low-enrollment languages were fragile. For universities with a broad spread of languages, the question was how to cut costs in order to keep the LCTLs; on campuses with fewer offerings, the question was how to make particular languages or groups of languages that were not taught available to students by alternative means. Consortial programs, with or without Title VI funds, were one way to expand the offerings of two or more universities, and also to cut costs. The Duke-UNC partnership was one such arrangement, and it extended beyond Title VI, to a cooperative graduate program in Slavic languages and literatures, for example, that greatly increased the language offerings available to Duke students. Another was a consortial agreement between Columbia

22 As of the 2003–06 Title VI funding cycle, three of Duke’s four area centers were joint; the fourth was based solely at Duke.
and New York University (NYU), through which the two institutions shared responsibility for certain low-enrollment languages. In spring 1999, Turkish and Akkadian were offered at NYU, and Czech, Polish, Ukrainian, and Sanskrit at Columbia; that fall, Columbia students could take Aramaic and Tagalog at NYU, while NYU students could take Armenian at Columbia. Columbia’s administration anticipated that while the offerings at either site might change, the arrangement would continue. Here it is worth mentioning the obvious, that both the Duke-UNC and Columbia-NYU collaborations were feasible because of the geographic proximity of the partner institutions.

Summer language programs, in the United States and in-country, were another strategy to provide instruction in languages not offered on the home campus, and also to enable students to gain advanced proficiency. When I visited UI in 1998, for example, the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies was sponsoring a summer language institute that offered instruction in Czech, Kazakh, Uzbek, and Russian (only Russian was offered on campus on a regular basis); the center also participated in the Baltic Studies Summer Institute (BALSSI) through the university’s membership in an eight-university consortium that provided partial support for the program. The institute, which rotated among the consortial partners, offered intensive language instruction in Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian, as well as a course in the history and culture of the Baltic States. In structure, BALSSI resembled the Southeast Asian Studies Summer Institute (SEASSI), probably the oldest and best known LCTL summer program. SEASSI was organized by a group of universities with programs in Southeast Asian studies, including UW and UM, in response to the particular problems created by the very large number of languages spoken in Southeast Asia and the language needs of students in the field. Few universities could offer more than at most 3 or 4 of the region’s 20 or so major languages, but SEASSI, which rotated among the member institutions, taught between 8 and 10 languages a summer, with the list changing according to demand. Organizing, in particular finding the instructors for the institutes, continues to be a formidable task, but SEASSI has made it possible to maintain instruction in languages that would not otherwise be taught.
Columbia’s Language Resource Center represented a third strategy to maintain instruction in low-enrollment languages, and also to provide a home for language pedagogy. Started with a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the center was broadly charged with finding more efficient, and more effective, ways to teach language, including the LCTLs; investigating ways to teach languages not currently offered, including alternative formats such as distance learning; and meeting the language needs of Columbia’s professional schools. When I visited Columbia in spring 1999, the center was not yet up and running; but two years later it was offering instruction in Bengali, Punjabi, Romanian, Tagalog, and Tamil, and it had assembled an LCTL database listing resources, both on and off campus, for teaching and learning these languages. The center’s charge to investigate alternative ways to teach language, other than face-to-face classroom instruction, specifically mentioned distance learning. This is a complex question, and one that I have neither the substantive knowledge nor the technical expertise to discuss. But administrators frequently spoke of distance learning as a cost-effective way to provide language instruction, particularly in the LCTLs. At UW, a vice provost commented that the reduction or ending of the Title VI program would affect language instruction in particular, especially low-enrollment languages. If these and other outside funds were cut, the university would move to distance learning, and here he was speaking not only about language but about area programs in general. The merits, and the effectiveness, of the multiple technologies and formats of distance learning are the subject of much debate; but unquestionably distance learning provides a means of offering otherwise unavailable language instruction, whether through linkages with universities in or outside the United States or through packaged programs delivered by video or television. A number of faculty members associated with area programs said as much, and were already using one or another of these technologies on their campuses.

The center’s charge to respond to the needs of Columbia’s professional schools points to a language constituency not mentioned before. The nature and extent of these needs, and how language departments have responded to them, will be discussed in the section that follows.
Professional Schools: Some Impressions

The internationalization of professional schools deserves a study in itself. It is a large subject, and one that the present project does not attempt to cover in a comprehensive way. But because professional schools play an enormously significant role in research universities; because they are, in varying degrees, becoming more international; and because linkages between professional schools and international programs in the arts and sciences are central to the concept of internationalizing across the university, they are an essential part of the discussion. Though the limits of this study did not permit me to interview representatives of every school on every campus I visited, I did talk to faculty and administrators in the business schools of the five target institutions, and more randomly to individuals in schools of law, engineering, public policy, the environment, and the health sciences. The remarks that follow are based on those interviews as well as on interviews with university administrators and international studies faculty in the arts and sciences. The more detailed comments focus primarily on business schools; for the most part, they bypass law schools because I did not talk to enough people to gain an adequate grasp of the issues in that field. Throughout, these observations are impressions based on a limited number of conversations: they make no claim to completeness.

Professional schools setting out to internationalize have done so to some extent through linkages with area studies centers and language departments within the arts and sciences, but more often independently and on a separate timeline. In general, this is because their needs differ from those of the arts and sciences, because they have the resources to put in place their own programs; and because, to a greater degree than the arts and sciences divisions, they are obliged to respond to their constituents, both students and prospective employers. A number of business school faculty and administrators thought that, particularly because of the demands of the market, their schools were “ahead of the game” in the move to internationalize. Others would dispute that claim; but few people from business schools, or from other professional schools, disputed the force of the market. The director of the Chazen Institute of International Business at Columbia’s business school remarked that “business is international—students are at a disadvantage without the background.” And a dean at UI’s College of Engineering, making the case for a more international
curriculum, wrote that the engineering profession was continually becoming more global; it was clear students must develop engineering and personal skills that would enable them to work effectively in an international engineering community.

The question for all professional schools was how to provide their students with the appropriate skills, and perhaps more difficult, what, exactly, was required. At first look, it would seem that area and international studies and language programs were the most obvious resource. Parenthetically, faculty in those programs generally welcomed the professional school connection—it broadened their base of support and gave them access to new resources—though there were some who feared a professional school take-over, or being relegated to the status of service departments. In practice, these collaborations assumed a variety of forms. Programs designed to combine professional training and regional expertise, including language, were one option, and at a number of universities, such programs had been in place for some time. At the University of Washington’s Jackson School of International Studies (JSIS), the master’s program in international studies was specifically designed to complement study for a professional degree, though dual enrollment was not required. As of 1998, more than half of the MA students in the international studies program were also pursuing a degree in one of six professional schools with which JSIS had formal agreements: business administration, forest resources, law, marine affairs, public affairs, and public health. In recent years, there had also been students from engineering, and architecture and urban planning. The concurrent degree program was generally regarded as successful and as defining the school’s niche. But it had limitations. The number of students enrolled was extremely small, perhaps 10 each year. Moreover, some faculty members questioned whether students in fact completed both degrees, especially since the joint degree ordinarily required an extra year; others thought the concept of the joint degree was flawed, that students were being trained in two entirely different ways of thinking with different analytic frameworks, or as a faculty member on another campus put it, students were on two tracks but they didn’t meet inside the student’s head.

At the University of Michigan, joint degree programs, combining an area studies MA with a professional degree, dated from the 1980s. At the end of the 1990s, a number of area programs, including
Chinese studies, Japanese studies, South and Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern and North African, and Russian and Eastern European studies, had joint programs with one or more professional schools, including business, law, public health, and natural resources. Enrollments varied across fields and from year to year, but overall the numbers were small, and here too completion was an issue. Figures collected for a 1996 report on area studies MA programs found that in the period 1989 to 1995, only 37 students had enrolled in joint degree programs with law and business, though it seemed likely that a few more students had not been counted. There were no figures for other professional fields or for completion, though on the basis of its own data, the report concluded that students who elected to pursue dual degrees were exceptionally well motivated, and that completion rates were high.\textsuperscript{23} The administrators I spoke to in the law and business schools agreed that joint degree students tended to complete both degrees: they were a self-selected group and would not have embarked on a joint program unless they intended to finish. But there were naysayers. An administrator at UM’s II commented that it was difficult for professionally oriented students to get regional training, especially adequate language skills; she thought that in the joint program with the business school, a large number of students “didn’t hang around” for the regional MA. Language requirements for the MA varied across regional programs, but it was generally assumed that for students starting a dual degree, in the difficult languages especially, some prior training was essential. On this point, it should be noted that at Michigan, as at UW, professional students were eligible for federally funded fellowships for language study, available through many area centers.

For professional students, the principal obstacles to joint degree programs were time and money. Meeting the requirements for both degrees generally added at least one semester, more often two, to the standard professional program. Since students typically carried a substantial burden of debt, the cost could be prohibitive. The highly structured nature of professional programs was a further disincentive, both because it was difficult to fit in course work and language instruction for the regional degree and because the traditional sequence of summer internships and job interviews was generally

\textsuperscript{23}“Report of the Review Committee on the Area Studies M.A. Programs,” International Institute, University of Michigan, January 31, 1996.
disrupted. At business schools, I heard repeatedly that the recruiting season for MBA students was the fall semester of the second year, with the expectation that candidates would graduate the following spring. Joint degree students with additional semesters to complete suffered from being out of step with their entering cohort. (The same argument worked against semester-long exchange programs, which tended to be offered in the first semester of the second year.) A law school administrator made the same general point: in recruiting for summer internship programs, law firms were interested in how close students were to finishing. Joint degree students lost out to their classmates because they had another year to go.

The structural and financial disincentives inherent in joint programs, together with the fact that, in any case, the pool of candidates was relatively small, meant that inevitably enrollments would be small. An administrator at UM’s business school commented that “the profile never fit that many people anyway,” though he went on to say that no one really knew the size of the market. But clearly there was a market. When I visited UM in spring 1999, the director of the Southeast Asian Studies Center reported that there were perhaps 10 students doing a joint degree with the business school, one with law, and one with public health. Two years of language classes were required, and federal fellowships for language study were available to professional students. Those numbers are impressive. But from the professional schools’ point of view, joint programs could not, and did not, address the more pressing problem of how to provide a large number of students with the skills to work in an international community.

It should be said that undergraduate programs combining a professional major and a regional specialization had more success in attracting students, particularly in business, an enormously popular undergraduate major. At UW’s business school, for example, as of the late 1990s, some 40 out of a total of 700 entering undergraduates enrolled in the International Studies in Business Program, which included area courses; three years of language study; and either a business internship or one quarter of study at an approved site in France, Germany, Japan, or Russia. The numbers were relatively small, but enrollments were steady and sufficient to maintain a viable program. When I visited the University of Iowa in spring 1998, the business school faculty and administrators I talked to said there was
not much international content in the MBA program, though
students and some faculty members were pushing for more; but an
undergraduate Certificate in International Business, open to both
liberal arts and business majors and including area courses and
language, was reported to be doing well and growing. In schools of
engineering, for most students the BS was the terminal degree, and
the four-year undergraduate program was as highly structured as the
master’s in other fields, presenting the same obstacles to acquiring
regional training. The undergraduate International Honors Program
at Duke’s School of Engineering offered a program that combined an
engineering degree with a certificate in regional studies requiring area
courses, language, and either a semester or two summers in a Duke-
approved study abroad program. With careful planning, the program
could be completed in four years. Even so, out of a total of some 1,000
undergraduates, only 5 or 6 students started the program each year.
And this was so in spite of the overwhelmingly positive reviews of its
graduates.

There were other, less extensive, kinds of linkages between profes-
sional schools and international and area programs. UM’s II spon-
sored a dozen or so joint appointments designed to build bridges
between professional schools and the arts and sciences and to facilitate
hiring faculty with international specializations. The positions were
initially intended to be joint between a professional school and an arts
and sciences department—biology and public health, economics and
business, sociology and public policy, for example—but subsequently
they could also be joint with the II itself. UM’s joint appointments
were unique among the campuses I visited, though the same kinds of
appointments were made elsewhere on an ad hoc basis. Specialized
programs linking a particular school with a particular regional center
were a more common form of collaboration. At Duke, for example, the
law school had close ties with Slavic studies and the Center for Slavic,
Eurasian, and East European Studies. Through the center, the Slavic
department offered a course in Law and Emerging Markets in Russia
and the NIS that was cross-listed with the law school, and faculty from
the Slavic department facilitated connections with the faculty of law
of St. Petersburg State University. At UM, the director of the Center
for Southeast Asian Studies remarked that the center’s ties with
professional schools were growing stronger. The center was providing
some language and culture programs for the schools of engineering
and public health, and engineering and medical school students were
now enrolling in regular courses. At UW too, there were strong ties between Southeast Asian studies and public health, and UI offered a graduate and undergraduate interdisciplinary certificate in global health studies, taught by faculty from the social sciences and the health sciences. These connections could be more or less formal, and as often as not evolved from collaboration between faculty members with a shared interest in a research question or region. But again, the number of students reached through such programs was relatively small.

In this context, it is worth mentioning another factor that could limit the effectiveness of linkages across schools, and this was the “cultural divide” between professional schools and the arts and sciences. At UM, for example, though the II was specifically charged with reaching out to professional schools, the joint appointments were a lightning rod for tensions between schools and departments and centers in the arts and sciences; to some degree, so was the II itself, given its location in the College of Letters, Science and the Arts (LS&A). A number of faculty and administrators in LS&A thought the professional schools objected in principle to the arts and sciences connection, and to LS&A’s role in the appointments, though in fact for the most part they were happy with the choices once they were made. But apart from questions of turf and intellectual orientation, it seemed that on both sides, here as elsewhere, to a considerable extent suspicions stemmed from differing concerns and interests. UM’s provost commented that the II had reached out to professional schools, but in ways that came out of its own focus and interests, and these by definition emphasized the humanities and social sciences, with close ties to the area centers; the professional schools were in a position to get their own funding and preferred to go their own way. On the same point, a center director described a meeting of faculty and administrators from the professional schools and LS&A as a “disaster”—people were focused on their own themes, they didn’t seem to care about the concerns of others. At UW, an administrator in the business school spoke of the business school culture as an obstacle to cooperation with regional programs: this was partly a matter of inertia, partly of the different backgrounds of business school faculty, but at bottom he thought it was because there weren’t enough faculty members in the business school who were interested in regional and international issues. He added that the same was true in the other direction of the JSIS faculty.
of UW’s College of Arts and Sciences, speaking of the college’s links to the rest of the university, said the business school was difficult—it had chosen to go its own way. And at UI, a faculty member in the law school with a longtime commitment to international initiatives was disappointed with the participation of law school students and faculty in these programs: they were uninterested and preoccupied with law school-related concerns. He thought there was more to the rhetoric of transdisciplinary programs than the reality, especially in the law school—there were different kinds of programs there than in the arts and sciences.

It seemed evident that for professional schools, joint ventures with the arts and sciences were limited in what they could accomplish: other strategies were required to further the broader international agenda. In looking at these strategies and how they were employed, one should note first the varying degree to which professions, and schools within the same profession, were moving to internationalize. This was partly a matter of mission, partly a matter of the resources available to advance the effort. A second, more obvious, point was the extent to which the needs of professions differed from one another. Since this discussion focuses largely on business schools, examples from two other kinds of professional programs—engineering and the health sciences—follow.

In spring 1998, an administrator at UI’s College of Engineering, commenting on the globalization of the profession, said that companies relied increasingly on international collaboration, that engineering graduates might work overseas at some time during their professional careers, but in many international collaborations, global teams rarely, if ever, met in person. They communicated principally through electronic means—e-mail, teleconferencing, data transmission—so that technical communication was very important. He thought there was “a need but not a necessity” for language skills: he had contacts in Siberia and in France, all of whom spoke English—people who got to the top were almost required to have English—but still, everything was not understood. The language of e-mails had to be clear and concise, and the same was true for teleconferences. He had proposed a program of “virtual international design teams” intended to introduce students to the electronic aspects of international collaboration, emphasizing technical communication. In a pilot project, he had supervised a small group of UI seniors who worked with a group of
French undergraduates to design a wind generator power system for households in southern France. He was pleased with the outcome. The UI students, only one of whom spoke French, learned how to communicate effectively by electronic means; they became familiar with engineering standards and practices in another country; and they got a sense of what it was like to work with international colleagues. The advisor of the French students was equally happy with the results.

UI's College of Nursing took a different route, appropriate to the profession and the needs of its students. When I interviewed the dean in spring 1998, a curriculum revision was underway that would incorporate an international dimension throughout the undergraduate program. The objective was to help students understand they were living in a global society and would work in one, and to make them aware of cultural difference. She pointed out that nursing was a highly cultural phenomenon, that you were taking care of people who were ill; they had different ways of reacting, and there were different ways of taking care of them. The school organized exchange programs and shorter three-week trips to Jamaica and to Russia, designed to expose students to how nursing was done in another culture. The ideal was to give every student such an experience, but she recognized that this was not a practical goal. The alternative was to have a bank of examples for faculty and students, to teach faculty members how to put the examples in different cultural settings and the right language to use in presenting them. The point was less to have students learn what people do in other cultures but rather to learn what questions to ask, how to ask the question, not to make assumptions based on U.S. cultural norms.

The effort to internationalize business schools can be traced back at least to the early 1970s, when what was then the American Assembly of Collegiate Schools of Business recommends that accreditation standards be changed to require a more international emphasis in the curriculum: students should be prepared for “citizenship and leadership roles in business and society—domestic and world-wide.” But it was not until 1980 that the language was made more specific, requiring that “every student should be exposed to the

24 The organization is now called AACSB International, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business.
international dimension through one or more elements of the curriculum.” It was further stated that all schools were not expected to meet this standard in the same way. Business schools took up the challenge with varying degrees of enthusiasm, varying approaches, and varying degrees of success. For schools that embraced internationalization, the rhetoric of catalogues, bulletins, and other informational materials was important in defining their mission, in attracting students both in the U.S. and internationally, and in heightening the school’s visibility as a locus of strong international programs. At UM’s business school, which had moved aggressively on the international front, the dean’s foreword to an international business brochure published in the early 1990s noted the school’s leading role “in internationalizing business studies and providing business students with a global perspective. We regard international business competency as an integral part of the MBA tool kit.” “Are you ready to take on the World?” asked the title of the 1997–98 bulletin of Duke’s Fuqua School of Business. The dean’s message responded that “today’s MBAs must be prepared for this challenge,” adding that “in all we do, we seek to expand our students’ global understanding.” The introduction assured prospective students that the focus on effective management in the global economy ran through every facet of the MBA program, and that “no other leading U.S. school has been as responsive to the need for managers with global outlook and cross-cultural understanding.” The dean’s message introducing the 1998 report of Columbia’s Chazen Institute of International Business led off with the assertion that “Columbia Business School is becoming widely acknowledged as the finest international business school in the world,” a reputation that grew largely from the institute’s activities. Since its establishment in 1991 with a $10 million gift from Jerome A. Chazen, former chairman of Liz Claiborne, Inc., the institute had “become the force that shapes virtually every aspect of the business school’s global agenda.” The presence of the institute was credited


with, among other things, increasing the school’s international student enrollment and its recruitment efforts outside the United States, promoting faculty research on international issues, and a curriculum revision designed to incorporate internationalism in every course. The report expanded on these themes and emphasized the advantages of Columbia’s location in New York, “arguably the world’s most international city.” The rhetoric of these various publications was persuasive enough: to what extent it reflected the reality was another matter. An administrator at UM’s business school remarked that all schools felt they had to use the rhetoric of “international” and “global” to keep up with the competition; the question was to what extent the international dimension really was present throughout the curriculum.

Business schools moving to internationalize had to decide initially whether to set up a separate international track, and perhaps a specialized degree, or to focus on incorporating an international dimension throughout the curriculum. The two paths were not mutually exclusive: it was a matter of emphasis and allocation of resources. As it happened, all the schools I visited had opted for the second approach, though several offered international concentrations or programs. In the case of Duke’s Fuqua School, for example, “Are you ready to take on the World?” was the title of the school’s general bulletin, not a separate publication describing its international programs. A relatively young school, Fuqua graduated its first MBA class in 1972 and began its effort to internationalize in the mid-1980s. The dean’s committee charged with devising an internationalization strategy recommended that the school incorporate an international dimension into all its courses rather than establishing a separate department or division. Subsequent accounts relate that the decision was made largely on the grounds that a separate division would be isolated from the rest of the school and have little influence on the program and, further, that to create a special department would require hiring more new faculty than was feasible. The objective was to make the whole school more international in focus. A significant number of faculty were not happy with the decision: they felt they had enough to do without taking on the additional burden of internationalizing their courses and research. But over the next decade, through a

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combination of education, persuasion, and new hires, the orientation of the school changed. When I visited Duke early in 1998, an administrator in the business school reported that an international dimension “was incorporated in all courses, including core courses”: the international element was “organic, not adjunct.” Even so, a director in the office of international programs noted that a large number of students followed a U.S.-focused program, though she added that two international courses were required. At Columbia, the business school’s already strong international focus was greatly enhanced by the establishment of the Chazen Institute. Because global issues were incorporated in all courses, the school did not offer an international degree, though international business was one of more than a dozen optional concentrations. The institute’s director said there were still some domestic-centered courses, that some faculty needed to be pushed to include an international dimension. An internationalization committee rounded up syllabi and looked at the degree of international content, but there was some resistance, particularly from faculty who had developed their own courses. For most people, the motivation to internationalize was largely self-interest, but financial incentives helped. This was the carrot approach, but resources were required. The institute offered a prize to recognize faculty members “who conceive new ways to teach issues in international business,” and a second prize had just been introduced for a piece of international research.

The reluctance of faculty to incorporate international content into their research and teaching was common to business schools and to the arts and sciences, and essentially for the same reasons. A faculty member at UI spoke of the tension between the “scholarly demands” of departments and the international needs of the school, adding that the international lost out. At UW, an administrator commented that faculty were too “bogged down” in offering required disciplinary courses to develop new international materials; there weren’t enough faculty members whose main interests were international. In business schools, as in the arts and sciences, providing financial incentives for faculty was one response to the problem; another was hiring new faculty whose interests were in international fields. But just as incentives required resources, so, of course, did new faculty positions. By and large, business schools were able to come up with the necessary funds, either internally or through seeking outside support. But schools without a relatively solid financial base were at a disadvantage,
and in danger of losing their competitive edge. On the question of resources, it is important to note that some 25 schools, including 4 of the 5 in this study, received funding from the U.S. Department of Education through their designation as Centers for International Business Education (CIBE). The centers, also known as CIBERs—the “r” was added for “research”—received on average about $300,000 a year, which could be used for a variety of purposes, including curriculum development, student and faculty research, language instruction, international internships and exchanges, and outreach to the local business community. On the campuses I visited, CIBER funds were particularly important to language instruction, curriculum development, and faculty and student research, and they provided seed money for a wide range of international initiatives.

Internationalizing the business school curriculum was a central component of the internationalization agenda, but there were other programs designed to further the effort. Every school cited the number of foreign or international students enrolled in the MBA program, ordinarily about 30 percent, and Columbia and Duke in particular spoke of active recruitment efforts in other parts of the world. Most schools also offered various kinds of internships, exchange programs and study tours, and the opportunity for language study.

On the campuses I visited, apart from programs combining a regional studies MA with an MBA, there was not much language in the MBA program, even the internationalized MBA. This was partly for pragmatic reasons: students found it difficult to fit language study into their already crowded schedules, particularly if this meant taking a course in an arts and sciences language department, and language credits rarely counted toward the degree. But the larger point appeared to be that English was regarded as the international language of business: a second language might be useful but it was not essential, though several faculty members commented that while this was true, “English takes you just so far.” Since this was the official stance of most schools, it is not surprising that for the most part, students chose not to take advantage of the opportunities available for language study. At Duke, as of spring 1998, only Spanish at the beginning and intermediate levels was offered through the Fuqua School, though students could continue a language in arts and sciences. Administrators reported that Japanese had also been offered,
but while students had expressed interest initially, there were no takers. At Columbia, the Chazen/EXCEL language program offered half a dozen non-credit language courses every semester at various levels, ranging from beginning to advanced. Classes met once a week for eight weeks, were open to students, faculty, and administrators, and emphasized conversational skills and business terminology. As of 1999, these classes were taught off-campus through a proprietary language school. The specific languages varied according to the needs of interested students, but recently the list had included Russian, Korean, French, Chinese, Spanish, German, Italian, and Japanese. A second, intensive program for intermediate and advanced students in Chinese, French, and Spanish, again emphasizing specialized language skills, was taught through Columbia’s CIBER, which the business school shared with SIPA, and offered during the January break. As of spring 1999, the Chinese and Spanish programs were taught by Columbia’s language departments, but the French program was based at Marymount Manhattan College in New York. A SIPA administrator explained that the attitudes of language faculty depended on the individual: some were willing to teach “special purpose” classes, some were not. It was hoped that Columbia’s new Language Resource Center would find more efficient ways to meet the language needs of professional students.29

At UW’s business school, the same pattern prevailed. Some language departments were willing to cooperate in meeting the needs of professional students, others were not. As of spring 1997, special purpose language courses were offered for professional students in Japanese, Chinese, German, Russian, and Spanish. Targeted to students with intermediate and upper-level proficiency, the courses were offered through the university’s extension program. Enrollments were small, with students both from the university and from outside; instructors were mostly from outside the university—an administrator said they were “hard to find.” The literature describing UM’s international business program drew attention to the exceptionally large number of languages taught in the university, and encouraged students to take advantage of the opportunities offered. It also noted that the business school’s CIBER sponsored classes in business French, German, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, and Arabic, some offered through the university’s language departments, others

29 For the Language Resource Center, see above, 50.
not. On the matter of special purpose language, it should be noted that a number of language faculty questioned the concept itself, and this obviously affected their willingness to teach it. The director of Columbia’s Language Resource Center thought there was a good deal of misunderstanding on the question of language for professional school students—“basic French is basic French.” He didn’t think there was much validity in special purpose languages, though they were useful in getting across the cultural aspects of business—in maximizing “the contact between students and the target culture.” A faculty member at Duke regarded “business Chinese, Japanese, Korean” as “useless” unless there was a base to build on, at least one year, preferably two. Otherwise, “people have to unlearn what they’ve been taught in those courses.” Nonetheless, the reality appeared to be that professional school students took special purpose language if they took any language at all.

Exchange programs, study tours, and overseas internships were another important element in international programs, all of them designed to give students an international experience. Exchanges varied in length and format, but ordinarily students spent a semester, or part of a semester, studying at a partner institution in some other region of the world. The list of partners ordinarily included schools in a number of European countries, Australia, Latin America, China, Southeast Asia, and occasionally South Africa. Language requirements varied according to the program. The exchange could be literal, “body for body” as at Columbia’s Chazen Institute, or defined somewhat more loosely, so that approximately the same number of students came to the U.S. institution. Speaking of the exchanges, Chazen’s director commented that while the material taught was the same, the cultural experience of studying in a different environment could be significant. At Columbia as of 1999, of nearly 1,000 students enrolled in the MBA program, each year perhaps 25 participated in the school’s 21 exchange programs scattered over 17 countries. At Duke’s Fuqua School, in 1998 there were 20 exchange programs in 15 countries. With a total enrollment of about 700 MBA students, about 35 participated in the exchange program each year. This appeared to be the pattern elsewhere as well: a relatively large number of programs but a small number of takers. There was general agreement that the principal obstacle to participation was the timing of the exchanges, which were ordinarily scheduled in the fall semester of the second
Traditionally this was recruiting season, and most students were understandably reluctant to be away from campus during those months. At Duke, an administrator said there was a move to shift the exchanges to the second semester of the second year, but it was not clear how much effect this would have. No one I talked to speculated on the size of the pool for semester-long exchanges, which may have been small in any case; but I heard on numerous occasions that students footing high tuition bills at the schools of their choice opted to get their money’s worth at the home campus rather than elsewhere.

Study tours avoided the practical obstacles inherent in semester exchanges, but provided students with an international experience, albeit a limited one. These were faculty-led trips of 15 to 25 students, ordinarily ranging from 7 to 21 days, to one or more countries in various regions of the world. The groups visited businesses, factories, and cultural sites, and met with government officials, leaders in business and industry, students in counterpart schools, and business school alumni, who could be important future contacts. The tours were sometimes offered for credit, sometimes not and, depending on the school, were preceded by varying amounts of classroom preparation and subsequent follow-up. Study tours were criticized for being too short and too superficial to give students any real sense of what it was like to do business in another cultural setting; an administrator commented that they had some value, but when they weren’t offered for credit, students didn’t take them seriously, “so the vacation aspect is there.” Others I spoke to thought that in spite of their limitations, they gave students at least some international experience. The flexibility of study tours made them attractive to large numbers of students, even though there was a price tag attached, generally between $2,000 and $3,000. At Columbia’s Chazen Institute, the tours were student initiated, and some 200–300 students participated each year; at Duke, the Fuqua bulletin reported that more than 20 percent of the school’s MBA students participated in a 1997 study tour. The contacts made through study tours and exchange programs often led to internship opportunities, a third way for students to gain international experience. Internship placements came from a wide variety of sources, from individual alumni or faculty to formal partnerships linking schools with international businesses and organizations. CIBERs often provided travel funds for internships, and at some institutions for exchanges and study tours as well.
There were other ways in which business schools expanded their international reach, though this is not the place to discuss them in any detail. A growing number of schools had established, or planned to establish, overseas campuses intended to provide opportunities for the school’s students, to tap into a new pool of students who would bring in additional tuition revenue, and to raise the school’s international profile. A few schools had developed relationships with partner institutions that enabled students to attend either school in the course of completing the MBA. The range of executive education programs offering certificates or MBAs to U.S. and international managers on the home campus, at sites around the world, or through a combination of both, falls beyond the limits of this study. Designed to provide further training for business professionals while they remain on the job, these programs were packaged to meet the needs of global enterprises. They were also moneymakers, and from this perspective, as one faculty member put it, irresistible to business school administrations.
Area and international studies at U.S. universities date from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but centers devoted to research and training in the language and culture of particular regions of the world were an outgrowth of the Second World War, when the United States found itself ill-prepared to deal with the countries engaged in the conflict, especially those outside Western Europe. During the war, the small number of academic experts on foreign areas were enlisted in the nation's intelligence effort; they were also called upon to set up university-based training centers to turn out specialists in the languages and cultures of areas considered to be of strategic importance to the nation. At the end of the war, some of these centers continued to exist, largely through the support of private foundations, notably the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations and, from the 1950s, the Ford Foundation. At Columbia, the Russian Institute, now the Harriman Institute, was established in 1946, followed by the East Asian Institute in 1949; the first center at the University of Michigan, the Center for Japanese Studies, was created in 1947; and by 1949, the University of Washington had both a Department of Far Eastern and Slavic Languages and Literature and a Far Eastern and Russian Institute.

The number of institutes and centers grew rapidly in the decade thereafter, spurred in part by the continuation of the Cold War. The launching of Sputnik in 1957 shook U.S. complacency and heightened national awareness of the need to know more about developments not only in the Soviet Union and its client states but in other parts of the world. Title VI of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA), passed the following year, responded to this need, providing funds for research and training in international and foreign language studies through support for area centers and fellowships for graduate students. The Fulbright-Hays Act, passed shortly thereafter, offered support for dissertation and faculty research abroad, adding an overseas dimension to the Title VI program. The explicit rationale for Title VI was national security, defined to include economic security. Subsequently reauthorized as part of the Higher Education Act of 1965, Title VI continues to be the single most important source of funding for area studies in U.S. universities.
There are now several hundred area studies centers and programs at colleges and universities across the country, 113 of them National Resource Centers (NRCs) that receive Title VI funding. (The figure is for the funding cycle that runs from August 2000 to August 2003.)\(^{30}\) Their numbers vary from one university to another, as does the number of NRCs on a given campus from one three-year funding cycle to the next. It is virtually impossible to generalize about these centers. The most significant variables are resources, which can differ enormously from one center to another, depending on the existence of dedicated endowments and other outside funding; visibility and perceived importance, which tend to shift as national interest in a region shifts; and the center’s status on campus, which varies in relation to its leadership and the key faculty associated with it. It is also the case that availability of resources and national attention to a region attract students, and student interest translates into the enrollments necessary to maintain course offerings and language instruction.

Despite these differences, in recent years area centers have faced a common set of problems. Long in the forefront of international studies, their preeminence has declined since the 1970s, when federal and foundation funding was sharply curtailed, and on many campuses they have been marginalized. At the same time, area studies as a form of scholarly inquiry has been questioned, together with its role in the academic enterprise. The reasons are several, some a consequence of relatively recent events, some of longstanding. In summary and to start with the obvious, the world has changed dramatically since the 1950s. The emergence of the global economy and the ongoing revolution in technology have already changed the nature of economic and political relationships between countries and regions, and moved the world toward greater interdependence. Shifting political alignments and proliferating centers of power are straining the limits of existing political institutions, up to and including the nation-state. These developments present new challenges to scholars seeking to understand the forces shaping the twenty-first-century world. Many of them reject the area studies approach as too narrow, opting instead for a broader perspective that looks at common problems across regions and views them in transnational or global terms. This is one element of the critique of area studies. A second relates to the genealogy of the area studies enterprise and its roots in the Cold War.

\(^{30}\)In the 2003–06 funding cycle, the number of NRCs has increased to 121.
The argument here is that the national security rationale, area expertise as a means for “us” to learn about “them,” carried with it an imperialist bias that skewed the research agenda. The obsolescence of the Title VI area categories and their failure to reflect new regional entities and changing demographics is a third element in the critique. The collapse of the Soviet Union is the most obvious case of the need to redefine areas, in this instance to accommodate the successor states of the former USSR and the countries that were part of the Soviet bloc. The end of the Soviet system threw the field of Russian studies into disarray; in signaling the end of “the communist menace,” it removed the major threat to national security, threatening federal funding for the area studies community as a whole. Though fears of severe reductions in Title VI funding, or even its termination, proved to be unfounded, they contributed to the pervasive malaise that afflicted the area studies enterprise in the early 1990s.

The challenge to area studies as a form of intellectual inquiry was central to that malaise. It came from theoretically oriented scholars working in the social sciences, particularly economics, political science, and sociology, intent on making their disciplines truly “scientific.” The principal battleground has been political science. The broad outlines of the debate are well known, the heated exchanges of the mid-1990s depressingly familiar. But because the dispute has had a major impact on international and area studies, it is worth reviewing the principal points at issue. Briefly, and at the risk of oversimplification, area specialists seek to know in depth the language, society, and culture of a particular region. They posit the distinctiveness of the region; their work is based on data gathered through field research. Area studies is thus region-centered and interdisciplinary; its methodology is primarily empirical. Social scientists seek to explain individual and institutional behavior, irrespective of context, by developing theories that can be generalized and tested against data from many parts of the world. Their data can be gathered empirically but more often it comes from previously assembled data-sets. They are rooted in the discipline, their armamentarium is theory, their field of study is anywhere and everywhere. They tend to dismiss area-based knowledge as atheoretical, methodologically unsophisticated, descriptive rather than explanatory, and incapable of making substantial contributions to the discipline. It goes without saying that this characterization of the two positions is
overdrawn: theoretical social scientists do not reject wholesale the area studies approach; area specialists do not reject the need for theory. Between the two extremes there is a large middle ground.

The debate between area studies and the social sciences dates back at least to the 1960s, but it was muted in earlier decades, when the federal government and private foundations were supporting area centers and scholars at generous levels. There was money enough to go round. The rift became overt in the 1970s and 1980s when those funds were cut back, and at the same time university budgets were shrinking. In the competition for resources, area centers stood to lose, because of the supremacy of the disciplines in the academic hierarchy and also because area programs are expensive to maintain, given their need for specialized faculty, libraries, and language instruction. A 1974 report on area studies and centers at UM underscored this point. Speaking of the interdisciplinary nature of area studies, the report observed that, given the tendency of American academic institutions to organize according to disciplines, “it is doubtful that area studies and centers would have gained much strength had it not been for the external funding that came from foundations and the federal government.” It went on to say that this situation was now changing, with funding from traditional sources on the decline.31 Writing 10 years later but using data from the late 1970s and early 1980s, Richard Lambert, a longtime commentator on international and area studies, thought that in the struggle between area studies and the disciplines, the disciplines had already won. He reported that area programs already feared regional specialists in the social sciences would not be replaced, particularly in economics, sociology, and psychology. (Interestingly, at this point he included political science among the core area studies disciplines, together with history, anthropology, and language and literature).32 These last two comments point to the principal problems area studies has had to contend with over the last 25 years: its interdisciplinary nature; the high cost of maintaining area programs; and above all, the matter of appointments, particularly in social science fields.


The rhetorical excesses of the area studies debate peaked in the mid-1990s, and while tensions remain, most participants would agree that the dispute was unduly polarized, the issues framed in terms of a choice between two approaches that are in fact complementary. The need for regional context is now generally recognized across the disciplines. The members of a task force convened by the dean of Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs articulated the consensus position when they concluded that “there is no real knowledge of theory without knowledge of place, and no real knowledge of place without knowledge of theory.”33 Or as one political scientist remarked, “social scientists do spend time in the field. Good work has to be about something.”

By the last years of the decade, the sense of crisis in the area studies community had passed. Federal funding did not end with the end of the Cold War, and though the budget for the Title VI and Fulbright-Hays programs was reduced in 1996, the appropriation for the following year more than made up for the cuts, and continued to increase through the end of the decade. Russian studies, of all fields the most directly affected by the end of the Cold War, is emblematic of regional studies as a whole. Two essays written by the director of a Russian studies center, the first in the summer of 1996, the second in the summer of 1998, illustrate the recovery of that field.34 The first piece reflected puzzlement, the loss of a sense of purpose, and the end of the Golden Age of government and foundation funding that characterized the Cold War years. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the longtime focus of research and teaching, there was an urgent need to reorient the Russian studies agenda to take into account new political realities and the complex economic and social issues emerging across the region. The process had already begun, but the essay’s predominant theme was “what next,” and the answers were not yet clear. Writing two years later, the director’s tone was upbeat not only about his own center but about the field as a whole, now called Russia, Eurasia, and East Central Europe. Though funding was down from its Cold-War peak, it had by no means vanished and


currently supported a more diverse array of fields. At his own university, enrollments in both Russian language and history and politics courses had reversed their decline. Overall, he was encouraged by developments in the field and looked forward to an interesting and exciting future. Asked what had changed from 1996 to 1998, the director said that by the summer of 1998 Russian studies had mobilized in the face of threat: it had redefined its mission. Scholars were working on Russia but also on the non-Russian states of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The field had opened up not only through bringing new regions into its orbit, but also because there was greater contact with scholars from the region, growing numbers of students from the region were coming to study at U.S. universities, and field work was now possible. At this director’s center, the outlook was positive.

Area studies had proved remarkably resilient. But by the end of the 1990s, the surrounding landscape had shifted. Within regional scholarship, there was now more emphasis on comparative work across and within regions; on collaborative work with colleagues from other disciplines and regional specializations, and with scholars from the region; and on problem-focused work dealing with broad themes such as democratization, migration, ethnicity and identity. These new directions, particularly the last, favored certain regions over others: scholars follow their interests in a regional sense, and social scientists in particular found Eastern Europe, Russia and the successor states of the former Soviet Union fertile ground for their work. More fundamentally, questions remained about the place of regional studies in the disciplines, as well as within the academic enterprise as a whole. University administrators spoke of “reorienting” or “repositioning” the area studies agenda and pushed for linkages with other units on campus, especially with professional schools. In effect, area studies was being asked to justify itself in terms of its contribution to scholarship and to the larger academic community.

In this changed environment, area scholars and area programs confront three interrelated problems. The first is the lack of recognition accorded to international, including regional, scholarship within the academy; the second is the matter of appointments; the third, cutting across the first two, is the question of resources. Though circumstances vary from department to department and from one university to another, it is generally the case that international work
brings few rewards and incurs considerable cost. In the social sciences in particular, except in fields such as history and anthropology, where knowledge of a specific culture or cultures is intrinsic to the discipline, the international dimension tends to be incidental to the disciplinary core and thus devalued; university-wide, international work encounters the same difficulties as interdisciplinary work, in part because much of it is interdisciplinary, and interdisciplinary projects have always found it difficult to gain a foothold within the academy. A center director at Duke commented that it was hard to get people to do international work because it is not built into the reward system. Being an advocate for international studies, he said, was “a Sisyphean task.” In some sense, this is a closet issue: it is mentioned in reports and plans for internationalization but then disappears from view; individual faculty members acknowledge the problem, but administrators and department chairs tend to dismiss it. UM’s report on international studies commented that a number of faculty members believed international work was viewed as “peripheral” to the core subject matter in some of the social sciences and professional schools, and consequently peripheral to the requirements for promotion and tenure. These perceptions appeared to have an influence on the career choices of young and future faculty. Duke’s report made the same observation—that junior faculty “in some fields” thought international research and teaching were not recognized and rewarded as much as work in the disciplinary core. In both instances, further inquiry and appropriate remedies were suggested, and there the matter ended.

The system’s failure to reward international work is scarcely a new issue, but as the two reports suggest, it has a direct impact on the recruitment of young scholars to international fields. This raises the second problem, the matter of appointments. With the obvious exception of language and culture departments, the era of quasi-permanent positions dedicated to particular regions of the world is over. There are exceptions, but in general retiring faculty with regional specializations are no longer replaced as a matter of course. Their positions are being redefined at the departmental level, and in some cases reclaimed by the dean or provost for reallocation elsewhere. The situation is worst in the social sciences—economics, political science, and sociology—but it exists in humanities departments as well. Administrative units—centers, institutes, schools—that control a certain number of appointments or have a formal vote in filling them
are in a stronger position than those that have no such leverage. But, since it is desirable, sometimes required, that these appointments be joint with a disciplinary department, finding a candidate whose credentials are acceptable to the regional program and the department can be extremely difficult. Again, the situation varies from department to department and from one university to another, but more often than not, success depends on negotiation, persuasion, and sometimes serendipity. Endowed or externally funded positions offer an alternative solution, but these are in short supply and in any case cannot be expected to provide a core program faculty. In the circumstances, there is little incentive for graduate students in social science fields (other than anthropology and history) to invest time and money in acquiring language and area expertise. If students happen to have a regional specialization, either from living in a given region or from their undergraduate training, they discount it when they face the academic job market, packaging themselves in terms of their disciplinary credentials. As junior faculty, they insist they are not area scholars, and should their interests lie in the direction of regional work, they postpone it until they are safely tenured. An assistant professor of sociology with a regional interest reported that at his university, he was told repeatedly not to be an area specialist, that area journals “don’t count.” But many younger scholars, including this one, are more open than their mentors to a variety of methodologies and approaches. They have no stake in the area studies debate and are finding new ways to incorporate a regional dimension into their work.

The difficulty of making appointments affects the recruitment of senior faculty as well. The number of senior scholars working in international and regional fields is small, those who also have high profiles in their respective disciplines smaller still. The competition to recruit these individuals is intense, and success can be expensive. Moreover, if a candidate is offered a position with a generous research budget attached, she is less likely to be interested in the research funds a regional center could provide or to want to devote much time to the center’s affairs, even if this is part of the job description. Regional expertise notwithstanding, the pull is toward the discipline, and understandably so, since this is where scholarly reputations are made.

At virtually every campus I visited I heard complaints that regional positions in the social sciences were not being replaced, that the base of regional and international expertise was eroding. This was true even
at those universities where there were dedicated positions, or some other mechanism designed to maintain strength in regional programs was in place.

**University of Michigan**

In the early 1980s, in an effort to protect the university's traditional strength in area studies at a time of severe budget cuts, UM's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LS&A) designated a pool of area studies positions that would be protected "at least partially" from being moved out of area studies. Initially, 22 positions were identified, known as FASAC positions from the Foreign Area Studies Advisory Committee that recommended their creation. All but 3 were in the social sciences, including history. The number now stands at 27, all but 4 in the social sciences. As these numbers suggest, the plan was designed primarily to shore up the social sciences; it also reflected the fact that a significant number of area positions had already been lost. (The Jackson Report (1989) described the FASAC mechanism as "ingenious but not entirely successful," citing "strong evidence" that over the last decade or so some 40 core international studies positions had been lost.\(^{35}\) The FASAC positions are now administered by UM's II.\(^{36}\) The II can shift the field of a position within a designated region, but approval of LS&A's executive committee is required for a shift from one region to another.

To a considerable extent, the FASAC positions have accomplished what they were intended to, but they have encountered two principal obstacles. First, since they are departmental appointments, they are often difficult to fill, particularly in economics, political science, and sociology, and as a result some slots have remained vacant for five or six years or more. This can be a matter of intransigence on the part of the disciplinary department, rigidity on the part of the area program, or a combination of both. Whatever the reasons, unfilled positions eventually lead to a loss of students and a decline in the program's reputation. Positions on the books make little difference if no appointments are made. Second, if junior faculty are hired, their tenure prospects are more than usually problematic, since area centers have a voice in the search and hiring process but not in tenure decisions. A junior faculty member, appointed to a FASAC position

\(^{35}\) Jackson Report, 44.

\(^{36}\) See above, 24-35.
in a discipline not much interested in regional expertise, underscored the difficulties facing all young scholars in theoretical social science fields. Remark ing that the advertisement for the UM job was the only one in the country over a period of two years that specified his regional field, he emphasized the importance of "hanging out" in the department rather than the center. He also pointed out that the department recognized the need to teach undergraduate courses on the region to meet student demand, a point made frequently by faculty at other universities. Departments were prepared to hire junior faculty for this purpose, but in the research university setting, undergraduate teaching does little to improve a young scholar's tenure prospects.

The FASAC mechanism has made a substantial contribution to maintaining UM's area programs, but it is not in and of itself a solution to the range of problems confronting them. Both faculty and administrators mentioned the particular difficulties involved in rebuilding an area studies field. They cited the example of the China program, a leader in China studies in the 1960s and 1970s which fell on hard times in the 1980s. The program is now being rebuilt. Ideally, a mix of senior and junior appointments would be desirable; but as one administrator pointed out, there are very few people at the top of the pyramid who are also movable, and it will take time for the younger scholars to establish themselves. It will, he said, be "a long road back." And this is the case even though there are seven FASAC positions in the China field.

The Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington

UW's Jackson School of International Studies (JSIS) began life in the early years of the twentieth century as the Department of Oriental Subjects and has evolved through nine decades and almost as many name changes into its present form. In the 1930s, Russian language instruction was added to the department's offerings, and at the end of the 1940s an interdepartmental Far Eastern and Russian Institute was established, with a Department of Far Eastern and Slavic Languages and Literature at its core. The institute was charged with promoting interdisciplinary research in the social sciences, while the department continued to shelter language instruction and research and teaching in the humanities. Institute and department remained
closely connected until the late 1960s, when the department was divided into its Asian and Slavic components, and both were split off from the institute. Through the following decade, the institute expanded its reach to include the study of other regions of the world and in 1983, several name changes later, was renamed the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies in recognition of Senator Jackson’s commitment to international studies and to the school.37

The Jackson School’s origins in regional studies defined its mission for the long term, and over the years it has maintained its area studies focus. JSIS now offers 13 degree programs, all but 3 of which are in regional fields; it has a faculty of 35 more or less, about half of whom are full-time appointments, the other half joint appointments spread over a variety of departments.38 Another 10 faculty members have voting rights in the school by virtue of their positions as program heads. In a document prepared for the 10-year review of JSIS in spring 1999, the director wrote that “what the school does is to offer academically challenging programs with a strong interdisciplinary emphasis and an international focus that is, most often, grounded in area expertise.” But maintaining the faculty to staff these programs has become increasingly difficult. The full-time positions controlled by JSIS are too few to meet the needs of all the programs under its umbrella; moreover, by virtue of the school’s history, these are heavily concentrated in the East Asia and Russian studies programs. The director’s leverage with other departments is not great enough to ensure that joint positions, or positions important to a program but entirely within a department, will be replaced by regional specialists when they fall vacant.

Since JSIS is a department within the College of Arts and Sciences and its director is de facto a department chair, when a position in JSIS becomes open, the director requests permission from the dean of arts and sciences to search for a replacement. He bases his case on the needs of the program and the school, and also on enrollments, since both the state and the university track the number of graduates per degree-granting program, and university funding is tied to enrollments. This


38 As of academic year 1998–99, the precise figures were 34 faculty members, 17 full-time appointments, another 17 joint, spread over 9 departments.
has been a problem for JSIS since undergraduate enrollments in regional studies programs tend to be low. 39 Most full-time JSIS positions are filled in this way, though current budgetary constraints make it unlikely that a senior faculty member who resigns or retires will be replaced by a scholar of comparable rank. This creates a problem for all programs that lose senior faculty. JSIS faculty and administrators were particularly concerned about the Japan program, which as of 1999 had five senior faculty members appointed within JSIS, four of whom were likely to retire in the next several years. They feared that if these scholars, or even half of them, were replaced at the junior level, the quality of the program would suffer.

In the case of joint appointments where JSIS controls half the position’s salary, the director negotiates with the department to secure a replacement in the same field or at least in an international field. He does not always succeed. Given the current priorities of social science departments, a given department is not necessarily prepared to accommodate JSIS’s need for a regional specialist. Here again, replacing a senior scholar is particularly difficult, both because the number of viable candidates is small and because recruiting these individuals is expensive. A historian of East Asia lamented the tendency to replace senior with junior faculty, but said that in any case, “there isn’t enough money to hire top disciplinary scholars.” Finally, if the director of JSIS has some influence over appointments whose salary is shared, in replacing program faculty who are paid entirely by another department he has virtually none. Here it is a matter of negotiation, persuasion, and luck.

A few examples will illustrate these difficulties. In the political science department, two regional specialists recently retired but the department agreed to replace only one, leaving one program without a key member of its faculty. The head of the program that lost its political scientist, one of two positions jointly appointed with JSIS, anticipated losing the second position as well. He described the program as entirely dependent on departments to maintain a core faculty; since he had no leverage, his role was “to schmooze, persuade,

39 One response to this problem, and also to the problem of limited faculty resources, was to replace the five majors in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, South, and Southeast Asian studies with a single Asian Studies major with five separate tracks. The five separate majors together had 35–40 students; as of 1998–99 the new combined major had 50–55.
and wheedle.” Given the competition from other regional programs, the disciplines, and state budgets, appointments in his program come about by chance. The program was at a further disadvantage because of lack of interest in the region in the United States. Overall, the prospects were bleak. But three months later, he said that things were looking up. No less than eight new faculty members had been appointed either in the field or with interests in it. As head of the program, he had been consulted and had interviewed candidates for six of the new positions but played no role in the searches for the other two. But he was quick to point out that for the most part the appointments were serendipitous. The fate of the program really rested with disciplinary departments: they controlled appointments and were rarely interested in regional specializations. This may have been an extreme case, but to one degree or another the same circumstances held for other programs.

The difficulty of maintaining a faculty adequate to staff the Jackson School’s regional and international programs goes to the core of its mission; more broadly, it calls into question the survival of a social science presence within area studies. The small number of appointments entirely within the school, initially intended to make possible appointments in the disciplines least sympathetic to regional specialists, cannot cover the core faculty needs of JSIS’s programs; given national disciplinary trends, it might not be able to do so in any case without some intervention from university administration. External resources help by providing funds for endowed positions and to raise the salary levels of others to make them more attractive to desirable candidates. But outside money is not a long-term solution. JSIS’s recently retired director hoped the university and the College of Arts and Sciences might come up with a better one.

Money alone is not a solution, but it helps. This has been a recurring theme throughout the present discussion, and it raises the third problem alluded to earlier, how to find the resources required to sustain the area studies enterprise. More than most academic units, area centers and programs have always been dependent on external support, both private and public, and they are thus more vulnerable to shifting priorities in federal and foundation funding. Centers with endowments, either for general or specific purposes, are to some
degree insulated from these trends and in a stronger position than their peers. Money for faculty chairs, graduate student support, faculty research and travel, and program-related activities obviously makes centers more attractive to students and faculty associated with them. In this regard, East Asia centers tend to be the richest, in part because they tend to be the oldest. Many of these programs benefited from the support of individuals before World War II; from foundations and the federal government during and after the war; and more recently from both private and government sources in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Russian centers are also among the oldest, but they have fared less well in securing a reliable resource base, largely because they were hit hard by the precipitous drop in federal and foundation funding in the 1970s and again in the 1990s. But a number of Russian studies programs are endowed to a greater or lesser extent. Columbia University’s Harriman Institute is the oldest Russian studies center in the country and one of the best. It also has a substantial endowment, and while it has achieved its preeminence through 50 years of distinguished scholarship and teaching, the W. Averell Harriman endowment gift in 1982 has been critical in enabling it to sustain its excellence. Columbia’s East Asian Institute, Harriman’s slightly younger sibling, is a leader in the field, and it too has a large endowment. Again, its solid financial base is not the reason for its excellence but it has helped. The institute “has always been out in front,” one of its faculty remarked, it is “large, rich, and excellent.”

A much newer center, the joint program in Latin American studies at Duke University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC), was established with funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, contingent on the requirement that a certain number of positions be maintained at each university. A subsequent grant to endow the program’s operating expenses required a substantial match. Duke’s program alone received additional funds from Mellon for a set of specified purposes. The Duke and UNC programs are the oldest on their respective campuses, and among the strongest. External funding was a principal enabling factor in building the joint center and sustaining its constituent programs, and it has provided leverage in seeking additional funds within the university and beyond.

In terms of more specialized funding, area libraries are particularly dependent on outside support to offset the rapidly escalating costs of maintaining their collections. A few libraries are endowed, but many
more rely on federal and foundation money to supplement tight university budgets. Outside funds also support language instruction, especially in fields where there is not high demand, as well as programs focusing on less studied regions. A Canadian-Ukrainian philanthropist enabled Columbia’s Harriman Institute to build a program in Ukrainian studies, and Harriman’s East Central European Center secured funds from the local Croatian and Serbian communities to continue offering language instruction in Serbo-Croatian when the university withdrew its support.

The principal source of federal funding for area programs is, of course, Title VI, which awards grants to institutions for area and international centers, designated National Resource Centers (NRCs), and Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) fellowships for graduate students. Of the 113 NRCs in the 2000–03 cycle, most have FLAS grants though some do not. Other centers have FLAS grants but are not NRCs. Grants vary in size from center to center, but the average is about $175,000 per year for the three-year period. Funds can be used for a wide variety of purposes, from faculty and staff salaries to course development to libraries and outreach programs for the local community, and the extent to which a center is dependent on Title VI funding varies according to the other resources at its disposal. Centers with sizable endowments put the money to good use, but their core programs would not—and do not—suffer if they lose NRC status for a time. At the other extreme are programs with no dedicated funding of their own, and minimal support from their home universities. For them, Title VI funds are critical. The director of one such program, largely dependent on Title VI, said she felt her center was an outpost of the federal government, that the university considered the program marginal and she feared it could be sliced off. The director of another, relatively small, center regarded Title VI as crucial to language instruction, library acquisitions, and fellowships; he had also been able to use the grant to leverage university funds for positions. He thought that without Title VI a significant institutional commitment would be necessary to sustain the program. Though center directors criticize the tremendous amount of paperwork involved in the application and reporting process, they agree that Title VI is essential in providing baseline support for their programs; they agree as well that funds for FLAS fellowships, libraries, and language instruction are most important, though salaries for admin-
Administrative positions come in a close second. Many are proud of their outreach programs, others view them as window dressing, but it is generally the case that if Title VI money runs out, outreach programs follow.

University administrators concur that Title VI provides a necessary base for supporting area and international programs; Title VI administrators, for their part, expect universities to make a financial or in-kind contribution in return. There is no minimum threshold for the institutional contribution, but the federal regulations governing the administration of the program are explicit in making "the extent to which the institution provides financial and other support to the operation of the center" a criterion for NRC designation. The Title VI match raises the more general question of internal funding and the extent to which area and international programs are successful in gaining access to university resources. Several issues relating to institutional support for these programs have already been touched on, notably the matter of appointments and the relative disadvantage of interdisciplinary programs in competing for university funds. For present purposes, probably the central point is the variation in the level of internal support across universities. This is in part a function of the institution’s total resources, in part of the priority accorded to regional programs. At Columbia, administrators generally expressed support for the regional institutes as centers of local knowledge but stopped short of providing much in the way of resources, unless it was otherwise expedient to do so. Faculty complained that university support was not sufficient to sustain programs without sizable endowments, in particular that the compensation awarded to directors was inadequate. At UW, administrators regarded JSIS as better funded than other units because of the endowments of individual centers and the school’s access to Title VI and other sources of external funding. But faculty and administrators at JSIS believed university support was inadequate and that the administration’s failure to commit sufficient matching funds to Title VI programs, outreach in particular, jeopardized the regional centers in the competition for NRC designation. By contrast, at Duke most, though not all, center directors felt the university was supportive of their programs. Title VI and foundation matches were negotiated through the Office of the Vice Provost for Academic and International Affairs, and since, as a matter of policy, the vice provost encouraged all units to raise their
own funds, in effect the matches rewarded success. With the help of the vice provost, Duke’s Latin American studies program was able to meet its share of the match for the Mellon Foundation’s grant to the Duke-UNC joint center in timely fashion. The program also received funds to augment its own administrative staff, and assistance in raising the substantial match required by Mellon’s grant to the Duke program alone. In the same way, Michigan’s II assisted programs in negotiating for Title VI and foundation matches and in identifying new sources of external funding. Though UM administrators were concerned about budgetary constraints, and faculty, inevitably, complained of inadequate support for their programs, the university’s commitment to regional and international programs was clear. It is worth noting that at both UM and Duke, the structures put in place to further internationalization made a significant difference in the ability of regional and international programs to achieve and maintain financial stability. The further point is that both units had funds at their disposal.

Some centers choose not to compete for Title VI funding. This is usually because the home institution lacks the spread of disciplinary faculty and languages Title VI requires, or because a program has a particular disciplinary or thematic focus and prefers to build on existing strengths rather than reach more broadly. This can put program heads at odds with administrators, who urge them to seek Title VI funding, both for budgetary reasons and for the prestige NRC status brings. “You can’t ignore Title VI,” an associate provost said, “it’s a source of funds.” The provost at another university explained that he was pushing for additional Title VI centers because they would increase the international presence on campus and advance the internationalization effort. When administrators pressure programs to apply, one would assume they were prepared to commit the necessary matching funds should the application be successful. In fact, this is not always the case, a circumstance Title VI administrators find especially frustrating. It implies a view of Title VI solely as a money machine and further, that the drive for prestige has won out over other considerations.

Two final points on the matter of funding are in order. First, by itself money is not the answer to building a strong regional center. At Michigan, the director of a relatively poor center, widely credited with being one of the university’s strongest and most successful area
programs, said his center had no choice but to reach out to other units in the university—a specific mandate in UM’s restructuring initiative—because it had to if it wanted to grow and build its resources. The well-endowed centers, on the other hand, tended to consolidate and husband their resources, a view that was confirmed by other faculty and administrators. Second, universities rarely provide Title VI matching funds for faculty positions, other than adjuncts in subject areas or language programs. Occasionally, centers are able to use Title VI money to leverage full-time positions, with the university picking up an increasing percentage of a salary over a period of several years. Title VI administrators report that this was once common practice but is now the exception.

The reluctance of universities to contribute to full-time faculty positions in regional fields leads back, by a different route, to the question of appointments, and in the present context, to the original concept of the National Resource Center. In accordance with the legislation, the federal regulations governing the administration of Title VI specify that centers eligible to receive grants focus on a single country or world area, offer instruction in the principal language or languages of that country or world area, and “those disciplinary fields necessary to provide a full understanding” of the region. Centers are expected to use these resources to provide opportunities for research and training at the graduate, professional, and undergraduate levels. The selection criteria include “the extent to which faculty from a variety of departments and professional schools” are involved. But, as the previous discussion suggests, it has become increasingly difficult for centers to maintain the breadth of faculty called for by the regulations, particularly in social science disciplines such as economics and political science, fields unquestionably “necessary to provide a full understanding” of the region. Collaborative centers, in which two or more institutions pool their resources, are able to increase the disciplinary spread of their faculty—indeed, this is one of the principal reasons for collaboration; but without the help of endowed chairs, visitors, adjuncts, or a combination of all three, centers at a single institution are hard put to offer representation across the social sciences on a regular basis.

In the circumstances, a number of centers have abandoned the effort to assemble the array of faculty required to qualify as bona fide research and training centers, and are repositioning themselves to take
account of the new reality. The director of a Latin American studies center, for example, said the program no longer had a significant cluster of research faculty and was not trying to build one. He believed it was counter-productive to push for regional specialists in departments, and agreed with colleagues in his own department, political science, that there was no justification for hiring people solely on the basis of regional expertise. The center continued to organize research and curriculum, and was a focal point for activities for visitors from Latin America. Though it had a number of contacts in the region, the director felt it had not done a sufficiently good job of reaching Latin Americanists in the university, and this was a priority for the immediate future. It had a small endowment designated for visiting scholars but was dependent on outside money to maintain its administrative structure. Since Title VI pays no more than 50 percent of salaries, additional funds were needed to cover the balance; these had been supplied by foundation funding that had come to an end. The center’s response to its financial problems was to set up an advisory board, consisting of individuals from the local financial community and from Latin America, as a means of making contacts, finding new constituencies, and raising funds from the private sector. At the same time, it was seeking support for collaborative research projects with other units in the university, as well as with institutions in the region. And it was developing for-profit partnerships with Latin American universities and institutes. The center’s efforts to become self-sustaining imply a commitment to the idea of the regional center, and this was indeed the case. The director believed the center was worth preserving as an interdisciplinary space, a place where people with interests in Latin America from both the university and the local community could come together and where visitors from the region could find a congenial intellectual environment. This is a view shared by many people associated with area centers: an ethnomusicologist who is also the director of a Southeast Asian center said she had no one to talk to in her institutional home, that the center was an important part of her intellectual life; the director of a South Asian center, commenting on the appointment of a number of faculty members with interests in the field, said that while they were not hired as regional specialists, for all of them the existence of the center was a draw.

The area center as a focus for activities and for individuals with interests in the region is one way in which centers are reorienting or
repositioning themselves in those institutions where university administrations and departments are unable or unwilling to facilitate appointments. This is a different role from the one centers have played in the past, and to the extent that it means abandoning the research and training mission of the NRC, it implies a different role for Title VI as well. On this point, a number of area scholars I talked to speculated that, in future, only a few centers would offer the full range of training required to produce regional experts; the others would follow alternate routes. Irrespective of whether this turns out to be so, the more fundamental question for area studies is how to ensure the survival of a social science presence in area programs and, conversely, how to incorporate substantive regional knowledge into the social science disciplines. The study returns to these issues subsequently.
VI. INTELLECTUAL ISSUES

The ongoing tension between area studies and the social sciences raises the broader questions of how best to approach the study of international (or transnational or global) problems and how best to contextualize international work. Here, it is worth remembering that internationalization is not solely a social science project, that the humanities, the arts, and the sciences are all to some degree engaged in the process, and so are the professional schools. The individuals, departments, and schools within these several constituencies have differing scholarly and educational agendas, differing stakes in the internationalization effort, and relate differently to one another in the institutional setting. As these separate interests negotiate for space in the academic community, a number of issues come to the fore repeatedly, among them the relationship between regional studies and the social sciences and between the humanities and social sciences, and the place of interdisciplinary work in the research university. How these issues are addressed, or not, as the case may be, both reflects and affects the intellectual and educational agenda.

REGIONAL STUDIES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

The relationship between regional or area studies and the social sciences was discussed at some length in the preceding section, but largely from the area studies perspective. The intent here is first, to comment further on the intellectual divide between the two constituencies and second, to provide a wider lens through which to view the differences between them.

First: the issues dividing area studies and the social sciences are both substantive and methodological. Theoretical social scientists are primarily concerned with theory: for them, theory is interesting in and of itself; it transcends regions; and while its application to a particular region may serve to demonstrate its explanatory power, the region is of secondary importance. Area specialists, by contrast, are primarily interested in the region and find its problems worth studying irrespective of their theoretical value. While most regional scholars do not reject outright quantitative and statistical techniques or theory qua theory, they argue that these methods and approaches...
were developed almost entirely from U.S. data for the study of American political and economic phenomena, and that their usefulness is questionable in regions whose institutions are not comparable and where comparable data is not available. Though Americanists have been largely responsible for methodological innovation in the social sciences, in economics, political science, and sociology in particular, they have failed to recognize that the United States is itself a region, that U.S. data is local, and the theoretical approaches elaborated from it are limited in their claims to universality. U.S.-based theory may be transferable to other “modern” industrial democracies, but it falls short in attempting to explain the differing realities of the developing world. This is not to say that area specialists need or want to abandon theory. On the contrary, many regional scholars are testing explanatory hypotheses against data from the regions they study and, more generally, they are looking at the ways in which theory can illuminate the problems of the developing world. Thus, knowledge of the region can inform and refine theory, suggesting one path for the reengagement of regional studies and the social sciences.

Second, any discussion of the social science attitude toward regional studies must start with the recognition that there is no monolithic “social science” point of view. Within the disciplines, attitudes range from the near total lack of interest in the regional characteristic of economics and the highly theoretical wings of political science and sociology, to scholars who are regionalists to some degree or at the least recognize the need for regional context in their work, to committed regional specialists. But for all but the regional specialists, regional issues have been dislodged from the center: they are viewed as instrumental to demonstrating theory, incidental to dealing with larger transnational and global phenomena. Here, it should be pointed out that what the regional expert means by knowledge of the region is not necessarily the same as “regional context,” and a good deal of the debate turns first, on how much knowledge of a region is required to provide the context for a particular research project and second, on how to acquire it.

To begin with, a few general, perhaps obvious points are in order. First, not all disciplinary departments are the same. The defining characteristics, the intellectual stamp of a political science or sociology department varies from one university to another, as does the degree
of pluralism in a given department. Equally, this orientation changes over time with changing personnel and shifting disciplinary priorities. Second, every department wants to place high in national disciplinary rankings and is often under pressure from university administrators to do so. For both the university and the department, this is a matter of prestige, of gaining a competitive edge over peer institutions, and thus being positioned to attract “hot” faculty and first-rate students; for the department, it may well mean more resources from the central administration. But the push to move up in the rankings means following disciplinary trends, and for most of the social sciences, the trend is toward theory. Thus the imperative is to build a strong core of theorists, unless such a core already exists; even if it does, the tendency of departmental faculty to clone themselves makes it likely they will hire more of the same, strengthening still further the theoretical cohort. The theorists may have regional interests, but these are incidental to their disciplinary credentials. Finally, for the great majority of departments that do not aspire to be among the top 10 or 20 in the country, the concern is to maintain a solid reputation and command respect in the field. No department wants to be judged second-rate, and, for good reasons or bad, a department that appears to be over-stocked with regional specialists falls into that category.

Columbia University:
The School of International and Public Affairs

These issues are highlighted at Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), where the economics and political science departments share space in the International Affairs Building with the school and the five regional institutes under its jurisdiction. More-over, since SIPA was established as an arm of political science in 1946, the same year the Russian Institute was founded, the relationship between school, department, and institutes has been close, though not always comfortable. At present, a number of political science faculty are members of SIPA’s core faculty, some with joint appointments in SIPA, and many have associations with regional institutes. A few economists have connections to SIPA and, to a lesser extent, the institutes. The overlap, together with the proximity of departments and institutes, makes SIPA an interesting place to look at the ways in which disciplinary and regional relationships play out.

40 See above, 10–11, for SIPA’s administrative structure.
Over the last several decades, the political science department has evolved from its long-time strength in international relations and comparative politics and area studies in the 1970s and 1980s, to a greater emphasis on international relations in the 1990s, when area studies came under attack. At the end of the 1990s, the chair described the department’s current strengths as international relations and international political economy; he added that most people were generalists with respect to region. Recently, the department has recruited faculty in political theory and American politics, fields in which it has traditionally been weak. Speaking of a new hire in comparative politics who is a rational-choice theorist, the chair said this was a direction the department would like to move in—“comparative politics with a more solid theoretical base” that can still incorporate some area knowledge. At present, comparative politics faculty work on every region of the world, though East Asia and Russia have always been the strongest fields; methodologically, most are qualitative, but some do soft rational choice and a few do formal rational choice and game theory. In terms of comparative politics students, some have no area focus but most have a light one; they are the largest group of students in the program, and among the best.

The relationship between political science and the regional institutes seemed wary but not unfriendly. SIPA’s dean, the former chair of political science, thought that in recent years the department feared it would become second-rate if it had to carry the full complement of regional appointments—a problem that was largely solved when the Department of International and Public Affairs (DIPA) was established in 1991, enabling SIPA to appoint its own faculty and thus to make joint appointments, based on regional expertise, with other social science departments. Even so, according to several faculty members, joint appointments are often difficult to broker since both appointments and tenure recommendations require the agreement of DIPA and the department. Moreover, given the relatively small size of SIPA’s faculty, the disciplinary departments hold the upper hand in terms of regional appointments. This was confirmed by the institute directors. One director remarked that in assessing needs, the university trusts departments, not programs, so you approach the department first. Another said simply that appointments were a matter of departmental politics: to be successful, “you gotta have clout.” Many if not most departmental faculty members feel this is as it should be, that departments should control their own resources and
make appointments as they choose, not as SIPA or the regional institutes feel they should.

The chair of political science believed that, in any case, the department had no choice but to maintain its ties to area studies. It was virtually in SIPA, and over the years students had come to Columbia for political science with strong area studies content. The university thus had more of a commitment. But how you do area studies was changing in line with the changing priorities of the disciplines. He mentioned the recently appointed rational-choice theorist in comparative politics as one indication of "the wave of the future." Appointments that met the needs of more than one department were another. Several years ago, when the department lost its senior East European specialist, SIPA, sociology, and political science joined forces to hire a sociologist who works on Eastern Europe, solving the problem of coverage of the region for all three. This kind of strategy was the way to go in an environment where "stand-up" area positions were becoming fewer.

Attitudes toward regional studies differed widely among the faculty I talked to, including those who were committed to the study of a region. One non-regionalist observed that in the disciplines, knowledge is focused on themes and processes, such as migration, ethnicity, and identity. Although these take place in and across areas, scholars without regional interests have to be persuaded there is a reason to devote some of their research to the area. Another commented that the former Soviet Union and the areas on its periphery were now interesting as social science problems, places where one could study democratization and nationalism; but again the focus was on the problem rather than the region. (The director of a regional institute made the same point when she remarked that people from sociology and political science were not around "unless something hits their specialty.") But a number of faculty said they were glad to have the institutes as neighbors and felt they were an asset to SIPA and the university. A senior scholar who works on the United States and described himself as "not an international person," reported that his interactions with area specialists had been "productive and interesting." He added that without the institutes, Columbia would be "a lot poorer." Several economists made the same point. One remarked that he liked "hanging out" with regional specialists; another, who does empirical work, consults with people in the institutes; a third, more
typically, thought there was a role for area faculty in providing context, presumably when and where it was needed.

Finally, a number of faculty spoke of the importance of regional knowledge to policy research, a comment reflecting the fact that economics and political science are located in SIPA and also that SIPA faculty are drawn to the school because of its policy dimension. Here it should be noted that while SIPA is a school of public administration as well as a school of international affairs, the two divisions are moving closer together in the face of advancing internationalization and globalization. International affairs is increasingly concerned with policy issues, public policy is acquiring an international dimension. In this setting, regional and disciplinary interests meet in recognizing the need for knowledge of place. Several scholars spoke of policy as the point where the regional and the global intersect: since globalization takes place locally, it pays to know the local.

These observations lead back to the question of how knowledge of cultures and societies should be contextualized, and how area studies and the social sciences can reengage in the study of international problems. There is no consensus on these issues and no easy answers are at hand. But there appears to be something approaching agreement on several points: some knowledge of place is essential to theory; the question is how much; theory can be useful, some would say necessary, to regional specialists, but its hypotheses must be tested against data from the areas they study; and regionalists should be aware of the transnational and global frameworks of the regions on which they work. A sociologist who works on Eastern Europe alluded to all of these issues when he said it was necessary to rethink the way context works in knowledge production.

**The Humanities and the Social Sciences**

University-based international studies began as the study of the languages and cultures of other parts of the world. It remained centered in the humanities, particularly in philology, through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, though in subsequent decades, history became an increasingly important presence in the field.41 Following World War II and the passage of the National

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41 By 1940, history accounted for more doctorates in international studies than all the humanities combined. See McCaughey, *International Studies and the...*
Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958, the social sciences (other than history), political science in particular, turned their attention to international fields, partly in response to the substantial funding available for international studies from private foundations and through Title VI of the NDEA. The federal legislation, providing funds for fellowships and for the establishment of area centers, dramatically increased the small number of regional centers established in the 1940s, and though the new centers were explicitly intended to be interdisciplinary, they became the particular stronghold of social scientists working in regional fields. The parallel development in many, though not all, cases was a growing estrangement between the social science-dominated centers and the language and literature departments that had previously been the core of international studies.

The history of the Jackson School of International Studies (JSIS) at the University of Washington is a useful illustration of the shifting orientation of international studies.42 The school originated in 1909 with the establishment of the Department of Oriental Subjects, soon renamed the Department of Oriental Studies. The department was humanist in orientation, offering courses in language, literature, history, and the history of religion of the ancient Middle East, India, China, and Japan, many of them taught by the founding chair. In 1931, a political scientist succeeded as chair, introducing a new perspective to the department. His successor, also a political scientist, became chair in 1939 and remained in that position until 1969. Over the course of those three decades, in incremental stages, a major reorganization took place. The Department of Oriental Studies became the Department of Far Eastern Studies, and in the 1940s, with the assistance of funds from the Rockefeller Foundation, an interdepartmental Far Eastern Institute was established to coordinate teaching and research on the Far East, including the Soviet Union. By the end of the decade, the institute had become the Far Eastern and Russian Institute, the department had been renamed the Department of Far Eastern and Slavic Languages and Literature (Russian language instruction had been added in the 1930s), and though it

42 The history of the Jackson School was referred to earlier in the discussion of area studies. See above, section V.
remained at the center of the new institute, it was assigned responsibility for language instruction and research and teaching in the humanities, while the institute was both the umbrella structure and the social science arm of the enterprise. In 1968, department and institute were split off from one another, and the department was split into its Asian and Slavic components. During this period, the institute received generous funding not only from the Rockefeller Foundation but also from the Carnegie and Ford foundations, and after 1958, from the federal government through Title VI of the NDEA.43 Confusing, yes; but instructive as an indication of the changing relationship between the humanities and social sciences in the second half of the twentieth century.

The present discussion is focused on international studies, but the broader context of these changes includes the increasing parochialism of the disciplines and the proliferation of sub-specialties within them; the consolidation of the disciplinary organization of universities and the grip of the disciplines on the intellectual agenda; the growing ascendancy of the social sciences over the humanities in the academic hierarchy; and the emergence of strong theoretical trends in both the humanities and social sciences, bringing with them their own distinctive languages, which, among other things, made communication across disciplines difficult. In the international field, the distance between disciplinary groups is evident at a number of different levels. Within the regional studies community, tensions between social science-oriented centers and language and literature departments can be a consequence of differences in intellectual orientation, competition for resources, or a mix of both. The relationship between the two units varies, depending on personalities, past history, and the relative strengths of center and department. At Columbia, regional institute directors variously described the connection with their counterpart language and culture departments as “very good” (the East Asian Institute and East Asian Languages and Cultures, the Harriman Institute and Slavic Languages), “on again, off again,” and “extremely hostile.” At UW’s Jackson School, ties between centers and departments were said to be close, with the exception of the East and Southeast Asian programs and Asian Languages and Literature, where tensions persisted. A program chair commented that students in the China and Japan studies programs “go to” the department for

43Hecker, International Studies at the University of Washington, passim.
language, but otherwise there was not much crossover. The chair of China studies thought the problem stemmed in part from differences in the intellectual focus of program and department: China studies had a modern tilt, and it was difficult to find people in the department who did modern literature. The chair of Southeast Asian studies said the department was not supportive of offering languages that were not linked to a departmental degree program, and these included Indonesian, Tagalog, and Thai, which were essential to their students. A longtime faculty member at UW observed that the tensions there, and he suspected elsewhere, reflected differences between those who regard philology as the basis for area studies and those who conceive of area studies primarily as the study of contemporary societies and cultures. Language and literature departments dominated by philologists are sometimes hostile to the study of contemporary culture, while some social scientists see no connection between their work and the study of premodern societies and cultures. These differences reflect the humanist origins of international and area studies, and they overlap with the division between regional studies and the social science disciplines.

At the University of Michigan, centers and departments generally got on well, though in some cases resources were an issue. But a broader intellectual division between the humanities and social sciences was evident, explained in part by the university’s longstanding strength in the social sciences, particularly in quantitative and theoretical research methodologies. The division came to the fore in the debate over Michigan’s II. To recapitulate the key points: the social science position at its most extreme was articulated by a political scientist, who spoke of “a deep division between the humanists/postmodernists and the social science/positivists.” He believed the humanists had more influence in the II, and that the humanities orientation of the institute made it inhospitable to social scientists. Many of his social science colleagues agreed. On the other hand, several humanities faculty members felt the humanities were marginalized within the II and that the internationalization effort was dominated by the social sciences to the exclusion of the humanities. “Internationalization,” said one literature professor, “is not more of a social science than humanities enterprise.” These were the views of a small number of individuals, but the tensions they reflected were

44See above, 27–33.
evident throughout the conversations I had with UM faculty and administrators.

In spite of these divisions, on every campus I visited, there were calls for closer ties between the humanities and social sciences in international fields. At the turn of the new century, the director of the Jackson School was pleased that humanities faculty were becoming more involved in the school—the heads of two programs were from language and literature departments—but he believed that ways must be found to bring in more humanities. At other universities, significant numbers of faculty thought it was important to bring the humanities and social sciences together, and were looking for ways to do this. Two examples follow.

**Duke University: “Oceans Connect”**

At Duke, the humanities have a higher profile than the social sciences, and according to the dean of the faculty, the humanities faculty are, on average, the highest paid in the arts and sciences (i.e., compared to the social and natural sciences). Asked about divisive intellectual issues within the faculty, a vice provost commented that the single most obvious tension was between the humanists and social scientists. In the humanities, he said, there was an emphasis on cultural studies—Marxist, post-colonial, subaltern studies—and this collided with the theory and methodologies of the social sciences. The difficulties of bridging this divide were acknowledged by a project, launched in response to the Ford Foundation’s Crossing Borders initiative, which set as its first goal “stimulating communication across a pair of formidable boundaries: the geographic borders of traditional area studies and the disciplinary borders between the social sciences and the humanities.”

The Oceans Connect project sought to reconceptualize the framework of “areas” around ocean basins, and to bring together faculty from across the humanities and social sciences to discuss the issues raised by the regroupings and their implications for research and curriculum. The initial faculty groups were centered on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans, the Mediterranean Sea, and the Black and Caspian seas. When I visited Duke in 1998 and 1999, the project was in its early stages—it was

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45 For the Ford Foundation initiative, see *Crossing Borders: Revitalizing Area Studies*. 96
first funded in fall 1997 and again in spring 1999. At the end of the first two years, the project directors reported that the groups that had come together most successfully were those in which all the participants were from the same or related disciplines: they shared a common orientation and a common field of discourse. The groups with a mix of people from the social sciences and from literature and culture had more difficulty: the research questions that interested them were different, they spoke in different idioms, and found it difficult to talk to one another. In all the groups, the single most important variable was the leader, both in terms of attracting participants and in the extent to which conversation could take place.

Two years later, the project directors provided an update. As of spring 2001, four of the five groups appeared to be flourishing—the fifth disbanded largely from lack of critical mass—and had evolved into lively interdisciplinary forums for conversation and research. But the groups that had pushed their agendas farthest typically noticed a narrowing of their constituencies in the process. In general, individual basin groups ended up either driven by humanists, with a leavening of scholars from the “interpretive social sciences” (history and anthropology), or they moved in the policy direction, drawing primarily on faculty from the social sciences and professional schools. The scholarly orientation of the leader remained the crucial element in determining the composition and tone of each group.

The directors noted that these positive developments had occurred largely within individual basin groups. The final challenge was to bring together representatives of all the groups in a single framework. Since teaching was a common denominator, the directors hoped to do this through a conference on pedagogy in which basin-specific (and thus, in many cases, discipline(s)-specific) break-out groups would be mixed with sessions addressing broad themes, such as the reconfiguration of regions and its curricular implications, that would cross all the disciplinary divides. The conference was scheduled for academic year 2001–02, the fifth and final year of the project. Overall, the directors were pleased with the degree of interdisciplinarity the project had achieved. One of them, who had led a group for a year, added that she at least would leave the project “with a greater appreciation of the divisional chasms we have encountered.”
Columbia’s Center for Comparative Literature and Society (CCLS) represents a somewhat differently focused, institutional attempt to bridge the disciplinary divide. Established in 1998 following an academic review of Columbia’s longstanding programs in comparative literature, the center was set up to administer those programs, formerly based in the English department, and now offers a reorganized undergraduate major in Comparative Literature and Society and an interdepartmental program at the graduate level. Beyond this primary responsibility, CCLS had a second goal, which was to establish greater communication between the social sciences and humanities, using area studies as the venue. Explaining the rationale for the center’s agenda, the director pointed out first, that comparative literature has always reached out to other humanities fields but was now ready to establish stronger links with disciplines and fields outside the humanities, including the social sciences, media studies, architecture, and law; second, that as comparative literature is becoming more interested in historical and social context, area studies is becoming more interested in culture; third, that comparative literature recognizes the need to expand its European focus to include the literatures of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Given these considerations, the regional institutes, the locus of area studies, seemed a likely meeting ground for the humanities and social sciences.

In laying out the center’s program, the planning group, which included two institute directors, observed that social scientists and humanists were interested in many of the same topics and issues, but approached them with different methodologies and perspectives, and spoke different disciplinary languages. The center’s goal was not to eliminate these divergences but, by bringing people together, to further their interaction in productive ways. It proposed to do this primarily through developing a series of team-taught cross-regional and/or transregional courses, beginning with the undergraduate and graduate introductions to comparative literature. Other courses being planned, and subsequently offered, included Narrative in Politics and Ethics, taught by faculty from literature and political science, The Politics of Memory by faculty from history and literature, and Spaces of Globalization, by faculty from anthropology and architecture. The center also hoped to sponsor a visiting professorship in a field not covered by existing faculty resources, and to organize a speaker series,
workshops, and conferences addressing topics of interest to both humanists and social scientists. Both administrators and faculty anticipated that CCLS would have a research dimension as well.

When I interviewed Columbia faculty and administrators late in 1998 and in spring 1999, CCLS was planning its initial program for academic year 1999–2000, and it was looking for money. As in the past, the departments affiliated with the comparative literature program would provide principal support for curriculum and graduate student funding; Arts and Sciences had contributed administrative support. The center had applied for, and subsequently received, a three-year grant from the provost’s Academic Quality Fund to provide start-up funding for key parts of its program, and it was seeking external support. Two years later, CCLS was up and running. The grant from the Academic Quality Fund covered administrative expenses—an office and staff salaries—and provided funds for three graduate student fellowships, team-taught courses, a visiting professorship, and conferences and lectures. Arts and Sciences had agreed to take over those expenses at the conclusion of the grant, and an operating budget for the center had already been negotiated. Moreover, CCLS had been remarkably successful in raising outside money. It had received grants from the Ford Foundation for a writer-in-residence, course development, and a post-doctoral fellowship; a grant from the Mellon Foundation for a seminar on Globalizing City Cultures; and two grants, with a third pending, from the Georges Lurcy Charitable and Educational Trust for team-taught courses. Courses to be offered in fall 2001 included Occult Modernity, an exploration of the non-rational dimensions of Western and Asian modernity, taught by faculty from anthropology and literature; Human Rights and the Question of Culture, taught by faculty from law and literature; and two courses given by the center’s first writer-in-residence, a Ghanaian writer and scholar of African literature. Finally, the center had developed a certificate in comparative literature and society for doctoral students in the social sciences. Approval of the new program was anticipated in the coming academic year, and there were already several candidates in anthropology and religion.

Reflecting on the center’s first two years, the director thought the response of faculty and students had been positive, though he had had to pursue faculty, and in some cases put them together, for the team-taught courses. In general, people in the “soft” social sciences, history
and anthropology, were most interested in team-teaching, though scholars in architecture and law had also come forward. Only a few faculty in other social science disciplines had expressed interest. The director also reported that CCLS’s experience had motivated others to experiment with team-taught courses. These were outside the center but could be cross-listed under the program.

Two further points are worth noting. First, the administration’s support was essential to the center’s success: the director emphasized that the support of Arts and Sciences for the center’s application to the Academic Quality Fund had been critical. Second, the administration conceived of CCLS as an alternative to cultural studies, one that remained within the framework of comparative literature and avoided what were regarded as cultural studies’ problematic aspects, in particular its lack of grounding in a discipline and its lack of historical depth.

Interestingly, cultural studies was frequently mentioned both as a point of intersection between the humanities and social sciences, since it is explicitly interdisciplinary, and as an obstacle, because its distinctive approach and often abstruse language make communication difficult. Given its base in literature and anthropology, the approach was generally more attractive to scholars working in humanities disciplines and in history and anthropology than to social scientists in fields such as economics and political science. But these lines were not hard and fast. At Michigan, a sociologist and former area center director thought the issues addressed by cultural studies, particularly the study of identities, might provide a meeting ground for the social sciences and humanities. Alternatively, an administrator interested in building connections between the arts and sciences and professional schools, said a number of professional schools had ties to the humanities, but the “cultural studies tilt” made it harder to sustain them. At Duke, where communication across disciplines proved difficult, in part because of the cultural studies orientation of the humanities, cultural studies staked out a claim to area studies by establishing a graduate certificate in Latin American cultural studies. Designed for doctoral students, generally in literature, history, and anthropology, the program’s founding director was a scholar in romance languages and literature and its faculty advisors were drawn principally from literature and anthropology. The director of Duke’s Latin American studies program thought the certificate program was
in part a response to the fact that the grant setting up the Duke-UNC program was largely the work of political scientists: the certificate program to some degree righted the balance. When I last visited Duke in spring 1999, the certificate program was still very new but it was reported to have attracted considerable student interest and to be doing well.

Returning again to the question of how knowledge of societies and cultures should be contextualized, the first and most obvious answer is that the contribution of the humanities is necessary, indeed essential, to international work. This discussion has looked at the more difficult question of the extent to which scholars in the humanities and social sciences can create a context that embraces their differing approaches. The evidence cited, and it is representative of what I found on other campuses, suggests that cooperation tends to be a matter of disciplinary orientation and individual inclination, the two being interrelated. Scholars working in anthropology and history are generally more inclined to work with colleagues from the humanities, and more drawn to cultural studies, than those in other social science disciplines, though there are, of course, exceptions. Predictably, it is generally easier to initiate productive relationships within disciplinary divisions and related disciplines than across the divisional divide. Moreover, since collaboration can at best be facilitated, not mandated, frameworks set up to reconcile different approaches are unlikely to succeed: the more successful route is to create spaces where humanists and social scientists can learn from their differing methodologies and perspectives. For those individuals who are interested in crossing disciplinary boundaries, the next question is how to do this in the research university setting.

**Interdisciplinary Work in the Research University**

The obstacles to establishing and sustaining interdisciplinary programs are institutional and financial as well as intellectual, and they have been touched on earlier, in the discussion of area studies and area centers as well as in the preceding section. The present discussion focuses on the practical rather than the intellectual impediments to interdisciplinary work, though the two are, of course, interrelated, and it deals with interdisciplinary programs in general rather than area studies programs in particular. In summary, given the prevailing
disciplinary organization of universities, interdisciplinary ventures come in second to departments in the competition for university funding and are thus more dependent on external support. Moreover, since interdisciplinary work is not built into the academic reward system—on the contrary, it tends to be suspect in the eyes of disciplinary promotion and tenure committees—there is little incentive for faculty to indulge their interdisciplinary interests, and for younger faculty doing so is a risk. The director of a highly regarded international studies program observed that interdisciplinarity was all well and good, but people might not be interested: there was no natural constituency for interdisciplinary and cross-regional approaches. You had to work with those who were intellectually interested, particularly senior people—"you have to work with what you've got."

The position of interdisciplinary programs within the university thus tends to be anomalous, the success of a given venture largely dependent on the individuals committed to it and the availability of resources. The support of the administration, whether from the office of the provost or the division of arts and sciences, is also crucial, though in financial terms, it is generally limited. Characteristically, the institution provides start-up or seed money for a program, with the expectation that it will raise funds from external sources to continue operation. Internal funding is then reduced or withdrawn entirely. (In the case of Columbia's CCLS, the administration was prepared to make a more substantial contribution because it had been directly involved in starting the center and had an interest in ensuring its success.) If an interdisciplinary program is started with external funds, the university may provide additional support, as happened with Duke's Oceans Connect project; and occasionally the university assumes full responsibility for the program. But all interdisciplinary programs are particularly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of university budgets and the shifting priorities of federal and foundation funding. It is also the case that faculty interests can change with changing intellectual trends and program directors can (and do) grow tired of fundraising. Without dedicated leadership and faculty support, programs begin to unravel and ultimately cease to be viable. For all these reasons, interdisciplinary programs are fragile; they are also ephemeral, even when they are successful. In this context, area studies programs have proved remarkably durable, in spite of their difficulties.
Most of the administrators I interviewed for this study believed interdisciplinary programs were “a good thing,” though the resources they were prepared to commit to them varied greatly from one institution to another. So did the opinions of individual faculty members and administrators on a given campus about how difficult it was to do interdisciplinary work. At Michigan, for example, the administration was committed to expanding the reach of international centers and programs across the university, and funding for cross-disciplinary, cross-school efforts was available, much of it through the II. The provost described the university as “very decentralized” but also “very interdisciplinary and collaborative,” a view shared by at least one area center director, who commented that the campus environment made it possible for interdisciplinary programs, including area studies, to flourish. An administrator at UM’s law school said the school’s faculty was very interdisciplinary, it included a number of non-lawyers and people with joint appointments in arts and science departments; a faculty member with an interest in international and comparative law agreed, but found it anomalous that the school’s interdisciplinarity rarely extended to things international. On the other hand, a humanities professor remarked that at UM, interdisciplinary and cross-school programs were often successful once, but that was it; and an administrator in the business school said flatly, “if you do anything really interdisciplinary, nobody trusts you—this is a sign of success.” At the University of Iowa, the administration was on record as promoting interdisciplinary work, but it was not clear there were funds to support it. An administrator in the College of Liberal Arts conceded as much when she said she believed interdisciplinary programs and research were crucial, but finding the money to pay for them was difficult, particularly when several administrative units were involved. Here again, views differed as to how difficult it was to do interdisciplinary work. The chair of two interdisciplinary programs, one an area studies program, thought it was relatively easy to cross boundaries between schools, the walls were low—“it’s easy to grow things here.” A number of faculty members I talked to agreed. But another area studies chair commented that while the university boasted about promoting interdisciplinary teaching and research, in fact this kind of work “flies in the face of the brick wall of departmental turf.” He added that this was unfortunate because “when it happens, it makes a huge difference to students.” A colleague concurred, remarking that at UI there was “little inclination to things interdisciplinary”—it was “a very departmental place.”
At both Duke and Columbia, substantial resources were available for interdisciplinary ventures, and it is instructive to look at some of the ways in which these funds were spent. Duke's commitment to interdisciplinary teaching and research was explicitly reaffirmed in the university's 1994 strategic plan, and the rhetorical commitment was embodied in an administrative structure and a funding mechanism. The vice provost for interdisciplinary affairs, a title initially held by the dean of the graduate school, was split off as a separate position in 1998; the Provost's Common Fund, in place since the early 1990s, provided seed money for interdisciplinary projects across the campus. The university was generally thought to welcome innovative initiatives of all kinds, and both faculty and administrators seemed proud of its openness to new ideas. A faculty member remarked that Duke was "a very entrepreneurial place, it's relatively easy to start something"; another said "the nice thing about Duke is that intellectually, anything goes." And an administrator commented that "by and large, people find it easy and fun to do interdisciplinary work." There were, of course, dissenters—several faculty members complained it was hard to get people to do international work, "it's not built into the reward system"—but among the people I talked to, they were in the minority.

When I visited Duke in 1998-99, several interdisciplinary projects were getting under way. The most visible, apart from Oceans Connect, was an initiative on Globalization and Democratic Governance, an effort designed to promote cross-disciplinary research around themes related to globalization and democracy. The project evolved in the first instance from the administration's desire to develop a high-profile, interdisciplinary research effort, in part as a fundraising vehicle for international programs in the university's capital campaign; more immediately, it came from a proposal submitted by the deans of arts and sciences, business, and law, who were looking for a project that would attract faculty from across the three schools around common research interests. The initiative received start-up support from the Provost's Common Fund, and thereafter planned to seek outside money to continue its activities. A second and related project, an interdisciplinary faculty-student working group on Globalization and Equity, was started in 1997, again with seed money from the Provost's Common Fund, and continued as a seminar.

with funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. These two projects were thematically oriented toward the social sciences, and though scholars from all disciplines were welcome, in both cases the core group consisted of faculty from economics, political science, and sociology, with some representation from business, law, and public policy. A third venture, the John Hope Franklin Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies, was not yet up and running when I last visited Duke in spring 1999. Supported by the provost and the dean of the faculty of arts and sciences, it was designed to provide study and research opportunities for faculty in “the humanities and interpretive social sciences,” in part to assist in the recruitment and retention of scholars in those fields. At its core was a program of Seminars for Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities whose participants were drawn primarily from faculty and graduate students in the humanities, though scholars from the social sciences were invited to apply. Thus, in the two globalization projects, interdisciplinary for the most part meant crossing disciplinary boundaries within the social sciences and professional schools, where there were faculty with related interests; in the case of the institute and its seminars, interdisciplinary meant crossing boundaries within the humanities and related social science disciplines.

Several observations are in order here. First, the support of the administration and the resources at its disposal were a critical factor in launching the three projects. Moreover, the university was directly involved in developing two of the three. Second, faculty research interests determined the topical focus of the globalization projects and also of the Franklin seminars, and that focus, together with the way in which the research questions were framed, largely determined the disciplinary affiliations of faculty participants. It appeared that faculty were drawn not only by common research interests but also by congenial approaches: for the most part, they chose to collaborate with colleagues in their own disciplinary divisions or from closely related disciplines. Oceans Connect was the single project that made a significant attempt to cross the divisional divide.

Columbia could not be described as an “interdisciplinary place,” but its administration was committed to furthering interdisciplinary research across the university, in particular to encouraging collaborations between the biological and physical sciences and the social sciences and humanities. The provost and the executive vice provost
believed it was not only desirable but necessary that research and teaching transcend disciplinary boundaries, and administrators in the arts and sciences shared their view, though perhaps somewhat less wholeheartedly. The provost was articulate and eloquent in laying out his argument. He thought that knowledge would have to be organized in different ways, disciplinary languages redefined. Traditional boundaries would have to shift, were in fact shifting already. Disciplines would have to learn how to talk to each other, to learn each other’s languages. He knew this would be difficult, he wasn’t sure how it would happen. He thought the biggest barrier to crossing disciplines was the reward system, especially since tenure was now harder to get. But there appeared to be more tolerance in the younger generation.

The younger faculty members I interviewed bore out this last speculation. Several recent hires in social science departments held joint appointments in SIPA, which implied a policy interest, but beyond that, they crossed disciplinary boundaries in their work and in their choice of colleagues. And the chair of a highly interdisciplinary languages and cultures department said the new generation of faculty now running the department—in their late thirties to early fifties—were far more open than their predecessors, conscious of making connections with colleagues elsewhere and with other departments.

In support of the administration’s commitment, the university provided start-up funds for multidisciplinary, cross-school ventures through the provost’s Academic Quality Fund and also through the Strategic Initiatives Program (SIP), funded with a part of the income derived from the university’s patent royalties and license fees. As of 1999, SIP was awarding about $20 million annually in seed grants, ranging in size from $20,000 to $5 million, to cross-disciplinary projects in categories that included the development and use of new media and information technologies; innovative research in the sciences and engineering; support for important new fields of scholarship in all disciplines; and several large-scale policy-related initiatives, notably the New York City initiative, focused on urban environments and urban development in general and New York City in particular.

47 Columbia Innovation Enterprise, the unit charged with developing these revenues and reinvesting them in education and research, has since been restructured, in part as a consequence of the greatly increased flow of income from these sources, more than $140 million in FY 2000.
and the Earth Institute, an education and research enterprise designed to increase knowledge about the earth and the relationship between the physical and human systems in the global environment.

Founded in 1996, the Columbia Earth Institute (CEI) perhaps best embodied the administration’s vision of a cross-disciplinary, cross-school enterprise. Drawing on the university’s impressive resources in earth-related sciences, the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, the Biosphere 2 Center, the Laboratory of Populations, the International Research Institute for Climate Prediction, and the Center for Environmental Research and Conservation, among others, the institute’s ambitious goal was to enable “physical, biological and social scientists to collaborate in understanding the earth and the complexity of our relationship to it.”

CEI was still very new when I interviewed faculty members and administrators at Columbia in 1998–99, and, regrettably, I did not talk to anyone directly involved in its activities. I did read a number of its publications, among them the preliminary report of a CEI planning committee workshop, held in May 1998, that brought together researchers from a wide variety of disciplines to define the institute’s initial research agenda. The report’s overview section, describing the issues the workshop brought to light, has relevance for interdisciplinary work of all kinds, especially for the difficulties of starting a conversation between widely disparate disciplines. The report spoke in particular of the gap between science and policy and the challenge of reconciling the goals of basic science research, free from policy constraints, and addressing the needs of policy. Scientists were reluctant to follow policy decisions, social scientists were accustomed to responding to policy: this was a cultural problem, solving it required patience and collegial trust among physical and social scientists. “The dialogue between physical and social scientists is the most difficult interface in interdisciplinary work,” the essay concluded. It would take “time and effort, as well as the development of new conceptual frameworks, social skills and friendships to effect the interface that is critical to the Institute’s future.”


The provost echoed the report’s assessment, remarking that when CEI brought people together around the El Niño problem—scientists, anthropologists, policymakers—they were all willing, but it took a year for them to learn each other’s languages. The executive vice provost, who had overall responsibility for the institute, said he thought people found it hard to work across disciplines. There were hierarchies among the disciplines—physicists looked down on geologists—and physical and social scientists were from different cultures. Parenthetically, both administrators emphasized CEI’s international dimension. The provost observed that the institute was by definition international, and implicitly concerned with the local and regional as well as the global; the vice provost spoke of the institute’s emphasis on system-level problems—its focus was on the global.

The support of the administration as well as substantial university funding were essential to launching CEI, just as they were for the Center for Comparative Literature and Society. But though money could create the conditions for cross-disciplinary collaboration, it was up to individuals to do the collaborating. Who participated in a project, what disciplines and fields they came from, depended not only on common interests and approaches but on the relationship of scholars to colleagues in other schools and disciplines, and also to administrators. This was the case at Columbia as well as at Duke.

Though the present discussion set out to focus on the practical impediments to interdisciplinary work, it has ended by demonstrating the impossibility of separating the practical from the intellectual. Nonetheless, several general points should be made. On the matter of resources, it seems clear that, at least in the early stages of an interdisciplinary venture, some degree of financial support is necessary; but money alone cannot ensure success, in part because it cannot guarantee the continued participation of key individuals. The question of organizational and institutional impediments goes directly to the issue of participation and the considerations that may dissuade faculty from working across disciplines. In the research university setting, disciplinary departments tend to be the units most resistant to interdisciplinary work, and their place in the institutional structure gives them considerable power. They function as gatekeepers in a double sense: they are the custodians of the discipline’s standards in teaching, research and training, and they control appointments and tenure decisions. Thus, they bear primary responsibility for shaping
the disciplinary culture on a given campus. Tenured faculty can, in principle, do as they like; but depending on the department, a scholar who devotes significant time and energy to an interdisciplinary enterprise may pay a price in terms of loss of influence and stature, and access to departmental resources. For some individuals, particularly those who have achieved distinction in their fields and whose careers are established, fitting in to the prevailing disciplinary culture is not an issue. But for younger tenured faculty engaged in building academic reputations, and for non-tenured faculty in particular, the pull of the discipline is difficult to resist. Non-tenured scholars with interdisciplinary interests tend to concentrate on work that conforms to established disciplinary standards until they achieve tenure.

The character of disciplinary departments varies widely from one discipline to another and from department to department across universities. But more often than not, the demands placed on younger faculty seeking tenure require them to take the path of expediency, which means playing it safe. There are, of course, exceptions. An environmental economist said he spent a lot of time doing cross-departmental work, “probably to my own detriment.” For his research, he needed to talk to people in science, but when he published an article in a science journal, his departmental colleagues regarded him with suspicion—this was not “economics.” He did not yet have tenure, but he added that he wasn’t committed to an academic career. Economics might be the discipline least interested in cross-disciplinary work. Even so, the economist’s situation is a sharp reminder that younger scholars may well bring more tolerance and openness to disciplinary departments, but they must get past the gatekeepers first.
VII. Observations and Conclusions

This study has looked at the international enterprise as it is, more accurately, as it was, on five campuses in the years when I was doing the site visits for the present project. To some extent, it has also looked at what went before, and thus it has a historical dimension, though it is not a history. The focus on what one reader has called “the ethnographic present,” taking into account the trajectory from past to present, but excluding consideration of subsequent developments, is not without limitations. The narrative stops, but the story continued, and in many instances, the trajectory followed an upward path: there was a success story waiting to be told. In this respect, the account may be unfair to those institutions where an unpromising or tentative start in fact led to something better; but given the purpose of the project, to get a sense of what internationalization meant on the ground, this seemed the best approach. Moreover, for practical reasons, the time frame had to be limited. The site visits could not continue indefinitely, though the temptation to return to a campus one “final” time was hard to resist; and to try to keep up with developments from a distance was neither feasible nor consistent with the project methodology. I did follow up on specific initiatives I had highlighted, both to check on the accuracy of the text and, if the project had been at a critical point when I last heard of it, to catch up in the near-term.

The other principal limitation relates to what I would call the “representativeness” of the faculty I interviewed, apart from administrators with specific jobs and titles, and faculty who were department or program chairs, or project directors. By design, I talked to as many people as I could; though most fell into one of those categories, some did not. Several readers have questioned the extent to which the views put forward by individuals, as representative of a larger group, really did reflect widely held attitudes; in particular, they found suspect the broad characterizations of the intellectual and political climate on campus offered by some of these individuals, and their motives for presenting themselves as spokespersons in the first place. On this point, a reader commented that “the ability to garner the limelight, and what one does when one gets it, seems to be very important here, at least in what ‘narrative’ people tell when asked to summarize the situation.” It is doubtless true that on every campus there were
grandstanders, and certainly I talked to some of them; but those interviews were no less informative than others, no more subject to individual bias that could lead to distortion and occasional misrepresentation. The challenge was how to assess the mix of opinions, attitudes, and distortions, and to understand how they fitted into the broader context. On a related point, there were objections to my lack of specificity in attributing an observation or opinion to "some" or "several" faculty members, with no further identification than a social science or humanities affiliation. From my perspective, this was a way of presenting the spread of opinion I heard on a given campus or across campuses, without citing every individual who expressed some version of every position. Who the individuals were, and how many, was less important than that they articulated a point of view I heard many times over, and which belonged in the picture that was emerging.

What did the picture look like? Though each university was different from every other, some common themes were evident across the five campuses. One was the centrality of money issues. Budgetary and financial considerations were part of the background of every conversation, and sometimes very much to the fore; resources, or the lack thereof, could make or break a fledgling experiment. As the preceding pages have shown, in times of financial constraint, international initiatives were particularly vulnerable to budgetary cuts, both because they remained at the margins of the academic enterprise and because they were heavily dependent on outside funding. To a significant extent, the availability of resources accounted for the fluctuating fortunes of area studies in general and the differing status of regional programs on a single campus. Multi- and cross-disciplinary ventures of all kinds were in the same position: marginal, dependent on outside funding, and therefore fragile. In the case of area studies, money was important, but it was not the only issue. On every campus, tensions between area studies and the social sciences persisted to some degree, particularly in the matter of appointments. Area program directors worried about replacing regional specialists, especially in economics, political science, and sociology, when they retired or left, and about the consequences for area studies of a dwindling social science presence. This was an intellectual issue but one with a financial dimension.
The problematic state of foreign language instruction was another common theme. Everywhere administrators were looking for ways to address a set of concerns that included maintaining undergraduate language offerings at the introductory and intermediate levels; how to maintain at reasonable cost the less commonly taught or difficult languages essential to language and literature departments and regional programs, but with chronically low enrollments; and how to meet the somewhat different needs of students in language departments and in regional and professional programs. Finally, with very few exceptions, there was a common lack of attention to undergraduate curriculum, apart from the repeated resolve to increase the number of students studying abroad.

These concerns were hardly new. Administrators and international studies faculty have been worrying about the same issues for more than 30 years. The question is whether the push to internationalize, and the initiatives that resulted from it, changed the way the issues were addressed, perhaps produced new and better approaches to existing problems; and further, whether internationalization reshaped or expanded the international agenda. In short, what has internationalization accomplished? On the five campuses I looked at, the answer appeared to be not a great deal that was new. This did not mean that nothing changed, rather that it was difficult to find significant change that resulted directly from internationalization initiatives. As always, there were exceptions. In the right circumstances, administrative reorganization could make a difference, particularly when it was accompanied by an infusion of money. If the new structure had the support of the central administration, if the individual who headed it was in a position to be an effective advocate for international projects, a new administrative unit could play a significant role in moving the international agenda forward. This was apparent at Duke, and also at Michigan, in spite of the early travails of the International Institute. But it is worth remembering that in both cases, reorganization brought with it new resources, as well as facilitating access to those already in place. To a considerable degree, administrative restructuring was successful to the extent that it unlocked new money. The other direct consequence of internationalization evident across campuses was, quite simply, a heightened awareness of international programs and activities, and this should not be underestimated. It resulted in large part from the sustained
focus on the university’s international resources by the faculty and administrators who produced the mission statements, reports, and strategic plans for internationalization. Substantively, it meant, or could mean, that administrations turned their attention to longstanding problems and looked for new ways to address them; and if the new awareness seldom brought budgetary reallocations, it often brought more assistance from development offices in seeking external support for international programs. It could also mean greater efforts to inform and attract students to on-campus international programs and opportunities for overseas experiences. A faculty member in a language program at Duke, who was not uncritical of the university’s internationalization initiative, credited it with according her program the departmental status it had long sought. One of her colleagues thought that as a consequence of the initiative, greater numbers of students were going abroad. But here too, money issues were of the first importance. Expressions of support for the international agenda meant little if they were not accompanied by a commitment of resources. This was a common complaint, particularly on campuses where budgets were chronically tight.

Internationalization produced no silver bullets: the perennial problems of international studies remained just that. But the renewed focus on the international and the global highlighted some effective ways to approach those problems, as well as a number of difficult issues requiring further attention. The promising approaches have, for the most part, been flagged along the way; but it makes sense to refer back to them in considering the difficulties that remain. The observations that follow are centered on area or regional studies, foreign language instruction, particularly the less commonly taught languages (LCTLs), and curriculum, though they spill over to some other issues.

To begin with, I should make two general points to frame these remarks, since they are essentially my own response to what I have learned. First, the work I have done on the present project confirms my sense that there is no template for internationalization transferable across institutions. Every university has its own culture, sets its own goals, and devises appropriate means to attain those goals. Universities proceed in terms of what works for them. Furthermore, there is no imperative that requires all universities to internationalize in a comprehensive way. Second, and following from the first point, it
seems misconceived and a mistaken use of resources for institutions to move toward something called “internationalization” or “internationalization across the university” because the competition requires it, particularly if a number of international programs are not already in place. Even if substantial funds have been committed to the initiative, internationalization is expensive, especially if it means creating new programs that will have to be sustained over the long run. Strengthening existing programs is the more sensible strategy, in other words, building on what is already there. Naive advice, I will be told, given the need to compete with one’s peers. But better, and ultimately more credible, to sell one or two solid programs that do in fact exist than to spin out the rhetoric of internationalization over what isn’t there. There is something to be said for truth in advertising.

Much of this study has dealt with area studies and area centers, and there is no need to revisit the earlier discussion. On the campuses I visited, area or regional programs had survived the trials of the mid-to-late 1990s and were reestablishing the place of regional studies in the international studies enterprise. In doing this, some were more successful than others. An accommodation between regional, transnational, and global perspectives was emerging, based on the recognition that the local and the global are interdependent: since globalization takes place locally, it pays to know the local. Nonetheless, tensions between area studies and the social sciences remained, and as social science departments, economics, political science, and sociology in particular, tended to be dominated by theorists, the problem of appointments remained as well. The intellectual debate within and between the social sciences and area studies will play out according to its own dynamic and at its own pace, and this is not the place for prognostication or prophecy. For present purposes, the question for area studies is how to negotiate the roadblocks thrown up by social science departments reluctant to make appointments in regional fields. Here, it should be noted that on every campus, faculty and administrators commented on the greater openness of younger scholars to combining theoretical and regional approaches, adding that they had the theoretical skills to do so. On this point, a regional scholar remarked that “area specialists are more and more linked to important disciplinary theory—they have kept pace—they have had to.” In any case, a generational shift was apparent, and it was hoped that ultimately the new generation of scholars would expand the pool
of candidates for regional appointments. In the near term, multi-purpose appointments that met the needs of more than one department or program were an effective response to the problem. Scholars to fill such positions are not easy to find, and recruiting them is expensive; but the task is not impossible, and the result well worth the effort. In general, less narrowly defined job descriptions would ease the difficulties of recruitment; financial incentives to persuade departments to look beyond core appointments would make this strategy still more attractive. As always, money helps. But not many institutions seemed ready to take the next step, and require that a certain number of departmental appointments be of use to more than one department. Such a policy would not always benefit regional programs, but it would open up the hiring process and provide a broader range of opportunities for scholars with expertise in more than one field. A senior political scientist, who is also a regionalist, thought this was not an entirely utopian scheme.

The money issue raises the question of how much universities are prepared to spend to maintain their area programs. Historically, these programs have been funded by a combination of internal and external support, with the institution very much the junior partner. In the case of Title VI centers, federal dollars are, of course, key, but without funds from other sources, they cannot do much more than provide baseline support. Given the long-term drop in funding from private foundations, the question becomes how much area centers are worth to their host institutions. For well-endowed centers, this is not an issue, but for others it can be a matter of whether and in what form they survive. Not all universities actively support area studies. Some are happy enough to see programs flourish if they can raise their own money, but contribute at most token support. At others, area studies have a history: programs and centers have been in place for 40 years or more, and have long been regarded as a mark of the university’s commitment to international work. In principle, the university has a stake in their survival. But when the traditional funding pattern of international programs and the competing demands of disciplinary departments come into play, area programs are often left to make do as best they can. Intellectual and budgetary priorities shift, resources are limited, and area programs are expensive. Moreover, in recent years, area studies have been distinctly unfashionable. But if a university regards its programs and centers as an asset, it would seem
in the institution’s best interest to ensure that they maintain their integrity and some level of excellence. This is not always easy: for some programs, external circumstances or the difficulty of maintaining core faculty can be fatal, others inevitably self-destruct. But at least, the university can be an enabler: it can provide matching funds for Title VI grants, occasional seed money for projects, assistance in raising outside money. The alternative is to walk away, leaving programs in danger of losing their academic substance, and centers of becoming primarily meeting places for people with an interest in the region. This may be a reasonable role for an area center to play, though it is not what Title VI intended; but the infrastructure needed to sustain the knowledge base and to train students is likely to be lost. The university should be mindful of the risk.

The fragile nature of area programs and, by extension, of the infrastructure required to maintain the regional knowledge base, suggests the possibility of a consortial approach to maintaining the full range of resources for studying a region. To an extent, this is already happening through at least some consortial Title VI centers, which, by pooling faculty and course offerings, can provide the comprehensive regional training, including language instruction, no one partner could offer alone. But not all joint centers have this kind of close collaborative arrangement. An alternative route would be for universities with programs focused on a particular region to agree that one or perhaps two of their number be the center or centers for study of the region: students who wanted advanced training in the field would seek out those institutions. In other words, responsibilities would be divided and shared. To date, universities have not been good at cooperating at the institutional level if it means giving up something they want to do. On this point, an area studies librarian, who served on a committee to coordinate regional collection development, reported that it had not been a great success, not really worth the effort. The bottom line, he said, was that universities were competitive rather than collaborative. But given the rising costs of maintaining specialized programs and library collections, the attractions of institutional collaboration may well increase.

The multiple problems besetting foreign language instruction were sketched out earlier in this discussion. In retrospect, the most striking aspect of the conversations I had with administrators, foreign language faculty, and faculty with a direct interest in foreign language
instruction was the pervasive sense of dissatisfaction running through them. Few people were happy with things as they were, and there was a good deal of unease and uncertainty about the future. That said, the difficult questions related to undergraduate language instruction, in particular the increasing demand for classes in elementary and intermediate Spanish while enrollments in most other languages languished, were not central to this study, though the consequences of such skewed numbers directly affected language departments and the full spectrum of language offerings, including the LCTLs. Consistently low enrollments in Russian, for example, threatened that department’s ability to staff advanced levels of instruction and, in some circumstances, could threaten the department itself.

The LCTLs, or difficult languages, have been the focus of this study, and in these languages enrollments were chronically low. At universities where a number of LCTLs were offered, the question was how to maintain them; at those where few were taught or had become too expensive to continue, ways had to be found to make them available to students. As with regional programs, the decision to teach, or continue teaching, an LCTL, whether through a language and literature department or in some other venue, ultimately came down to whether the institution was prepared to support it. This was a money issue, but also a matter of how much was at stake. Universities with a long-term commitment to international work and a significant number of regional programs had a direct interest in maintaining their status as international universities. This meant continuing to offer a wide spread of languages, including LCTLs, both as a matter of principle and to meet the language needs of regional programs; but ways had to be found to do this cost-effectively. For universities with fewer languages, the decision to add or drop a language, particularly an LCTL, was likely to be a budgetary one. But whether for a large number of languages or a few, outside funds were essential to maintaining instruction in the LCTLs, and the federal government, in particular the Title VI program, was the principal source of support.

Ideally, languages were taught on campus, through a department, a language center, or sometimes a regional program. But where there was no department or a department did not teach an LCTL, there were alternatives, including intensive summer language programs in the United States and in-country, and consortial agreements between
universities that enabled them to share resources, by splitting instruction between neighboring campuses or offering courses through videoconferencing and other forms of distance learning. Free-standing language centers, though ordinarily requiring outside funding at least initially, were equipped with the resources to teach a broad spread of languages and provided an alternative to offering languages through departments; moreover, because they were not tied to departments, they were perhaps better positioned to respond to the needs of varied constituencies. This is an important point, since demand for the LCTLs came largely from students in regional programs, from heritage students, and to a lesser extent from professional students, rather than from students in language and literature programs. In effect, language centers detached certain kinds of language instruction from language and literature departments. The idea of separating or, as one faculty member put it, “decoupling” basic language instruction from departments was proposed by faculty and administrators on several campuses as a means of serving diverse communities of language learners more effectively. The issues are complex and highly political; even so, the approach is worth considering.

Finally, with LCTLs, as with regional studies, universities might eventually want to think about cooperative agreements through which one or two institutions with strong programs in a particular language or languages would become the centers for studying and teaching those languages. Responsibility for preserving the infrastructure for the LCTLs would thus be shared, and costs would be shared as well.

Curriculum has not occupied much space in this study because, on the campuses I visited, it did not occupy much space on the international agenda. The rhetoric of internationalizing the undergraduate curriculum notwithstanding, I heard little about undergraduate programs, except for initiatives funded with outside money, and for the most part these expanded opportunities for students with international interests. General education courses designed to introduce undergraduates to cultures other than their own, the kinds of courses required to educate the global citizen, were nowhere to be found.

The exceptions were Columbia College, which had a major cultures requirement as part of its core curriculum, and Duke, whose revised curriculum included two courses in cross-cultural inquiry and a
language requirement. Here, it should be noted that Columbia College is a liberal arts college of some 4,000 students within Columbia University, and Duke’s undergraduate college of arts and sciences, Trinity College, enrolls about 5,000 students. The relatively small enrollments in the two colleges point to one reason why they have been more successful than larger institutions in incorporating international content into general education curriculum. A second, and related, reason is money. The logistical challenges, and the costs, of mounting a general education curriculum for 25,000–30,000 students should not be underestimated, particularly when the undergraduate population is spread across different schools and colleges, whose students may or may not be subject to the requirement. Changing the mix of courses, or introducing new ones, is both politically difficult and expensive. These issues have already been discussed. But there is, I think, a third reason why research universities have not made much headway in developing a general international curriculum, and this is, quite simply, that there is no consensus about how to do it. (Whether faculty and administrators have tried hard enough to find one is another question.) On many campuses, a language requirement is regarded as the answer; but language can hardly be expected to provide “a window into another culture,” if indeed it ever could, in circumstances where enrollments are declining, students routinely test out of the requirement, and the range of language offerings is shrinking. In terms of international curriculum, language is not a quick fix.\textsuperscript{50} On this point, it is worth mentioning that when I was doing the site visits for this project, I received a query on behalf of the incoming dean of a campus I had visited, asking if I knew of any universities that had in place programs that gave all undergraduates a meaningful experience of another culture. The dean was looking for models, and evidently they were hard to find.

If the obstacles to introducing an international perspective into general education courses are indeed insurmountable, universities might do well to focus on other aspects of the undergraduate curriculum, and, I would add, to dispense with the rhetoric of the global citizen, which in any case has never had much substance. There are other strategies, whether strengthening existing programs or developing new ones. But the emphasis should be on what is doable.

For administrations, the major issue is probably whether to commit available resources to programs reaching a larger or smaller number of students, or some mix of both. Two programs mentioned earlier, at the University of Iowa and the University of Washington, illustrate the alternatives. The project at UI was designed to increase the international content in courses across the university; it targeted high-enrollment courses in an effort to introduce a relatively large number of students to the international aspects of their fields of study. The Sichuan project at UW provided a small number of students with an intensive international experience, including language training and a year of study and research in China. Apart from the differing goals of the two projects, the Sichuan project was significantly more expensive. It was launched with a large grant from the university and substantial outside funding, and while it reached fewer students, the cost per student was far higher. UI’s project had a price as well, in the form of incentive grants for participating faculty, but it cost much less, both in absolute terms and cost per student. These two projects represent the opposite ends of the spectrum; on every campus, faculty and administration must decide which direction to take, and it need not always be the same. The important point is that the university make some commitment to international programming, financial as well as rhetorical. Without that commitment, starting at the top levels of administration, there is not much hope that deans and department chairs, who are the key actors, will find it worth their while to develop and support international initiatives. And without their active involvement, there will not be much encouragement for faculty to become engaged in international work. Ultimately, universities are about faculty and students, though at times that may seem like a questionable assertion. To the extent that the idea of internationalization or internationalizing the university has any reality, faculty and students must buy into it; and for that to happen, university administrations must begin to take the international agenda seriously.

51 See above, 37–39.
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